The Chechen future in the Russian federation

Helsinki Monitor

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 42-52

  Zelkina, Anna ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 33645580818     PISSN: 09250972     EISSN: 1571814X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/157181400X00319     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Many Russian military and political officials did not share in the general scepticism about military deployment in the Northern Caucasus. For a discussion of the plans for a new military operation in Chechnya in the summer of 1998 see 'Time for a Special Operation in Chechnya' in: Izvestiya, 22 September 1999.
2. The question of co-operation between the armed groups that crossed over from the Chechen territory and local 'Islamists' is not clear. The amir (religious leader) of the Karamakhi jama'at (community) reportedly denounced the interference from outside. So did Ayyub Astrakhanskiy, the most strict Islamist leader of Daghestan. However, there were also reports that some of the Islamist activists from Karamakhi had joined the Islamic fighters. Consequently the Russian army was deployed in the Karamakhi jama'at and the Daghestani authorities staged a campaign against Islamists. On the trial of the suspects see for, example, an article by Dmitriy Bal'burov, 'Del na mnogo', Moscow News, 23-29 May 2000.
3. The confrontation between Shamil Basaev, Mauladi Udugov, Arbi Baraev and Abdul Malik Mejidov and the supporters, of the Chechen President dated back to 1997 and reached its peak in July 1998 during the armed clashes in Gudermes. Ironically at the time when Alsan Maskhadov tried to destroy his opposition that operated under the ideology of 'pure Islam', a Presidential Commission on Opposing Political Extremism (Prezidentskaya Komissiya po bor'be s politicheskim ekstrmizmom) met up to discuss the Wahhabi issue. On the 22 July it declared that in the view of the commission the Wahhabite movement was not extremist and that 'One should distinguish between the religious movement and the extremist trends that exist within it', Izvestiya, 22 July 1998. In Chechnya as well as in other parts of the Northern Caucasus it was immediately interpreted as an indication that the 'Wahhabies' enjoy the backing of certain political quarters in Moscow and restrained Maskhadov's activities against them. For more on the Wahhabies in Chechnya see Vahkit Akaev, 'Religious-Political Conflict in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria', in: Political Islam and Conflicts in Russia and Central Asia, ed. L. Johnson and Murad Esenov, The Sweedish Institute of International Affairs, Conference Papers 24, Stockholm, 1999, pp. 47-59.
4. Kremlin Package, 2 September 1999.
5. Komersant Daily, 1 September 1999.
6. This has been a reccurring theme in Russian statements on Chechnya. See, for example, 'Lubyanka People Know who committed Terrorist Acts' in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 September 1999, Svetlana Nikitina, see also the above article.
7. See, for example, Ilya Maksakov, 'Chechenskaya Voyna uzhe nachalas' in: Nezavisimakya Gazeta, 21 September 1999.
8. See the Interview with Mr. Putin in: 'Putin Vows to Stay the Course', Vera Kuznetsova, Moscow News, 29 September 1999.
9. Ekho Moskvy radio broadcast, 24 September 1999.
10. 'PM Putin vows to stay the course', Vera Kuznetsova, Moscow News, 29 September 1999.
11. See the reports of Reuters, RIA Novosti. Also see the discussions on the military, economic and political aspects of the cordon line in: 'Setting the Stage for another Quagmire in Chechnya' in: Russian Political Monitor, 1 October 1999, 'The Russian Military Plan to Halve Chechnya' in: Nezavisimakya Gazeta, 29 September 1999.
12. For an outline of the broader plan see, for example, Alexander Koretsky, The Third Stage is for Khattab and Basaev in Segodnya, September 12, 1999.
13. Vladimir Putin: U Nas est' tol'ko odin put' - unichtozhat' terrorizm, Radio Mayak, 10 November 1999. Also published by 'rv I Radio Monitoring. Politica (TV and Radio Monitoring Russian Service, Politics), 12 September 1999
14. Victor Loshak, The Putin Paradox, Moscow News, 29 September 1999.
15. These declarations were contested in the Russian media. On the different announced 'deadlines for the military stage of the operation', see for example Vladimir Solovyev, 'Samouspokoenie generalov ne sposobstvuet skoromu zaversheniyu kampanii', in: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 17 March 2000.
16. In public declarations, General Manilov claimed that ' the Russian army came to defend the fundamental human rights of the Chechen people in the field of education, welfare and healthcare. E.g. his address at the ITAR TASS-Moscow News Conference in Moscow, December 1999.
17. E.g. see Putin's interview with Vera Kuznetsova: 'PM Putin Vows to Stay the Course', Moscow News, 29 September 1999.
18. Parlament Chechni Sozyva 1996 goda Priedet v Respubliku, Radio Rossii, Vesti, 11 I October 1999, published by TV t Radio Monitoring, Politika, 12 October 1999.
19. An example of such a proposal was presented by a representative of the Ministry of Nationalities at a Workshop on 'The International Community and Strategies for Peace and Stability in and around Chechnya', SIIA, 27-28 April 2000.
20. On the system of Direct Presidential rule introduced by Putin, see Vladimir Solovyev, 'V Chechne Vvoditsya Priamoe Prezidentskoe Pravlenie' in: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 12 May 1999.
21. See for example the reports in Kisilev, Segodnya, Situatsiya v Chechnye, TV and Radio - Monitoring, Politics, 10 July 2000.
22. At the time of writing of the present article it appears that Ahmad Qadyrov is closely following the guidance of the military commanders and tries to avoid any possible confrontation with them. Discussion of Qadyrov's appointment see for example in Sanobar Sermatova, Voyna vsekh protiv vsekh in Moscow News, No. 24, 20-26 June 2000.
23. Esadze, Zapiska ob Upravlenii Kavkazom, 1899, p. 186.
24. It is notable that the Russian Minister for the Oil Industry, Victor Kolyuzhny, announced plans for the construction of an alternative pipeline on 24 September 1999, which makes it clear that the Russian operation in Chechnya was not driven by any oil-related economic considerations
25. This view was articulated first by General Ermolov, the Russian Commander-in-Chief of the separate Georgian Army Corps and the Chief Administrator of Georgia and the Caucasus. On Ermolov's system see M. Gammer, 'Russian Strategies in the Conquest of Chechnya and Daghestan, 1825-59' in: The North Caucasus Barrier, ed. M. Bennigsen Broxup, 1992, Husrs and Co., pp. 45-62
26. M. Gammer, 'The Muslim Resistance to the Tsars', Franc Kass, 1994
27. A. Zelkina 'In Quest for God and Freedom', Hurst and Co, NY University Press, 2000.
28. It is quite notable that those Russian observers and politicians who believe that the Russian army can achieve a complete military victory and crush the resistance draw on Stalin's policy in Western Ukraine and the Baltic states in the late 1940s-1950s. It was successful largely due to the policy of deportation and resettlement of the insurgent areas by the loyal population from Eastern Ukraine and mainland Russia. E. Pain, Vozmozhnye Varianty Dinamiki Vtoroy Chechenskoy Voyny', Paper presented at the SIIA, Stockholm, 27 April 2000 to be published by the Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal, p. 7.
29. Already by late May the number of human losses in the Russian army had reached the level of the total human losses suffered by the Russian army during the previous war. See Itogi, 25 May 2000.