Commercial speech under the European Convention on Human Rights: Subordinate or equal?

Human Rights Law Review

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 53-86

  Randall, Maya Hertig ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645553399     PISSN: 14617781     EISSN: 17441021     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/hrlr/ngi036     Document Type: Review

References (260)

1. The terms 'freedom of expression' and 'free speech' will be used interchangeably.
2. See mainly Casado Coca v Spain A 285 (1994); (1994) 18 EHRR 1.
3. For a detailed overview of the evolution of the case-law, see Ioannou, 'Ban on Publicity in the Light of the European Convention on Human Rights', in Skouris (ed), Advertising and Constitutional Rights in Europe: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994) 347 at 351.
4. Nicol, Millar and Sharland, Media Law & Human Rights (London: Blackstone Press, 2001) at 166
5. Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick, Law of the European Convention of Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 1995) at 378
6. Calliess, 'Zwischen staatlicher Souveränität und europäischer Effektivität: Zum Beurteilungsspielraum der Vertragsstaaten im Rahmen des Art. 10 EMRK', (1996) 23 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 293 at 297
7. and, Rigaux, 'Introduction générale', (1993) 4 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme 3 at 13.
8. Cohen Jonathan, 'Liberté d'expression et message publicitaire', (1993) 4 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme 69 at 93.
9. Smolla, The First Amendment: Freedom of Expression, Regulation of Mass Media, Freedom of Religion (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1999) at 17.
10. For a more detailed analysis see Schefer, Konkretisierung von Grundrechten durch den U.S.-Supreme Court: Zur sprachlichen, historischen und demokratischen Argumentation im Verfassungsrecht (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997) at 450.
11. See Smolla, supra n. 5 at 16.
12. Munro, 'The Value of Commercial Speech', (2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 134 at 157.
13. In a similar vein, it has been argued that political speech cannot satisfactorily be distinguished from other categories of speech. See Hare, 'Is the Privileged Position of Political Expression Justified?', in Beatson and Cripps (eds), Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information. Essays in Honour of Sir David Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 105.
14. For a detailed analysis of these conditions see, for instance, Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick, supra n.3 at 386
15. Cohen Jonathan, 'Ad article 10', in Pettiti, Decaux and Imbert (eds), La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Commentaire article par article, 2nd edn (Paris: Economica, 1999) 384
16. and van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998) at 558-85.
17. Handyside v United Kingdom A 24 (1976)
18. (1976) EHRR 737 at para. 50.
19. Jersild v Denmark A 298 (1994)
20. (1994) 19 EHRR 1 at para. 31.
21. Sunday Times (No. 1) v United Kingdom A 30 (1979)
22. (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 245 at para. 59, but see para. 8 of the joint dissenting opinion limiting the Court's supervision to a mere reasonableness and good faith standard.
23. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 (1993); 1 IHRR 145 (1994). Balancing the various interests involved, the Committee concluded that Quebec's legislation prohibiting outdoor advertising in the English language violated freedom of expression.
24. Ibid. at para. 11.3.
25. For an overview of the different tests employed by the United States Supreme Court in deciding free speech cases, see Smolla, supra n. 5 at 21
26. and Schefer, supra n. 6 at 7.
27. See van Dijk and van Hoof, supra n. 10 at 573
28. Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick, supra n. 3 at 374 and 396
29. and Jacq and Teitgen, 'The Press', in Delmas-Marty (ed.), The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights: International Protection Versus National Restrictions (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) 59 at 64.
30. For an analysis of the margin of appreciation doctrine, see Brems, 'The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights', (1996) 56 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 240
31. Jones, 'The Devaluation of Human Rights under the European Convention', [1995] Public Law 430
32. Lavender, 'The Problem of the Margin of Appreciation', (1997) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 380
33. MacDonald, 'The Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights', in Clapham and Emmert (eds), Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 1990: The Protection of Human Rights in Europe Vol. I, Book 2 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) 95
34. Mahoney, 'Universality versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining Some Recent Judgments', (1997) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 364
35. Merrills, The Development of International Law by The European Court of Human Rights, 2nd edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993)
36. Morrison, 'Margin of Appreciation in European Human Rights Law', (1973) 6 Human Rights Law Journal 263
37. O'Donnell, 'The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights', (1982) 4 Human Rights Quarterly 474
38. Prebensen, 'The Margin of Appreciation and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention', (1998) 19 Human Rights Law Journal 13
39. Schokkenbroek,'The Basis, Nature and Application of the Margin-of-Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights', (1998) 19 Human Rights Law Journal 30
40. van Dijk and van Hoof, supra n. 10 at 82
41. and Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of the European Human Rights Jurisprudence (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996).
