Information perception and price dynamics in a continuous double auction

Simulation and Gaming

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 195-208

  Rouchier, Juliette ^a   Robin, Stéphane ^b  

^a Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

^b GATE Lyon Saint Etienne   (France)

Author keywords

Agent based simulation; Continuous double auction; Experimental economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646416746     PISSN: 10468781     EISSN: 1552826X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1046878106287947     Document Type: Article

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