Optimal mechanisms with finite agent types

Management Science

Volumn 52, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 788-803

  Lovejoy, William S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Auctions; Finite types; Mechanism design; Nonlinear pricing; Principal agent; Supermodularity

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; AUCTIONS; MECHANISM DESIGN; NONLINEAR PRICING;

FUNCTIONS; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING;

NUMERICAL ANALYSIS;

EID: 33646351968     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1050.0502     Document Type: Article

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