Design of drilling contracts-Economic incentives and safety issues

Energy Policy

Volumn 34, Issue 15, 2006, Pages 2324-2329

  Osmundsen, Petter ^a   Toft, Anders ^b   Agnar Dragvik, Kjell ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

^b NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM DIRECTORATE   (Norway)

Author keywords

Drilling contracts; Financial incentives; Safety

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; DRILLING RIGS; ENERGY POLICY; FINANCE; SAFETY FACTOR;

DRILLING CONTRACTOR; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; RIG CONTRACTS;

OIL WELL DRILLING;

DRILLING; FINANCE; SAFETY;

EID: 33646541074     PISSN: 03014215     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2005.04.011     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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