Righting wrongs

South Atlantic Quarterly

Volumn 103, Issue 2-3, 2004, Pages 523-581

  Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 33646422167     PISSN: 00382876     EISSN: 15278026     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/00382876-103-2-3-523     Document Type: Review

References (113)

1. This essay was originally presented in the Oxford Amnesty Lectures series "Human Rights, Human Wrongs," Spring 2001
2. George Shelton incidentally provides a gloss on the native English-speaker's take on the word wrong in Morality and Sovereignty in the Philosophy of Hobbes (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 128-29
3. See also D. D. Raphael, "Hobbes on Justice," in G. A. J. Rodgers and Alan Ryan, eds., Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 164-65
4. Alex Callinicos gives other examples of social Darwinism in Social Theory: A Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999)
5. Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 217n 33.This is a much-revised version of earlier work. The initial thinking and writing of the piece took place in 1982-83. In other words, I have been thinking of the access to the European Enlightenment through colonization as an enablement for twenty-odd years. I am so often stereotyped as a rejecter of the Enlightenment that I feel obliged to make this dear at the outset. But I thought of this particular method of access to the Enlightenment as a violation as well. In 1992, I presented "Thinking Academic Freedom in Gendered Post-Coloniality" in Cape Town, where I laid out the idea of ab-using the Enlightenment, in ways similar to but not identical with the present argument. (That essay is being reprinted in Jane Huber, Political Anthropology (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming). The editor describes it as "prescient" about South Africa, because it was presented as early as 1992. She describes the piece as the "sting in the tail of her collection," because Spivak, contrary to her stereotype, recommends using the Enlightenment from below.) This, then, was a decade ago. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why I hang in with Derrida, because here is one critic of ethnocentrism (Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976], 3) who continues, as I remarked in "Responsibility," to indicate the danger and bad faith in a wholesale rejection of the Enlightenment (Spivak, "Responsibility," boundary 2 31.3 [Fall 1994]: 38-46). My double-edged attitude to the European Enlightenment is thus not a sudden change of heart
6. Mel James, "Country Mechanisms of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights," in Yael Danieli, Elsa Stamatopoulou, and Clarence J. Dias, eds., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Fifty Years and Beyond (Amityville, NY: Baywood Publishing, 1999). 76-77
7. Cited in Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 79
8. The identity of the nation and the state is generally associated with the Peace of Westphalia (1648), often thought of as one of the inaugurations of the Enlightenment. See, for example, R. Paul Churchill, "Hobbes and the Assumption of Power," in Peter Caws, ed., The Causes of Quarrel: Essays on Peace, War, and Thomas Hobbes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 17
9. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
10. I have written about this class in Spivak, A Critique, 392. They are not only involved in righting wrongs, of course. The head of the Space Vehicle Directorate's innovative concepts group, behind George W. Bush's new space war initiative, is a model minority dias-poric; hardly righting wrongs!
11. I am not tendentious in being critical of this. Ian Martin, secretary-general of Amnesty International from 1986 to 1992, is similarly critical. See Ian Martin, "Closer to the Victim: United Nations Human Rights Field Operations," in Danieli, Stamatopoulou, and Dias, Universal Declaration, 92
12. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, Power, 170
13. Edward W. Said, Refiections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), xi. It is interesting that Mary Shelley calls imperial Rome the "capital of the world, the crown of man's achievements" (The Last Man [London: Pickering, 1996], 356). I am grateful to Lecia Rosenthal for this reference
14. Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley, eds., On Human Rights (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 127
15. see also, Kuan Yew Lee, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000 (New York: Harper, 2000); the sentiment about detention is to be found on page 488
16. Meanwhile, general pieces like Asbjorn Eide, "Historical Significance of the Universal Declaration," International Social Science Journal 50.4 (December 1998): 475-96, share neither Rorty's wit nor the realism of the rest
17. I think there is something like a relationship between these and the "tutored preferences" discussed in Philip Kitcher, Science, Truth, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 118-19. Professor Kitcher is speaking of an ideal community of tax-paying citizens and he is concerned about "well-ordered science," whereas I will be speaking of students in general, including the rural poor in the global South. Even with these differences, I would argue that "transmitting information" (118) would not necessarily lead to a tutoring of preferences. This is part of a more general interrogation of "consciousness raising" as a basis for social change