42. Handyside, supra n. 11 at para. 48.
43. See, for instance, Schokkenbroek, supra n. 18 at 34
44. Brems, supra n. 18 at 256
45. and van Dijk and van Hoof, supra n. 10 at 87.
46. See Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick, supra n. 3 at 397
47. Cohen-Jonathan, supra n. 10 at 401
48. and Jacq and Teitgen, supra n. 17 at 66.
49. For a recent case, see Dichand and Others v Austria, Judgment of 26 February 2002, Application No. 29271/95, at para. 39.
50. Thorgeirson (Thorheir) v Iceland A 239 (1992)
51. (1992) 14 EHRR 843 at para. 63.
52. Handyside, supra n. 11 at para. 48.
53. See also Müller and Others v Switzerland A 133 (1988)
54. (1991) 13 EHRR 212 at para. 35
55. Wingrove v United Kingdom 1996-V 1937
56. (1997) 24 EHRR 1 at para. 58
57. and Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria A 295-A (1994)
58. (1995) 19 EHRR 34 at para. 50. These cases concerned the field of morals and religion, for which the Court grants national authorities a wide margin of appreciation due to the lack of a uniform conception throughout Europe.
59. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 132 quoted in Hart, 'Essay 12: Jhering's Heaven of Concepts and Modern Analytical Jurisprudence', in Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) 277.
60. In this sense, Schauer, 'Categories and The First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts', (1981) 34 Vanderbilt Law Review 265 at 275.
61. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994) at 119.
62. Ibid. at 126 and 128
63. Hart, supra n. 25 at 27.
64. Schauer, supra n. 26 at 294 et seq.
65. See Groppera Radio AG and Others v Switzerland A 173 (1990)
66. (1990) 12 EHRR 321
67. Autronic AG v Switzerland A 178 (1990)
68. (1990) 12 EHRR 485
69. and Demuth v Switzerland 2002-IX 1
70. (2004) 38 EHRR 20.
71. ETS No. 132.
72. (1979) 16 DR 68.
73. For a summary of the case, see Boisson De Chazournes, 'Publicité commerciale et liberté d'expression - dans le cadre du Conseil de l'Europe', (1988) Revue générale de droit international public 929 at 931
74. Pinto, La liberté d'information en droit international (Paris: Economica, 1984) at 206
75. and, Smyth, Business and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Bristol: Jordan, 2000) at 239.
76. Subsequent cases squarely falling into the field of commercial advertising which will not be analysed below all concerned liberal professions (see Hempfing v Federal Republic of Germany, Admissibility Decision of 7 March 1991, Application No. 14622/89
77. Colman v United Kingdom A 258-D (1993)
78. (1994) 18 EHRR 119
79. and, Lindner v Germany, Admissibility Decision of 9 March 1999, Application. No. 32813/96).
80. X and Church of Scientology, supra n. 32 at 78.
81. Ibid. at 79.
82. Ibid. at 80.
83. Ibid. at 79 [translated by the author].
84. The Commission also applied a deferential standard of review in two subsequent cases, namely Colman, supra n. 33 and in Nederlandse Omproepprogramma Stichting v Netherlands, Admissibility Decision of 13 October 1993, Application. No. 16684/90, a case concerning restrictions on indirect advertisement in TV children's programmes.
85. Supra n. 2.
86. Ibid. at para. 55.
87. Ibid. at para. 50, references omitted. The Court referred to markt intern and Barthold, which will be analysed below (see 2 C (iii) and 2 D (i)).
