Intermediation by aid agencies

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 79, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 469-491

  Rowat, Colin ^a   Seabright, Paul ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Altruism; Donations; Non profit; Signalling; Two sided market; Wage differential

Indexed keywords

AID FLOW; AID ORGANIZATION; AID POLICY; ALTRUISM; MINIMUM WAGE; NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION;

EID: 33645954916     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.007     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Armstrong M., and Rochet J.-C. Multi-dimensional screening: a user's guide. European Economic Review 43 4-6 (1999) 959-979 (April)
2. Besley T., and Ghatak M. Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents. The American Economic Review 95 3 (2005) 616-636 (June)
3. Buraschi, Andrea, Cornelli, Francesca, 2003. Donations, mimeo, 16 August.
4. Easterly W. Can foreign aid buy growth?. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 3 (2003) 23-48 (Summer)
5. François P. Not-for-profit provision of public services. The Economic Journal 113 486 (2003) C53-C61 (March)
6. Frank R.H. What price the moral high ground?. Southern Economic Journal 63 1 (1996) 1-17 (July)
7. Glaeser E.L., and Shleifer A. Not-for-profit entrepreneurs. Journal of Public Economics 81 (2001) 99-115
8. Handy F., and Katz E. The wage differential between nonprofit institutions and corporations: getting more by paying less?. Journal of Comparative Economics 26 (1998) 246-261
9. Jullien, Bruno, Salanié, Bernard, Salanié, François, 2003. Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case, mimeo. September.
10. Maggi G., and Rodríquez-Clare A. On countervailing incentives. Journal of Economic Theory 66 1 (1995) 238-263 (June)
11. Milgrom P., and Roberts J. Price and advertising signals of product quality. Journal of Political Economy 94 4 (1986) 796-821 (August)
12. Mocan H.N., and Tekin E. Nonprofit sector and part-time work: an analysis of employer-employee matched data on child care workers. Review of Economics and Statistics 85 1 (2003) 38-50 (February)
13. Myerson R.B. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics 10 1 (1982) 67-81 (June)
14. Preston A.E. The nonprofit worker in a for-profit world. Journal of Labor Economics 7 4 (1989) 438-463 (October)
15. Reinikka R., and Svensson J. Working for God?. Discussion Paper 4214 (2004), CEPR, London (January)
16. Ruhm, Christopher J., Borkoski, Carey, 2002. Compensation in the nonprofit sector, mimeo. June.