18. It is not a coincidence that Nussbaum became aware of poor women by way of a stint at the educational wing of the UN (Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life [PJ] [Boston: Beacon Press, 1995], xv-xvi and 123n 4)
19. She went to India "to learn as much as [she] could about women's development projects" and worked through interpreters in order to find both a philosophical justification for universalism and to draw conclusions about the pros and cons of public interest litigation. (Her book ends with three legal case studies.) The "case"-s are exceptional subalterns prepared by SEWA-one of the most spectacular social experiments in the third world. I have mentioned elsewhere that this organization is the invariable example cited when microcredit lenders are questioned about their lack of social involvement (Spivak, "Claiming Transformations: Travel Notes with Pictures," in S. Ahmed, J. Kilby, M. McNeil, and B. Skeggs, eds., Transformations: Thinking through Feminism [London: Routledge, 2000], 119-30)
20. It is not without significance that her models are social-realist novels and Walt Whitman read as expository prose. Wordsworth's project was pedagogic - to change public taste (742-45).There is not a word about pedagogy in Nussbaum's text. Like many academic liberals she imagines that everyone feels the same complicated pleasures from a Dickens text. As a teacher of reading, my entire effort is to train students away from the sort of characterological plot summary approach that she uses. In the brief compass of a note I am obliged to refer the reader to my reading of Woolf in "Deconstruction and Cultural Studies: Arguments for a Deconstruc-tive Cultural Studies," in Nicholas Royle, ed., Deconstructions (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 14-43
21. Jamaica Kincaid in "Thinking Cultural Questions in 'Pure' Literary Terms," in Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, Lawrence Grossberg, Angela McRobbie, eds.. Without Guarantees: In Honor of Stuart Hall (London: Verso, 2000), 335-57
22. and Maryse Condé in "The Staging of Time in Maryse Condé's Heremakhonon" (forthcoming in Cultural Studies) for accounts of such teaching. The only rhetorical reading Nussbaum performs is of Judge Posner's opinion on Mary Carr v. GM (PJ 104-n). (The piece in Royle will also give a sense of my activist reading of the poiesis/istoria argument in Aristotle.) I have remarked that, in the context of "Indian women," "education" is a contentless good for Nussbaum. In the context of her own world, the "moral education" offered by literature is simply there (PJ 84)
23. Anthony de Reuck comments on the discontinuity between subaltern and elite (using a "periphery/center" vocabulary) as "styles of perceptual incoherence . . . on the threshold of a cultural anthropology of philosophical controversy" and veers away from it: "That, as they say, is another story!" (de Reuck, "Culture in Conflict," in Caws, Causes of Quarrel, 59-63). My essay lays out the practical politics of that other story, if you like. The superiority of Northern epistemes, however, remains an implicit presupposition. Jonathan Glover analyzes the possibility of the Nazi mindset in numbing detail and discusses Rwanda with no reference to a mental theater at all (Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (London: Jonathan Cape, 1999). Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink vary their definition of the domestic as "below" by considering freedom of expression only in the case of Eastern Europe and not in the cases of Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, Philippines, Chile, and Guatemala. The luxury of an expressive or contaminable mind is implicitly not granted to the subaltern of the global South
24. This forgetfulness is the condition and effect of the simple value judgment that rights thinking is superior - "fitter." Social psychology is now producing abundant retroactive "proof" that each separate "developing" culture is "collective" whereas "America" (syn-ecdochically the United States) and "Europe" (synecdochically northwestern Europe and Scandinavia) is "individualistic. " This "collectivism" is a trivialization of the thinking of responsibility I shall discuss below. "Multiculturalism" (synecdochically "global" if we remember the important role of upward mobility among diasporics and the economically restructured New World) is now factored into this authoritative and scientific division, although all comparisons relating to actually "developing" countries is resolutely bilateral between one nation/state/culture and the Euro-U.S. The sampling techniques of such work is pathetic in their suggestive nudging of the informant groups to produce the required "evidence" (Susan M. Ervin-Tripp, John J. Gumperz, Dan I. Slobin, Jan Bruk-man, Keith Kernan, Claudia Mitchell, and Brian Stross, A Field Manual for Cross-Cultural Study of the Acquisition of Communicative Competence, second draft - July 1967 [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967]
25. Geert H. Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991]
26. Saburo Iwawaki, Yoshihisa Kashima, and Kwok Leung, eds., Innovations in Cross-Cultural Psychology [Amsterdam: Swets and Zeit-linger, 1992]
27. Gail McKoon and Roger Ratcliff, "The Minimalist Hypothesis: Directions for Research," in Charles A. Weaver III, Suzanne Mannes, Charles Fletcher, eds., Discourse Comprehension: Essays in Honor of Walter Kintsch [Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum, 1995], 97-116
28. Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," in Annual Review of Sociology 23 [1997]: 263-87
29. Huong Nguyen, Lawrence Messé, and Gary Stollak, "Toward a More Complex Understanding of Acculturation and Adjustment: Cultural Involvements and Psychosocial Functioning in Vietnamese Youth," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 30.1 [January 1999]: 5-31
30. Arie W. Kruglanski and Donna M.Webster, "Motivated Closing of the Mind: 'Seizing' and 'Freezing,'" in E. Tory Higgins and Arie W. Kruglanski, eds., Motivational Science: Social and Personality Perspectives [Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2000], 354-75
31. Hong Ying-yi, Michael W. Morris, Chiu Chi-yue, and Veronica Benet-Martinez, "Multicultural Minds: A Dynamic Constructivist Approach to Culture and Cognition," American Psychologist 55 [July 2000]: 709-20.) The sophistication of the vocabulary and the poverty of the conclusions rest on an uncritical idea of the human mind. We cannot ask social psychology to become qualitative cognitive psychology or philosophical ontology. Yet these sorts of academic subdisciplinary endeavor, especially when confidently offered up by female diasporics (my last terrifying encounter with this type of scholarship came from a young intelligent innocent confident power-dressed Hong Kong Chinese woman trained in California), directly or indirectly sustain the asymmetrical division between "Human Rights" and "Human Wrongs" that inform our title. The division that we are speaking of is a class division dissimulated as a cultural division in order to recode the unequal distribution of agency. In that context I am suggesting that the begging of the question of human nature/freedom, much discussed when the question of human rights was confined to Europe, has been withheld from a seemingly culturally divided terrain not only by dominant political theorizing and policymaking, but also by disciplinary tendencies. Alex Callinicos, whom no one would associate with deconstruction, places the nature/polity hesitation as the conflict at the very heart of the European Enlightenment, arguing its saliency for today on those grounds (Callinicos, Social Theory, 25, 26, 29, 31, 37, 67, 83, 178, 179)
32. Thomas Paine, Rights of Man; Common Sense (New York: Knopf, 1994), 38
33. Derrida, "Force of Law," in David Gray Carlson, Drucilla Cornell, and Michel Rosen-feld, eds., Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York: Routledge, 1992), 3-67
34. Benjamin's essay is included in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1978), 277-300
35. Derrida shows how Benjamin attempts to solve the problem both on the "universal" register (the new state) and the "singular" register (his own signature). In terms of the text's relationship to the subsequent development of a full-fledged Nazism, Derrida offers an alternative reading. Most readings (including Derrida's) miss Benjamin's conviction that "the educative power" is a "form of appearance" (Erscheinungsform) of what Benjamin calls "divine power," because it breaks the crime/expiation chain that the law deals with. And yet the educative does not depend on miracles for its definition (Walter Benjamin, "The Critique of Violence," in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken, 1986), 297; I am reading enlsünden as breaking with the unavoidable link between guilt and expiation - Schuld and Sühne - rather than as "expiate," as in the English text, a translation that renders Benjamin's argument absurd. I thank Andreas Huyssen for corroborating my reading. The reader will see the connection between the guilt-and-shame of human rights enforcement, and our hope in the displacing power of education
36. Ernst Bloch, Natural Law and Human Dignity, trans. Dennis J. Schmidt (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986); quotation from 263
37. Michel Foucault, "The Masked Philosopher," in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Routledge, 1988), 323-30
38. Derrida, "My Chances/Mes Chances: A Rendezvous with Some Epicurean Stereophonies," in Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan, eds., Taking Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis, and Literature (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 1-32
39. For the Nietzschean moment, see Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (New York: Verso, 1997), 79-80. It is of course silly to call Zeno and Epicurus "colonial subjects," or Aristotle - who never became an Athenian citizen - a "resident alien." The point I am trying to make is that the removal of the Austro-Asiatic aboriginals from the Indo-European colonizing loop - the narrative behind Indian constitutional policy - was active when Epicurus the Athenian from Samos, hugging the coast of Turkey, whose parents emigrated from Athens as colonists, and Zeno the Phoenician from Syrian Cyprus - both places the object of constant imperial grab-shifts - came to Athens to be educated and subsequently to found their philosophies. As I will go on to elaborate, these Indian aboriginals are among the disenfranchised groups whose contemporary educational situation seems crucial to the general argument of this essay. I discuss the resultant process of atrophy and stagnation at greater length later in this essay