88. Ibid. at para. 51 [emphasis added].
89. Ibid. at para. 54.
90. Ibid. at para. 55.
91. Supra n. 11.
92. Casado Coca v Spain, supra n. 2 at para. 56 [emphasis added].
93. Ibid. at para. 54, where the ECtHR observed a tendency to liberalise the rules on advertisement for lawyers in the Member States, pointing out that the Barcelona Bar Council had itself relaxed the strict rules applicable to Mr Casado Coca.
94. See Lindner, supra n. 33, which concerned direct client solicitation, and Stambuk, infra n. 65 at para. 40, in which the ECtHR pointed out that contrary to rules on advertisement in the medical profession, the regulation of lawyers' advertisement varied greatly among the signatory states and were in a process of change.
95. Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG (no. 3) v Austria 2003-XII 91
96. (2004) 39 EHRR 42.
97. Supra n. 2 and section 2 C (i).
98. See infra section 2 D (i).
99. See infra section 2 D (ii).
100. Krone Verlag, supra n. 48 at para. 33.
101. Ibid. at para. 34.
102. 1998-VII 2864
103. (2000) 30 EHRR 665.
104. Ibid. at para. 44.
105. Ibid. at para. 47.
106. 2001-VI 243
107. (2002) 34 EHRR 4.
108. For a case comment, see Docquir, 'Vers la reconnaissance d'un droit d'accès à la tribune médiatique', (2002) 52 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'hommes 1035.
109. Ibid. at para. 57.
110. Ibid. at para. 66 [emphasis added].
111. Ibid. at para. 71.
112. Ibid.
113. 2003-IX 1
114. (2004) 38 EHRR 13.
115. Ibid. at paras 67 and 81.
116. A 90 (1985)
117. (1985) 7 EHRR 383.
118. (2003) 37 EHRR 42.
119. Barthold, supra n. 64 at para. 58.
120. Ibid.
121. For a discussion of the standard of review in the Barthold case, see Yourow, supra n. 18 at 120.
122. Barthold, supra n. 64 at para. 58.
123. Ibid. at para. 58.
124. Supra n. 2 and section 2 C (i).
125. Stambuk, supra n. 65 at para. 39.
126. See Casado Coca, supra n. 2 and section 2 C (i).
127. Stambuk, supra n. 65 at para. 40.
128. Ibid. at para. 41.
129. Ibid. at para. 42.
130. Ibid. at para. 41.
131. See section 2 C (i).
132. A 165 (1989)
133. (1990) 12 EHRR 161.
134. Ibid.
135. markt intern Verlag GmbH and Beerman v Germany, Commission Report of 18 December 1987 at para. 251.
136. Ibid. at para. 26.
137. Ibid. at para. 33.
138. Ibid. at para. 34.
139. Ibid. at para. 35.
140. Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick, supra n. 3 at 405.
141. markt intern, supra n. 79 at para. 37 [emphasis added].
142. Calliess, supra n. 3 at 295.
143. In this sense, see also Nicol, Millar and Sharland, supra n. 3 at 167
144. and, Jongen, 'Observations. Le message publicitaire', (1991) 2 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme 213 at 216.
145. A 291A (1994)
146. (1995) 19 EHRR 64. For a discussion and summary, see De Merieux, 'The German Competition Law and Article 10 ECHR', (1995) 20 European Law Review 388.
147. Jacubowski, ibid. at para. 27.
148. Ibid. at para. 26.
149. Ibid.
150. 1998-VI 2298
151. (1999) 28 EHRR 534.
152. See also Woods, 'Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights During 1999', (1999) 70 British Yearbook of International Law 366.
153. Admissibility Decision of 12 April 2001, Application No. 43524/98.
154. Hertel, supra n. 92 at para. 23.
155. Ibid. at para. 47.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid. The three dissenting judges, in contrast, argued that the national authorities were to be granted a wide margin of appreciation in the field of unfair competition law, since the latter is 'a complex technical subject' which is not suitable for the Court to decide.
158. Ibid. at para. 50.
159. SRG, supra n. 93 at para. 1.
160. Ibid.
161. See Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) at 158
162. and Munro, supra n. 8 at 150.
