War, responsibility, and the age of terrorism

Stanford Law Review

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 793-823

  Yoo, John ^a,b  

^a Berkeley School of Law ^*  (United States)

^b AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646060403     PISSN: 00389765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (129)

1. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) [thereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST].
2. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993) [hereinafter ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY].
3. Ely's conclusions are shared by, among others, LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 203 (1995);
4. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 81 (1990);
5. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 109 (1990);
6. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 158-61 (1990);
7. Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002);
8. William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 700 (1997).
9. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 3 (footnotes omitted).
10. Id. at 54.
11. Id. at 4 (quotation and footnote omitted).
12. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 188-296 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, The Continuation of Politics];
13. John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1221 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Clio at War];
14. John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1686-1704 (2000) [hereinafter Yoo, Kosovo];
15. John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1669-71 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text].
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
17. Id. art. III, § 3.
18. See Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 7, at 1669-71.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
20. Id. § 8.
21. See Yoo, The Continuation of Politics, supra note 7, at 250-52.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. For a valuable discussion of this point, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001).
23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
24. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 1.
25. For a well-known critique of Ely's thesis, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
26. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 3.
27. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
28. The Pennsylvania Convention, 20 November-15 December 1787, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 321, 583 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (statement by James Wilson to the ratifying convention on Dec. 11, 1787).
29. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 570 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
30. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 4.
31. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 312 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1906).
32. For a discussion of the historical context of the letter, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 581-618 (1993);
33. Yoo, Clio at War, supra note 7, at 1183.
34. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 97 YALE L.J. 1425, 1439 n.57 (1987) ("Although his name has unfortunately faded from American constitutional folklore, Wilson's role as a chief architect of the Constitution has long been recognized by historians.").
35. For a more complete account, see Yoo, The Continuation of Politics, supra note 7, at 196-290;
36. Yoo, Clio at War, supra note 7, at 1191-1208.
37. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *249-50, *254-58;
38. see also Yoo, The Continuation of Politics, supra note 7, at 204-08.
39. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics, supra note 7, at 214-17.
40. Id. at 252-54.
41. Id. at 222-23, 228-34.
42. The Virginia Convention, 2-27 June 1788 (Continued), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 19, at 1179, 1282 (statement of James Madison to the ratifying convention on June 14, 1788).
43. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 99 (1991) (arguing that constitutional war requires Congress to fund the President's decisions on conduct of war);
44. Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the United Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597 (1993) (arguing that the President cannot wage war without Congress's consent).
45. See William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Publication Editors' Preface to HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at xi (William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1998).
46. For some very notable exceptions, see, for example, ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 117, 321 (1996);
47. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980);
48. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 99-102, 154 (1999);
49. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term - Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001);
50. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
51. But see Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887 (2003) (criticizing these arguments against judicial review as inconsistent with constitutional text, structure, and history).
52. See, e.g., FELIX GILBERT, TO THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF EARLY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 72 (1961) (discussing the relationship between isolationism and idealism in early American foreign policy);
53. WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, PROMISED LAND, CRUSADER STATE: THE AMERICAN ENCOUNTER WITH THE WORLD SINCE 1776, at 15-38 (discussing the tradition of exceptionalism in American foreign policy).
54. The events leading up to the Mexican-American War are detailed in DAVID M. PLETCHER, THE DIPLOMACY OF ANNEXATION: TEXAS, OREGON, AND THE MEXICAN WAR (1973).
55. Representative Abraham Lincoln, Speech in United States House of Representatives: The War with Mexico (Jan. 12, 1848), in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 439 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953);
56. see also Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William Herndon (Feb. 15, 1848), in 2 THE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 50, 51-52 (Arthur Brooks Lapsley ed., 1905) (speaking in the same context against the potential for executive abuse in exercising the warmaking power).
57. See JERALD A. COMBS, AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: TWO CENTURIES OF CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS 56-61 (1983) (discussing accusations of slavery interests behind Mexican-American War).
58. The Spanish-American War and the events leading up to it are detailed in ERNEST R. MAY, IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY: THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICA AS A GREAT POWER 196-254 (1961);
59. H. WAYNE MORGAN, AMERICA'S ROAD TO EMPIRE: THE WAR WITH SPAIN AND OVERSEAS EXPANSION (1965).
60. MCDOUGALL, supra note 33, at 117-21 (evaluating the significance of the Spanish-American War);
61. see also WALTER LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN SEARCH FOR OPPORTUNITY, 1865-1913, at 180 (1993);
62. AKIRA IRIYE, THE GLOBALIZING OF AMERICA, 1913-1945, at 34-35 (1993) ("[I]n the wake of the Spanish-American War, the nation had steadily extended its influence [in Central America and the Caribbean] through various means: annexation (Puerto Rico), a protectorate (Cuba), military occupation (the Canal Zone), customs receivership (Santo Domingo), and political intervention (Nicaragua).").
63. See, e.g., WALTER LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AT HOME AND ABROAD, 1750 TO THE PRESENT 614-18 (1994) (describing domestic opposition to Vietnam War).
64. The 1991 authorization to use force in the Persian Gulf barely passed. The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991), passed the House by 250-183 and in the Senate by 52-47. See Adam Clymer, Confrontation in the Gulf - Congress Acts to Authorize War in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, § 1, p. 1.
65. H.R. 114, 107th Cong. (2002) became the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498, passing by a vote of 296-133 in the House and 77-23 in the Senate. See Allison Mitchell & Carl Hulse, Congress Authorizes Bush to Use Force Against Iraq, Creating a Broad Mandate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at A1. The continuing controversy over the war in Iraq was perhaps most salient in the 2004 presidential campaign, in which John Kerry attacked the merits of the Bush administration's decision to go to war, and tracking polls the day before the election showed that Iraq was considered by a plurality of voters (26%) to be the most important issue in the election. Wash. Post, Charting the Campaign (Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/elections/2004/charting.html.
