Rent seeking

IMF Staff Papers

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 28-49

  Chakraborty, Shankha ^a   Dabla Norris, Era ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OREGON   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646425320     PISSN: 10207635     EISSN: 15645150     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (32)

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