40. Gregory Elliott puts together two distanced assertions by Louis Althusser to sharpen the latter's sense of Machiavelli's uncanny engagement with this problematic: "Machia-velli's 'endeavour to think the conditions of possibility of an impossible task, to think the unthinkable' induces 'a strange vacillation in the traditional philosophical status of [his] theoretical propositions: as if they were undermined by another instance than the one that produces them - the instance of political practice'" (Elliott, "Introduction," in Louis Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, trans. Gregory Elliott [London: Verso, 1999], xviii). Althus-ser attempts to fix Machiavelli's place upon this chain of displacements (123-26)
41. See also Adam D. Danel, A Casefor Freedom: Machiavellian Humanism (New York: University Press of America, 1997)
42. For the Hobbes-Bramhill debate, see Vere Chappell, ed., Hobbes and Bramhill on Liberty and Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
43. David Gauthier provides an interesting way of linking Hobbes and Paine (Gauthier, "Hobbes's Social Contract," in Rodgers and Ryan, Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, 126-27, 148)
44. George Shelton, Morality and Sovereignty, 20, 86-87, 175- "Fiction" and "reality" are Shelton's words. By indicating the slippage Shelton makes room for my more radical position - that the fiction marks the begging of the question that produces the "real."
45. Patricia Springborg, "Hobbes on Religion," in Tom Sorell, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 354-60
46. see also Arrigo Pacchi, "Hobbes and the Problem of God," in Rodgers and Ryan, Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, 182-87. Balibar suggests a double Hobbes: one in whose writings the violence of original sin was always ready to burst forth; and another who saw law immanent in natural self-interest and competition (private communication); a version, perhaps, of the discontinuity about which I am speaking
47. In his reading of Rousseau in Of Grammatology Derrida has indicated Rousseau's place on this chain (trans. Spivak [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976], 95-316)
48. Locke's view of natural rights is another well-known concatenation on this chain (see John Locke, Questions Concerning the Law of Nature, trans. Diskin Clay [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990] for how Locke taught the issue; for a scholarly account
49. see A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992]). Balibar suggests that, by "privatizing nature on the one hand [as] he is also socializing it," Locke is able to reconcile natural society and artificial community ("'Possessive Individualism' Reversed: From Locke to Derrida," forthcoming in Constellations)
50. For a contemporary discussion of the chain from at least Roman law, Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) remains indispensable. This is of course a layperson's checklist, not a specialist bibliography
51. Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 128
52. I have argued this in Imperatives to Reimagine the Planet (Vienna: Passagen, 1999)
53. Gewirth, Human Rights, 45
54. Derrida has discussed this with reference to Leibnitz in his "The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils," Diacritics 13.3 (Fall 1983): 7-10
55. emphasis mine. Reason as "white mythology" is the informing argument of Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 207-271
56. "The ability to make fine-grained predictions indicates that the task is unlikely to be error-tolerant" (Kitcher, Science, 23-24). The effort I am speaking of must be error-tolerant, in teacher, trainer, trained, and taught, since we are speaking of cultural shift, and thus a shift in the definition of error
57. Spivak, Imperatives, 68. Marshall Sahlins lays out the general characteristics of these defects in his Stone Age Economics (New York: de Gruyter, 1972). Sahlins also points at the obvious absence of a "public sphere" in such social formations. I am grateful to Henry Staten for bringing this book to my attention
58. As I will mention later in connection with Anthony Giddens's Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), I am not extolling the virtues of poverty, not even the Christian virtues of poverty, as does Sahlins by association (Stone Age, 32-33). I am only interested in bringing those virtues above, and concurrently instilling the principles of a public sphere below; teaching at both ends of the spectrum. For, from the point of view of the asymmetry of what I am calling class apartheid in the global South, a responsibility-based disenfranchised stagnating culture left to itself can only be described, in its current status within the modern nation-state, as "a reversal of'possessive individualism'," the tragedy "of 'negative' individuality or individualism" (Etienne Balibar, "'Possessive Individualism' Revisited: [An Issue in Philosophical Individualism]," unpublished manuscript)
59. Marx, "Concerning Feuerbach," in Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone (New York: Vintage, 1975), 422; translation modified
60. Marx, "The Trinity Formula," in Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3, trans. David Fembach (New York: Vintage, 1981), 953-70
61. I will be developing this concept-metaphor of suturing as a description of practice. To situate this within Marxist thought, see Callinicos's gloss on Marx's discussion of religion: "Religious illusions. . . will survive any purely intellectual refutation so long as the social conditions which produced them continue to exist" (Callinicos, Social Theory, 83-84)