163. Distinguishing between different categories of expression based on the purpose of the governmental regulation is the approach chosen by Alexander, 'Speech and Speaker's Intent', in Alexander (ed), Freedom of Speech, Vol. I (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) 22.
164. For a similar case, see City of Cincinnati v Discovery Network, Inc., 507 US 410 (1993)
165. 113 S Ct 1505 (1993), in which the United States Supreme Court struck down Cincinnati's prohibition to distribute commercial handbills via news racks situated on public streets. Cincinnati had justified this ban with aesthetic and safety reasons.
166. Ibid. The Supreme Court found a violation of the First Amendment amongst others because the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech bore no relationship to the invoked justifications, i.e. safety and aesthetics.
167. See Wright, 'Freedom and Culture: Why We Should Not Buy Commercial Speech', (1994) 72 Denver University Law Review 137 at 160
168. and Stern, 'In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech', (1995) 58 Maryland Law Review 55 at 95.
169. See section 2 E (iii).
170. See section 2 D.
171. Cohen Jonathan, supra n. 10 at 405 relies on the absence of a competitive relationship to conclude that markt intern should not have been treated as a commercial speech case.
172. This aspect was highlighted in the joint dissenting opinion of markt intern, supra n. 79 at 24: 'Consumers, who are exposed to highly effective distribution techniques and to advertising which is frequently less than objective, deserve, for their part too, to be protected, as indeed do retailers'.
173. See also Calliess, supra n. 3 at 295.
174. See Bergens Tidende and Others v Norway 2000-IV 371
175. (2001) 31 EHRR 16 at para. 51.
176. markt intern, supra n. 79 at para. 203.
177. Scheyli, 'Die Abgrenzung zwischen ideellen und kommerziellen Informationsgehalten als Bemessungsgrundlage der "margin of appreciation" im Rahmen von Art. 10 EMRK: Anmerkung zum Urteil des EGMR vom 5.11.2002 im Fall Demuth vs. Schweiz', (2003) 30 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 455 at 457.
178. The Court also relied on this criterion in Bergens Tidende and Others v Norway, supra n. 110 at para. 51
179. Lehideux and Isorni, supra n. 54 at para. 47
180. and VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken, supra n. 57 at para. 57.
181. See Rigaux, supra n. 3 at 15.
182. Ibid.
183. See section 2 A (iv) and supra n. 24.
184. See Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free Press, 1993) at 121.
185. For an overview of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on commercial speech, see Smolla, supra n. 5 at 115.
186. See De Merieux, supra n. 88 at 398
187. Calliess, supra n. 3 at 295
188. Scheyli, supra n. 112 at 458
189. and, Pettiti, Decaux and Imbert, supra n. 10 at 404 et seq.
190. See section 2 B.
191. See section 2 E (i).
192. Supra n. 79 and section 2 D (i).
193. Supra n. 2 and section 2 C (i).
194. See, for instance, Powell and Rayner v United Kingdom A 172 (1990)
195. (1990) 12 EHRR 355 at 369, concerning policies to limit noise stemming from aircraft: 'It is certainly not for the Commission or the Court to substitute for the assessment of the national authorities any other assessment of what might be the best policy in this difficult social and technical sphere. This is an area where the Contracting States are to be recognised as enjoying a wide margin of appreciation'.
196. See Brems, supra n. 18 at 261
197. and, van Dijk and van Hoof, supra n. 10 at 89.
198. In this sense, see van Dijk and van Hoof, supra n. 10 at 93.
199. Jongen, supra n. 87 at 216.
200. See section 2 A (ii).
201. See Morrison, supra n. 18 at 265.
202. This policy field is mentioned by Brems, supra n. 18 at 261 as one in which the Court grants the national authorities a wide margin of appreciation.
203. See, for instance, Rasmussen v Denmark A 87 (1984)
204. (1985) 7 EHRR 371 at para. 40, mentioning 'the existence or non-existence of common ground between the laws of the Contracting States' as a relevant factor under the margin of appreciation doctrine.
205. See also the cases mentioned at n. 24.
206. See Brems, supra n. 18 at 284
207. Jones, supra n. 18 at 440
208. and Yourow, supra n. 18 at 127 and 193.
