The filtering matrix: Integrated mechanisms of information control and the demarcation of borders in cyberspace

First Monday

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 41-64

  Villeneuve, Nart ^a,b,c  

^a Citizen Lab

^b UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^c OpenNet Initiative ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645760451     PISSN: 13960466     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5210/fm.v11i1.1307     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. Voice-over-Internet-Protocol is technology that allows voice communications, such as phone calls, to be made over the Internet.
2. For content that is hosted domestically, takedown and removal are preferred methods. Since the servers are hosted domestically, government can just authorize ISPs to remove offending content.
3. Countries may use keyword filtering, as China does, to broaden the content that is filtered, however, this is generally restricted to keywords in URLs. URLs that contain offending content but do not have such keywords in the URL path will not be blocked.
4. Ronald Deibert and Nart Villeneuve, 2004. "Firewalls and power: An overview of global state censorship of the Internet," In: Andrew Murray and Mathias Klang (editors). Human rights in the digital age. London: GlassHouse.
5. OpenNet Initiative, 2005. "Internet filtering in China," at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/, accessed 29 December 2005.
6. OpenNet Initiative, 2005. "Internet filtering in Iran," at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/iran/, accessed 29 December 2005.
7. The author conducted tests on ParsOnline and other smaller ISPs which indicated that various products, including Websense, are in use in Iran.
8. DNS is an Internet service that translates domain names into IP addresses. An IP address is a numeric designation used for routing on a TCP/IP network. A URL (Uniform Resource Locator) is an address used to access content on the World Wide Web.
9. J. Dubios, 2004. "Memorandum Center for Democracy and Technology v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," at http://www.cdt.org/speech/pennwebblock/20040910memorandum.pdf, accessed 29 December 2005.
10. The author has conducted tests confirming the use of commercial filtering products in all these countries. The use of SmartFilter has been documented in OpenNet Initiative reports on as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. For Tunisia see: IFEX Tunisia Monitoring Group, 2005. "Tunisia: Freedom of Expression under Siege," at http://www.ifex.org/download/en/FreedomofExpressionunderSiege. doc, accessed 29 December 2005.
11. There are some significant exceptions. Saudi Arabia, for example, the domain amnesty-usa.org is accessible, but a specific URL (http://www.amnesty- usa.org/countries/saudi_arabia/morenewsandreports.html) containing content critical of Saudi Arabia is blocked.
12. Major ISPs in the U.S. including AOL, Verizon, and WorldCom testified that they were unable to implement URL filtering on their networks, citing significant expense and possible negative impact on their quality of service. See J. Dubios, 2004. "Memorandum Center for Democracy and Technology v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," at http://www.cdt.org/speech/pennwebblock/20040910memorandum.pdf, accessed 29 December 2005.
13. In Norway, Telenor and KRIPOS, the Norwegian National Criminal Investigation Servicej have introduced a new filter system. In the U.K., British Telecom, blocks access to child pornography sites compiled by the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF). Telenor, 2004. "Telenor and KRIPOS introduce Internet child pornography filter," at http://press.telenor.com/PR/200409/ 961319_5.html, accessed 29 December 2005
14. and Martin Bright, 2004. "BT puts block on child porn sites," The Guardian, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/online/news/0,12597,1232506,00.html, accessed 29 December 2005.
15. OpenNet Initiative, 2005. "Internet filtering in Iran," at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/iran/, accessed 29 December 2005.
16. OpenNet Initiative, 2005. "Internet filtering in Burma," at http://opennetinitiative.net/studies/burma/, accessed 29 December 2005.
17. OpenNet Initiative, 2004. "Internet content filtering in India: Variations in compliance and accuracy," at http://www.opennetinitiative. net/bulletins/003/, accessed 29 December 2005;
18. and, Priya Ganapati, 2004. "Mumbai police gag hinduunity.org," Rediff.com, at http://us.rediff.com/news/2004/may/26hindu.htm, accessed 29 December 2005.
19. OpenNet Initiative, 2005. "Collateral blocking: Filtering by South Korean government of pro-North Korean Web sites," at http://www. opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/009/, accessed 29 December 2005.
20. OpenNet Initiative, 2005. "Internet filtering in China," at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/, accessed 29 December 2005.
21. The blockpage in Saudi Arabia also contains a link to a form to request that a site be added to the blocking list.
22. For example, the Websense filtering software categorized Microsoft's download page as a "marijuana" site. See John Leyden, 2005. "Websense makes hash of MS classification," The Register, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/11/04/ms_websense_hash/, accessed 29 December 2005.
23. For a more detailed technical explanation of this process see OpenNet Initiative, "Google Search & Cache Filtering Behind China's Great Firewall," at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/006/, accessed 29 December 2005;
24. and, Nart Villeneuve, 2005. "Censorship is In the Router," at http://ice.citizenlab.org/?p=113, accessed 29 December 2005.
