Assortative matching with explicit search costs

Econometrica

Volumn 74, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 667-680

  Atakan, Alp E ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Assignment; Assortative matching; Search frictions; Supermodularity; Transferable utility

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646384733     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00678.x     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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