Composición del consejo de administración, propiedad y endeudamiento. relaciones de agencia entre banca e industria en españa

Revista Espanola de Financiacion y Contabilidad

Volumn 29, Issue 104, 2000, Pages 415-441

  Calderón, Isabel Gutiérrez ^a   Montes, Francisco Javier Lloréns ^b   Correa, Juan Alberto Aragón ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GRANADA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645880612     PISSN: 02102412     EISSN: 02102412     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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