25. IFEX Tunisia Monitoring Group, 2005. "Tunisia: Freedom of expression under siege," at http://www.ifex.org/download/en/ FreedomofExpressionunderSiege.doc, accessed 29 December 2005.
26. OpenNet Initiative, 2006. "Internet filtering in Uzbekistan," in press, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/.
27. Blocked sites include http://www.amnesty.org, http://www.president.gov.tw and http://news.bbc.co.uk.
28. See OpenNet Initiative, 2005. "Internet filtering in China," at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/, accessed 29 December 2005.
29. The Shah of Iran was overthrown in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
30. Blocked sites include http://www.cpiran.org/, http://www.hoder.com and http://www.iran-e-sabz.org.
31. See OpenNet Initiative, 2005. "Internet filtering in Iran," at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/iran/, accessed 29 December 2005.
32. Blocked sites include http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com, http://www.stopdictatorkarimov.com and http://www.soros.org.
33. See OpenNet Initiative, 2006. "Internet filtering in Uzbekistan," in press, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/.
34. Both SmartFilter and Websense have categories that target human rights groups: Non-Profit Organizations/Advocacy Groups (http://www.securecomputing. com/index.cfm?skey=86#np) and Service and Philanthropic Organizations (http://www.websense.com/global/en/SupportAndKB/SiteLookup/)
35. See the promotional materials for SmartFilter: http://www. securecomputing.com/index.cfm?skey=86.
36. See OpenNet Initiative, 2004. "OpenNet Initiative: Bulletin 002" at http://opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/002/, accessed 29 December 2005;
37. and, Reporters Without Borders, 2004. "Ban lifted on two gay websites," at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3? id_article=9586, accessed 29 December 2005.
38. For example, in Tunisia, the Web site of the Movement of Democratic Socialists (http://www.mdstunisie.org) is blocked even though it has expired.
39. See Elijah Zarwan, 2005. "False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa," Human Rights Watch, at http://hrw.org/ reports/2005/mena1105/index.htm, accessed 29 December 2005.
40. OpenNet Initiative, 2005. "Collateral Blocking: Filtering by South Korean Government of Pro-North Korean Websites," at http://www. opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/009/, accessed 29 December 2005.
41. OpenNet Initiative, 2004. "Internet Content Filtering in India: Variations in Compliance and Accuracy," at http://www.opennetinitiative. net/bulletins/003/, accessed 29 December 2005.
42. Reporters Without Borders, 2005. "Access to Sahrawi sites blocked within Morocco," at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=15809, accessed 29 December 2005.
43. Nart Villeneuve, 2005. "Internet filtering in Morocco," at http://ice.citizenlab.org/?p=165, accessed 29 December 2005..
44. OpenNet Initiative, 2005. "Telus Blocks Consumer Access to Labour Union Web Site and Filters an Additional 766 Unrelated Sites," at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/010/, accessed 29 December 2005.
45. Bangkok Post, 2003. "Thai Internet censors can't agree what to ban," at http://www.thaivisa.com/index.php?514&backPID=10&tt_news= 523, accessed 29 December 2005.
46. Bangkok Post, 2003. "Govt forces ISPs to block 'inappropriate' Web sites," at http://www.thaivisa.com/index.php?514&backPID= 514&tt_news::=434, accessed 29 December 2005.
47. Jeffrey Race, 2004. "Censoring the Internet in Thailand," at http://www.camblab.com/nugget/block/block_01.htm, accessed 29 December 2005.
48. See Web site censorship in Thailand, at http://2bangkok.com/blocked. shtml, accessed 29 December 2005;
49. and, Committee to Protect Journalists, at http://www.cpj.org/cases05/ asia_cases05/thai.html, accessed 29 December 2005.
50. See Edwin Yapp, 2005. "Slamming door on porn opens others," at http://startechcentral.com/tech/story.asp?file=/2005/6/21/technology/ 11282315&sec=technology, accessed 29 December 2005;
51. and, News24, 2005. "Porn sites must be blocked," at http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0.2-10-1462_1721610.00.html, accessed 29 December 2005.
52. Arbibi Ashoy, 2005. "Where will 'block porn sites' move lead to?," at http://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/37126, accessed 29 December 2005.
53. Timothy L. Thomas, 2003. "Al Qaeda and the Internet: The danger of cyberplanning," Parameters, volume 33, at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/ usawc/Parameters/03spring/thomas.pdf, accessed 29 December 2005.
54. Michael Slackman, 2005. "Muslim Brotherhood cements its leadership of Egyptian opposition," International Herald Tribune, at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/27/news/egypt.php, accessed 29 December 2005.
55. Elijah Zarwan, 2005. "False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa," Human Rights Watch, at http://hrw.org/reports/ 2005/mena1105/index.htm, accessed 29 December 2005.
56. Nart Villeneuve, 2005. "Choosing Circumvention: Technical Ways To Get Around Censorship," Reporters Without Borders, Handbook for Bloggers and Cyber-dissidents, at http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=542, accessed 29 December 2005.
57. Bill Xia, 2002. "Statement of Bill Xia, China's Cyber-Wall: Can technology break through?" at http://cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/110402/ xiaStatement.php, accessed 29 December 2005.
58. OpenNet Initiative, 2004. "Unintended Risks and Consequences of Circumvention Technologies: The IBB's Anonymizer Service in Iran," at http://opennetinitiative.net/advisories/001/, accessed 29 December 2005.