Does more deterrence require more punishment? [or should the punishment fit the crime?]

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 143-156

  Henderson, John ^a   Palmer, John P ^b  

^a Lambton College   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Crime; Deterrence; Punishment

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646453523     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1013628803560     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. See the Winter 1996 Symposium on "The Economics of Crime" in The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 10, Number 1, especially Isaac Ehrlich, "Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses," and the references contained therein.
2. The most recent exposition of this analysis is provided by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 45-76. Unfortunately, these writers seem unaware of the potential aggregation problem, going from the individual to the societal level of analysis.
3. The traditional models are usually written in terms of fines and expected fines. We tend to carry on this terminology in this paper, but there is no reason that the analysis would not apply equally to other forms of punishment.
4. We assume that the option for comparison is not committing the crime. It is likely, of course, that for many criminals the choice is which crime to commit. In such cases, the result of increased deterrence of one particular crime will be simply be an increase in some other crime, not necessarily less serious than the one deterred.
5. The curves are straight lines for risk neutral, convex from below for risk averse, and concave from below for risk-seeking individuals.
6. Samuel Cameron (1988), "The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Kyklos 41, 301-323.
7. Samuel Cameron Op. cit., 1996.Kyklos
8. Daniel Kessler and Steven D. Levitt (1999), "Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation," Journal of Law and Economics 42, 343-363.
9. Isaac Ehrlich and Zhiqiang Liu (1999), "Sensitivity Analysis of the Deterrence Hypothesis: Let's Keep the Econ in Econometrics," Journal of Law and Economics 42, 455-487.
10. A. Mitchell Polinski and Steven Shavell (1999), "On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence," Journal of Legal Studies 28, 1-16;
11. see also Note 2, supra.
12. 0.
13. However, consider the situation in which collecting the fine is costless so that s = 0. In this case the isocost is horizontal, and the outcome for equilibrium depends on the shape of the isoquant map associated with the production function D(p, f). If the isocost turns upward (i.e., the marginal productivity of collecting fines becomes negative eventually), there would still be a limit to the optimal size of the fine. But if the isocost never turns up, no matter how large the fine, then the optimal fine would be infinite when s = 0. see Palmer and Henderson (1998), "The Economics of Cruel and Unusual Punishment," European Journal of Law and Economics 5, 235-245.
14. See, for example, Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen (1997), Law and Economics (2nd edition), Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley.
15. In addition to the references provided supra Notes 1, 6, and 7, see Vijay K. Mathur (1978), "Economics of Crime: An Investigation of the Deterrent Hypothesis for Urban Areas," Review of Economics and Statistics 60, 59-66;
16. Paul E. Tracy, Mervin E. Wolfgang, and Robert M. Figlio (1990), Delinquency Careers in Two Birth Cohorts, New York, Plenum Press,
17. Richard T. Wright and Scott H. Decker (1994), Burglars on the Job, Boston, Northeastern University Press, especially pp 91ff.
18. H Con Resolution 105. September 29, 1995.
19. The CTV/National Angus Reid Poll, "Crime and the Justice System", July 27, 1997; http://www.angusreid. com/media/content/displaypr. cfm?id_to_view=842.