Nomos in Attic rhetoric and oratory

Journal of Hellenic Studies

Volumn 116, Issue , 1996, Pages 33-46

  Carey, C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645985278     PISSN: 00754269     EISSN: 20414099     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/631954     Document Type: Article

References (81)

1. See W.K.C. Guthrie, The sophists (Cambridge 1971) 125 f.
2. W.M.A. Grimaldi S.J., Aristotle Rhetoric I, a commentary (New York 1980) 317 f., for the ethical question.
3. Problems of application are noted in passing by D.C. Mirhady, ‘Aristotle on the rhetoric of law’, GRBS 31 (1990) 397
4. E.M. Harris ‘Law and oratory’, in Persuasion ed. I. Worthington (London 1994) 130–150, 140.
5. Arist. Rhet. 1355b35 ff.
6. Although Anaximenes recognizes a similar category of proof (Rhet. Alex. 1428a16 ff.), it is interesting to note that his four types of ‘supplementary proof do not include law.
7. D. Mirhady, ‘Non-technical pisteis in Aristotle and Anaximenes’, AJP 112 (1991) 5–28, 10 f. suggests that Aristotle's item ‘law’ corresponds to Anaximenes' item ‘opinions of the speaker’ and that both reflect an original item enklema, ‘the statement of accusation’ in their shared source. However, since nothing is said by Anaximenes in any of his references to this pistis to indicate that it is to be confined to any one or other aspect of the factual or other issues dealt with in oratory, forensic or otherwise, I find it difficult to accept the identification. It is easier to suppose that the two authors have independently expanded a simpler schema which they have inherited.
8. Witnesses, e.g. Lys. 13.64 $: laws
9. e.g. Lys. 14.5 $.
10. See e.g. Isai. 2.16 $.
11. I discuss this issue in ‘Artless proofs in Aristotle and the orators’, BICS xxxix (1994) 95–106.
12. For this and other clauses in the dikast's oath see A.R.W. Harrison, The law of Athens II (Oxford 1971) 48
13. R.J. Bonner and G. Smith, The administration of justice from Homer to Aristotle II (Chicago 1938) 152 ff.
14. S.C. Todd, The shape of Athenian law (Oxford 1993) 60 underrates the force of law when he attributes to it only a persuasive power.
15. See in general M. Ostwald, ‘Was there a concept of $ in classical Greece’ in Exegesis and argument: studies in Greek philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos, ed. E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, R.M. Rorty, 70–104, 71f.
16. Grimaldi (n. 1) 287.
17. Rhet. I375a34-b2 $.
18. Rhet. 1374a 18 ff.$.
19. Thuc. 2.37.3 $.
20. Rhet. I373bl8 f.$ M$. More precisely, the Mss. have a lacuna after ‘$ the quotation is supplied by the scholiast.
21. Rhet. 1354a 11 ff. In ‘Artless proofs in Aristotle and the orators’ (n. 6) I argue that Aristotle exaggerates the distinction between artful and artless proofs.
22. Rhet. 1375a27 ff.
23. Grimaldi (n. 1) objects to the translation of $ as ‘when the written law is opposed to our case’, but offers no argument. His alternative, to take $ as ‘that which took place, the actual fact, the specific action at issue’ gives an inferior sense. The question is not whether the law is relevant to the subject under dispute (for throughout his discussion of nomos Aristotle clearly envisages the citation of law by one side or the other) but which side the law favours.
24. Plat. Crit. 50c-53a.
25. Dem. 39.41 $…
26. For the general compatibility of oath and laws see e.g. Aischin. 3.8 $ …
27. Lys. 10.32 (n. 41).
28. Lyk.1.9 $.
29. Cf. Lys.14.4
30. Dem. 56.48.
31. See Dem. 20.91
32. Aischin.3.38.
33. See especially S.C. Todd (n. 8) 64 ff.
34. For other examples of the rigidity of rhetorical theory in comparison with actual practice see C. Carey, ‘Rhetorical means of persuasion’, in Persuasion ed. I. Worthington (London 1994) 26–45, esp. 29, 35 f., 39 f., 43f.
35. Arist. E.N. 1180a34 ff. $.
36. Hyp. Athen. 13 $.
37. Dem. 57.5 $.
38. Cf. Lys. 10.13 $….
39. [Dem.] 44.8 $.
40. Dem. 56.14 $.
41. The effect is to present the speaker as an $, a reasonable/equitable man, whom Aristotle (E.N. 1138al f.) characterizes as disinclined to insist rigidly on his rights, even when the law is on his side $.
42. Cf. Isai. 1.35 $.
43. Dem. 19.179 $.
44. See also Dem. 35.45, 39.41.
45. Cf. [Dem.] 42.2 $.
46. See also Isai. 4.21
47. Hyp. Athen. 13.
48. Cf. also Anaximenes 1444a 10 ff.
49. Mirhady (n. 1) 396 n. 7, 399 argues that epieikeia in Aristotle is to be distinguished from common law. It is however difficult to disentangle the two concepts completely. Evidently the two are not completely identical, but they are closely associated for Aristotle, who makes no attempt to distinguish them precisely.
50. At Rhet. 1374a27 ff., he discusses epieikeia in the context of his definition of written and unwritten dikaia; he defines it as ‘justice contrary to written law’, particularly associated with imprecision and omission in the law
51. cf. E.N. 1137bII ff.), which in context is explicitly one of two aspects of unwritten dikaia (for the close relationship between epieikeia and to dikaion
52. see E.N. 137a33 ff.). Epieikeia and unwritten nomos are associated at 1375a29 ff.
53. Cf. Harris (n. 1) 140.
54. As Dem. 21.148 $,225 $. Cf. 25.81.
55. Isai. 2.24 $.
56. Cf. Isokr. 19.50 $
57. Lys. 1.2 $ …
58. Cf. Lys. 14.11 $
59. Dem. 21.57 $.
60. Dem. 21 is particularly rich in examples: cf. 21.34. 57, 177, 224.
61. E.g. Lys. 10.32 $
62. Dem. 21. 177 $, 18.121 $.
63. See in general Harris (n. 1) 149 nn.6–7.
64. Cf. Isai.6.49 $ …
65. Dem. 21.48 $, 36.26 f.
66. Cf. Lys. 15.9 $.
67. Lys. 1.26 $…’.
68. Cf. [Dem.] 42.2 $
69. Lys. 14.9 $.
70. Lys. 6.8 $.
71. [Dem.] 59.115 $.
72. [Dem.] 26.27 $,….
73. Cf. Lys. 10.32 (n. 41)
74. Dem.21.225 (n. 50).
75. Lys. 1.34 $
76. Dem. 21.224–5 $….
77. [Dem.] 58.56
78. [Dem.] 59.115
79. cf. Dem.21.221 ff.
80. Lys. 14.15 $
81. Cf. [Dem.] 59.86.