Contract enforcement in the early transition of an unstable economy

Economic Systems

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-23

  Koford, Kenneth ^a   Miller, Jeffrey B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE   (United States)

Author keywords

Bulgaria; Contract enforcement; Contract institutions; Contract law; Legal institutions

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645850685     PISSN: 09393625     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecosys.2005.08.002     Document Type: Article

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