62. Interestingly enough, this very passage was used in a speech entitled "Responsibility: The Price of Greatness" by Anthony F. Earley Jr., Detroit Edison Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, at a conference on Business Ethics, Integrity and Values: A Global Perspective, on March 23, 1999. Churchill's own speech, made at Harvard on Monday September 6, 1943, was precisely about the United States as the savior of the world: "One cannot rise to be in many ways the leading community in the civilised world without being involved in its problems, without being convulsed by its agonies and inspired by its causes." I am grateful to Lecia Rosenthal for bringing these connections to my attention. The point of my humble experiment is that the textural imperatives of such responsibility, acknowledged in the national political and corporate sphere, the internalized reflex "to save the environment," for example, do not follow automatically
63. "Muddying the Waters," available online at www.amnesty.it/ ailib/aipub/1998/IOR/ 14000298.htm; emphasis mine
64. For a discussion of the contradiction between individualism (rights) and communality (obligations) when they are seen in a linear way, see Tuck, Natural Rights, 82
65. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Inßnity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969 [first French edition 1961]), 255-66
66. Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other; or, the Prosthesis of Origin, trans. Patrick Mensah (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 70-72
67. Indeed, that sentiment is implicit in the very last line of Spivak, A Critique: "The scholarship on Derrida's ethical turn. . . . when in the rare case it risks setting itself to work by breaking its frame, is still not identical with the setting to work of deconstruction outside the formalizing calculus specific to the academic institution" ( 431). It must, however, be said, that in European from-above discussions, it is the so-called poststructuralists who are insistent not only on questioning a blind faith in the rational abstractions of democracy, but also in recognizing that top-down human rights enforcement is not "democratic" even by these terms. See, for example, the strong objections raised by Foucault, Lyotard, and Derrida after Claude Lefort's claim that "[a] politics of human rights and a democratic politics are thus two ways of responding to the same need" (Claude Lefort, "Politics of Human Rights," in The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, trans. Alan Sheridan [Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986], 272
68. The discussion is to be found in "La question de la democratic" in Denis Kambouchner, ed., Le Retrait du politique [Paris: Galilée, 1983], 71-88). I have recently read Derrida, "Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the German," where Derrida traces the genealogy of the Euro-U.S. subject who dispenses human rights, with uncanny clarity
69. (in Acts of Religion, trans. Gil Anidjar [New York: Routledge, 2002], 135-88)
70. Giddens, Beyond Left and Right
71. quotations from 165, 247, 184, 185, 190, 194. "Third Way" was, I believe, coined in a Fabian Society pamphlet (Tony Blair, New Politics for the New Century [London: College Hill Press, 1998]) confined to policies of a European Britain. I am grateful to Susan M. Brook for getting me this pamphlet. It was used by Bill Clinton in a round-table discussion sponsored by the Democratic Leadership Council in Washington, D.C., on April 25, 1999
72. I have discussed the role of teaching in the formation of collectivities in "Schmitt and Post Stucturalism: A Response," Cardozo Law Review 21.5-6 (May 2000): 1723-37. Necessary but impossible tasks - like taking care of health although it is impossible to be immortal; or continuing to listen, read, write, talk, and teach although it is impossible that everything be communicated - lead to renewed and persistent effort. I use this formula because this is the only justification for Humanities pedagogy. This is distinct from the "utopian mode," which allows us to figure the impossible
73. John Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," in Shute and Hurley, On Human Rights, 56.I have a pervasive objection to Rawls's discipline-bound philosophical style of treating political problems but felt nervous about stating it. I feel some relief in George Shelton, Morality and Sovereignly, 171, where the author expresses similar objections. Callinicos describes such Rawlsian requirements as "wildly Utopian," offers an excuse, and then goes on to say "nevertheless, some account is required of the relationship between abstract norms and the historical conditions of their realization" (Social Theory, 313-14)
74. Marx, Capital 3:1015-16 puts it in a paragraph, in the mode of "to come."
75. I gave an account of this so-called postState world in A Critique, 371-94
76. Daniel M. Farrell, "Hobbes and International Relations," in Caws, Causes of Quarrel, 77
77. For an idea of the best in the Cultural Studies account of globalization, see Public Culture 12.1 (Winter 2000)
78. Pat Smith and Lynn Roney, Wow the Dow! The Complete Guide to Teaching Your Kids How to Invest in the Stock Market (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 18.
79. Some other books are Robert T. Kiyosaki with Sharon L. Lechter, Rich Dad Poor Dad: What the Rich Teach Their Kids about Money - That the Poor and Middle Class Do Not! (New York: Warner Books, 2000)
80. Gail Karlitz and Debbie Honig, Growing Money: A Complete Investing Guidefor Kids (New York: Price Stern Sloan, 1999)
81. Diane Mayr, The Everything Kids' Money Book: From Saving to Spending to Investing - Learn All about Money! (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corp., 2000)
82. Emmanuel Modu and Andrea Walker, Teenvestor.com: The Practical Investment Guidefor Teens and Their Parents (Newark: Gateway, 2000)
83. Willard S. and William S. Stawski, Kids, Parents and Money: Teaching Personal Finance from Piggy Bank to Prom (New York: John Wiley, 2000)
84. Janet Bamford, Street Wise: A Guide for Teen Investors (New York: Bloomberg, 2000). This information is taken from my "Globalizing Globalization," forthcoming in Rethinking Marxism
85. Here are passages from one of many undergraduate textbooks (Henry Assael, Consumer Behavior and Marketing Action [Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing, 1995]). This is standard Cultural Studies stuff, but the reminder remains necessary. the banality of these excerpts reminds us not to be absurdly out of touch when a Giddens counsels "antiproductivism": "In a study, Campbell's Soup found that the men who are most likely to shop view themselves as liberated, considerate, achievement-oriented individuals. These are the types of males who do not feel the need to conform to a 'macho' image. As a result, a second change has occurred in male purchasing roles: Males are beginning to buy products that at one time might have been dismissed as too feminine - jewelry, skin care products, moisturizers, and cosmetics. In marketing these products, advertisers have had to depict males in a way that is very different from the traditional strong, masculine image of the Marlboro Cowboy or in the typical beer commercial. A new concept of masculinity has emerged - the sensitive male who is as vulnerable in many ways as his female counterpart. As a result, a growing number of advertisers have begun telling males that being sensitive and caring does not conflict with masculinity" (386). "Psychoanalytic theory stresses the unconscious nature of consumer motives as determined in childhood by the conflicting demands of the id and the superego. Marketers have applied psychoanalytic theory by using depth and focus group interviews and projective techniques to uncover deep-seated purchasing motives. These applications are known as motivation research" (404). "The broadest environmental factor affecting consumer behavior is culture, as reflected by the values and norms society emphasizes. Products and services such as Levi jeans, Coca-Cola, and McDonald's fast-food outlets have come to symbolize the individuality inherent in American values.This is one reason why East Germans quickly accepted Coke after the fall of the Berlin Wall" (451). This is the dominant general global cultural formation, appropriating the emergent - feminism, psychoanalysis, cultural studies, now environmentalism - remember my humble experiment in the Columbia gym and take a look at Ruth La Ferla, "Fashionistas, Ecofriendly and All-Natural" (New York Timesy 15, 2001). The Derrida-Levinas line, if it were understood as a cultural formation rather than an ethical phenomenology, is an altogether minor enclave compared to this and will show up transmogrified on the dominant register any day now
86. John P. Clark, Going with the Cash Flow: Taoism and the New Managerial Wisdom
87. available online a www.britannica.com (viewed May 2000), and Thomas V. Morris, If Aristotle Ran General Motors: The New Soul of Business (New York: Henry Holt, 1997). Examples can be multiplied
88. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1981), 29-31
89. "Our Voice," Bangkok NGO Declaration, available online at www.nativenet.uthsca.edu/ archive/nl/9307
90. I believe because Marshal Sahlins intuits this that he defends Marcel Mauss's Essay on the Gift against disciplinary criticism of form and/or content, although he recognizes that it "is an idiosyncratic venture . . . , unjustified moreover by any special study of the Maori or of the philosophers. . . invoked along the way." Sahlins is writing about the economic calculus, but in his comments on Mauss, he touches responsibility, only to transform it, via Mauss, into the principle of reason (Sahlins, Stone Age, 149, 168-69, 175). As for himself, he ends his book in the mode of a supplemented capitalism "to come": "A primitive theory of exchange value is also necessary, and perhaps possible - without saying it yet exists" (314). This is consonant with my sense that the ethical push for socialism must come from cultural formations defective for capitalism
91. Justine Burley, ed., The Genetic Revolution and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