209. See Casado Coca, supra n. 2 and section 2 C (i).
210. Cohen Jonathan, supra n. 10 at 405.
211. Lingens v Austria A 103 (1986)
212. (1986) 8 EHRR 407 at para. 41,
213. drawing on Handyside, supra n. 11 at para. 49.
214. For an overview and critical analysis of the main theories underlying freedom of expression, see Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) at 8
215. and Schauer, supra n. 101.
216. For authors justifying the protection of commercial speech based on the argument of self-fulfilment or similar reasons, such as autonomy and liberty, see, for example, Redish, 'Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker', (1982) 130 Pennsylvania Law Review 678
217. Munro, supra n. 8 at 157
218. Baker, 'Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom', (1976) 62 Iowa Law Review 1
219. and Shiner, Freedom of Commercial Expression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 178 et seq.
220. In this sense, see Tabbara, Kommunikations- und Medienfreiheit in den USA. Zwischen demokratischen Aspirationen und kommerzieller Mobilisierung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003) at 199.
221. See section 2 C (i).
222. The impact of commercial speech on the media illustrates this point. Whilst advertising revenues are the main income of the press and private broadcasting, the financial dependence of the media on the private sector can result in tendencies of self-censorship, as the media tend to avoid reports critical of corporations they have concluded advertising contracts with. See Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), especially Chapter 2.
223. See Schauer, supra n. 26 at 290
224. and, Sunstein, supra n. 116 at 135.
225. See Sunstein, supra n. 116 at 135
226. and, Wright, supra n. 105 at 141.
227. See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Pettiti in markt intern, supra n. 79.
228. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 425 US 748 (1976) at 771, note 24.
229. See also Schauer, supra n. 26 at 291
230. and, Sweetland, 'The Demise of a Workable Commercial Speech Doctrine: Dangers of Extending First Amendment Protection to Commercial Disclosure Requirements', (1997) 76 Texas Law Review 471 at 490.
231. See, for instance, Rigaux, supra n. 3 at 8.
232. Lingens, supra n. 135
233. Castells v Spain A 236 (1992)
234. (1992) 14 EHRR 445
235. Oberschlick v Austria A 204 (1991)
236. (1995) 19 EHRR 389
237. and Thorgeirson, supra n. 23.
238. For recent cases, see Dichand, supra n. 22
239. and Feldek v Slovakia (2002) 27 European Law Review: Human Rights Survey 212.
240. See, for instance, Coussirat-Coustère in Pettiti, Decaux and Imbert, supra n. 10, 409 at 416.
241. Supra n. 146 at para. 46.
242. The United States Supreme Court is frequently criticised for failing to recognise the need to check corporate power: See, for example, Zines, 'Freedom of Speech and Representative Government', in Beatson and Cripps (eds), supra n. 9, 35 at 36
243. and Hare, supra n. 9 at 116.
244. This need is also referred to by Rigaux, supra n. 3 at 15, who notes that economic operators, similarly to the government, benefit by virtue of their financial means from a privileged access to mass communication.
245. See also the joint dissenting opinion in markt intern, supra n. 79 at 23, stressing the need for openness of business practices.
246. markt intern, supra n. 79 at para. 35.
247. The Court also addressed the need to check corporate power in Fayed v United Kingdom A 294-B (1994)
248. (1994) 18 EHRR 393 at para. 75
249. and Steel and Morris v United Kingdom (2005) 41 EHRR 22 at para. 94
250. See Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 839.
251. Public-choice theory can be defined as the 'application of economic analysis to political rather than market choices': Harrison, Law and Economics in a Nutshell, 2nd edn (St Paul: Minnesota, 2000) at 291.
252. Farber, 'Commentary: Free Speech without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment', (1991) 105 Harvard Law Review 554.
253. Ibid.
254. See also Ramsay, Consumer Protection: Text and Materials (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1989) at 42
255. and, Sunstein, supra n. 116 at 69.
256. Ramsay, ibid. at 42.
257. See the seminal article by Akerlof, 'The Market for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism', (1970) 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 488.
258. Farber, supra n. 153 at 570.
259. 2000 c. 36.
260. Smolla, supra n. 5 at 17.