66. See generally JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE LONG PEACE: INQUIRIES INTO THE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR (1987).
67. The strategy of containment and its demand for greater military resources is discussed in JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF POSTWAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 89-126 (1982) (describing buildup in American military required by NSC-68 and containment);
68. MELVYN P. LEFFLER, A PREPONDERANCE OF POWER: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, AND THE COLD WAR (1992); MCDOUGALL, supra note 33, at 147-71;
69. DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (1977).
70. See Yoo, The Continuation of Politics, supra note 7, at 178 (describing widespread support for American intervention at outset of Korean War, and rising opposition to the war later).
71. See Yoo, Kosovo, supra note 7, at 1879-85 (describing votes on authorizing and funding conflict).
72. Treanor, supra note 3, at 695.
73. See WARREN I. COHEN, AMERICA IN THE AGE OF SOVIET POWER 68 (1993) (describing reversal of North Korean gains upon arrival of American forces).
74. For more detailed historical discussion of the Korean War, see generally 1 & 2 BRUCE CUMINGS, ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR (1981-1990);
75. BURTON I. KAUFMAN, THE KOREAN WAR (1986);
76. WILLIAM STUECK, RETHINKING THE KOREAN WAR: A NEW DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC HISTORY (2002).
77. WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 24-54 (2003) (discussing Congress's structural disadvantages in informationally complex areas such as foreign affairs).
78. See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999) (discussing transaction cost problems with the organization of Congress).
79. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 12-25 (1980) (discussing constitutional, procedural, and political obstacles to enactment of legislation).
80. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 30-36 (1995);
81. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992);
82. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995);
83. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 91 n.68 (2000) (collecting sources).
84. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978);
85. Paul Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978);
86. John Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot?: The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1137-39 (1996) (collecting sources critical of expanded judicial role in structural remedies).
87. But see Owen Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case: Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697 (1971);
88. Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
89. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (concerning the constitutionality of Line Item Veto Act); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (concerning the constitutionality of the Immigration and Nationality Act's authorization of a one-house congressional veto of an executive branch decision).
90. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003);
91. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002);
92. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997);
93. Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002).
94. See the discussion in Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermuele, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003).
95. Compare Chevron v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), with United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
96. See, e.g., Gary S. Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1237-41 (1994).
97. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44
98. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (mandating judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguous statutes because of greater agency expertise and democratic accountability); see also Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron - The Intersection of Law and Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821 (1990) (elaborating on legitimacy rationale for judicial deference).
99. See generally Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in the Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
100. See, e.g., Sidak, supra note 30.
101. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 3 (footnotes omitted).
102. Madison's comment comes from 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 18, at 316.
103. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 4.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L SECURITY 5, 9-14 (1994-1995) (discussing structural realism) ("States are instrumentally rational. . . . [E]ach state in the international system aims to guarantee its own survival").
106. See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ, A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979);
107. John Norton Moore, Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 341, 416 (2004) ("[A]n examination of historical case studies overwhelmingly suggests rational actors in decisions to commit aggression and other insults to the international community. Such decisions certainly are ruthless, indeed, sometimes barbaric in their inhumanity, and they are frequently mistaken about ultimate consequences. But they are not the actions of those unable to consider consequences.") (footnote omitted).
108. See Yoo, Kosovo, supra note 7, at 1675-85, 1706-08 (discussing these new conflicts).
109. Some argue that involvement by the United States is the linchpin to heightened awareness and global criticism of humanitarian disasters. Without U.S. intervention, disasters continue unanswered by the international community. See Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1487-88 (2003).
110. See Moore, supra note 64, at 400-01.
111. See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004) [hereinafter Yoo, Using Force].
112. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
113. See Yoo, Using Force, supra note 68.
114. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 13-14.
115. These nations were listed as terrorist-sponsoring states long before President Bush took office. See Moore, supra note 64.
116. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 13-16.
117. See John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 901-14 (2001) (discussing policy imperatives behind national missile defense program).
118. James A. Kelly, Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs (July 15, 2004) (statement of State Department's assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, discussing North Korea's nuclear weapons program), http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm.
119. John R. Bolton, Iran's Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (June 24, 2004) (testimony of State Department's undersecretary for arms control and international security before House International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, discussing Iran's WMD programs), http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33909.htm.
120. See International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § § 1701-06 (2000) (grandfathering sanctions regime on North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act). President Carter first imposed sanctions on Iran under IEEPA; those sanctions were reviewed in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
121. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . .").
122. See Yoo, Using Force, supra note 68.
123. Id.
124. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
125. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991) (authorizing use of force against Iraq to achieve specific United Nations Security Council resolutions calling on member nations to remove Iraq from Kuwait).
126. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.
127. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture.").
128. 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639-40 (2004) ("[W]e conclude that the AUMF is explicit congressional authorization for the detention of individuals in the narrow category we describe (assuming, without deciding, that such authorization is required), and that the AUMF satisfied [18 U.S.C.] § 4001(a)'s requirement that a detention be 'pursuant to an Act of Congress' (assuming, without deciding, that § 4001(a) applies to military detentions).").
129. Id. at 2657 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (relying on congressional authorization for power to detain enemy combatants, and refusing to reach question of President's commander-in-chief power).