92. I am no philosopher, but this is undoubtedly why the later Wittgenstein was interested in children's acquisition of language (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1972 [1953]) paragraphs 1-32, 200, 208). To mention the part of the mind that dreams would be to muddy the waters with arguments for and against Freud
93. Luce Irigaray, "The Fecundity of the Caress," in Richard A. Cohen, ed., Face to Face with Levinas (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), 231-56
94. This case has been discussed in Spivak, "The New Subaltern: A Silent Interview," in Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial, ed. Vinayak Chaturvedi (London: Verso, 2000), 335-36
95. and in Spivak, "Discussion: An Afterword on the New Subaltern," in Partha Chatterjee and Pradeep Jeganathan, eds., Community, Gender, and Violence: Subaltern Studies XI (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 324-40
96. Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Surveys From Exile, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Vintage, 1973), 147; translation modified
97. Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Crimes-War, Crimes-Peace," in Shute and Hurley, Human Rights, 84
98. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), x; the next passage quoted is on 60.I am not, of course, speaking of the provenance of social contract theories but rather of historical variations on something like actual social contracts
99. Paine, Rights of Man, 79
100. William Sacksteder, "Mutually Acceptable Glory," in Caws, Causes of Quarrel, 103
101. For an uncritical summary of this cultural formation as universal history, see Ronald Reagan, "Free Enterprise," Radio Essay (1979), retrieved from www.newyorktimes.com
102. We should not forget that Kant fixed the subject of the Enlightenment as one who could write for posterity and the whole world as a scholar (Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment" in James Schmidt, ed., What Is Enlightenment Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996], 60-61). As the reader will see, our effort is to suture a cultural inscription rather unlike Kant's into the thinking and practice of the public sphere and an education that will not preserve class apartheid. An unintended posterity, a world not imagined by him as participant in the cosmopolitical
103. Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Minute on Indian Education," in Speeches by Lord Macaulay with his Minute on Indian Education (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), 349. When Khushwant Singh, an Indian writer in English, opined last year that you could say "blue sky" a million different ways in English, whereas in Hindi you could only say "neela asman," I realized the failure of Vidyasagar's experiment.The problem, then as now, is the one I have already indicated: one English, the superb and supple, technologically adroit language of the victor; the many languages of the vanquished; restricted permeability. Going down is easy; coming up is hard. The Ford Foundation can run a program called "Crossing Borders." But the literatures in the domestic languages are dying. And even this is a middle-class matter. Let us go back to the rural poor
104. Iswarchandra Vidyasagar, Barnaparichaya (Calcutta: Benimadhab Sheel, n.d.)
105. Binaybhushan Ray, "'Shikkhashar' theke 'Barnaparichaya' - Shomajer Shange Shishu-Patthyer Paribartan" Akadami Patrika 6 (May 1994): 12-62, makes no mention of the experimental pedagogy of the text and the Xeroxes seem to have been obtained from the India Office Library in London
106. For self-ethnography, see Rosalind Morris, In the Place of Origins: Modernity and Its Mediums in Northern Thailand (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000)
107. I have explained this phenomenon in "Megacity," Grey Room, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 8-25
108. W. E. B. DuBois, "Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others," in The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Signet, 1995 [1903]), 78-95
109. Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of Children, trans. Marjorie Gabain (New York: Free Press, 1965), 406.This difference between saying and doing is often honored by the best sayers. Thus Sahlins distinguishes between "a conventional metaphor of exposition" and "a true history of experiment"
110. (Sahlins, Stone Age, 192)
111. Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986 [1953])
112. This point cannot be developed here. Please see Spivak, "From Haverstock Hill Flat to U.S. Classroom, What's Left of Theory" in Judith Butler John Guillory, Kendall Thomas, eds., What's Left of Theory New Work on the Politics of Literary Theory (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1-40
113. For an example of involving the children of exploitation in intense matha khatano on the other side, see John Tierney, "Here Come the Alpha Pups," New York Times Magazine, August 5, 2001, 38-43