Management ownership and market valuation. An empirical analysis

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 20, Issue C, 1988, Pages 293-315

  Morck, Randall ^a   Shleifer, Andrei ^b   Vishny, Robert W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645896609     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90048-7     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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5. Separation of ownership and control
6. The market mechanism as an incentive scheme
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8. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence
9. An analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths: Implications for the managerial labor market
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11. Tobin's Q ratio and industrial organization
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13. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis
14. Large shareholders and corporate control
15. Value maximization and the acquisition process
16. On takeover resistance, managerial discretion, and shareholder wealth
17. Agency theory managerial welfare and takeover bid resistance
18. The tender takeover
19. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity