The role of ex ante regulations in addressing problems of moral hazard in agricultural insurance

Agricultural Finance Review

Volumn 62, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 103-116

  Turvey, Calum G ^a   Hoy, Michael ^b   Islam, Zahirul ^c  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH   (Canada)

^c FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS   (Canada)

Author keywords

Agricultural insurance; Ex ante regulations; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645744117     PISSN: 00021466     EISSN: 20416326     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/00214910280001132     Document Type: Article

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