Lieber and Alexander reply

International Security

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 191-196

  Lieber, Keir A ^a   Alexander, Gerard ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645737725     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.191     Document Type: Letter

References (16)

1. Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 109-139;
2. and Robert J. Art, "Correspondence: Striking the Balance," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 177-185. Additional references to this letter to the editors appear in parentheses in the text.
3. Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7-45;
4. Robert A. Pape, "The World Pushes Back," Boston Globe, March 23, 2003;
5. T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 46-71;
6. Christopher Layne, "America as European Hegemon," National Interest, No. 72 (Summer 2003), pp. 17-29;
7. Christopher Layne, "The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power: The Paradoxes of American Hegemony," in T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the Twenty-first Century (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 103-126;
8. Stephen M. Walt, "Taming American Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5 (September/October 2005), pp. 105-120;
9. and Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).
10. In fact, Art believes that China's actions are directed against the United States, but we use the quotation to illustrate his idea that intentions are not a necessary component of balancing.
11. Lieber and Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing," pp. 119, 122.
12. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf.
13. As Art writes elsewhere, "ESDP was meant to enhance Europe's influence within the NATO alliance; to enable Europe to act in those instances when the United States chose to sit out a European crisis that required military action, instances that the Europeans hoped would be rare; and to appear to do more burden sharing so as to keep U.S. forces in Europe." Robert J. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets," in Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, Balance of Power, pp. 179-213, at p. 199.
14. "The EU Battlegroups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell," European Union fact sheet, February 2005, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpIoad/ Battlegroups.pdf;
15. and EU Security and Defence: Core Documents, 2004, Vol. 5, Chaillot paper no. 75 (European Union Institute for Security Studies, February 2005), http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai75e.pdf, pp. 10-11.
16. Craig S. Smith, "Europe's Direction Is Unclear, Much as Germany's Is after Vote," New York Times, September 20, 2005.