Regulation, more Regulation, Partial Deregulation, and Reregulation: The Disequilibrating Nature of a Rent-Seeking Society

Advances in Austrian Economics

Volumn 8, Issue , 2005, Pages 105-143

  Benson, Bruce L ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33646124485     PISSN: 15292134     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1529-2134(05)08005-1     Document Type: Review

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