The original management incentive schemes

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 135-144

  Holden, Richard T ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645825835     PISSN: 08953309     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/089533005775196688     Document Type: Review

References (11)

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