NGOs and monitoring genocide: The benefits and limits to human rights Panopticism

Millennium: Journal of International Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 403-432

  Steele, Brent J ^a   Amoureux, Jacque L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

^b BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645374579     PISSN: 03058298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/03058298060340022001     Document Type: Article

References (98)

1. Besids Bentham and Michel Foucault, more recently, Stephen Gill has interpreted the neoliberal state as a Panoptic system of labour and finance, where the individuals is coerced to be productive economic citizen. Stephen Gill, 'The Global Panopticon? The Neoliberal State, Economic Life, and Democratic Surveillance', Alternatives 2, no. 1 (1995): 1-49.
2. See also Foucauldian, 'surveillance theory' applied especially to electronic surveillance: David Lyon, 'An Electronic Panopticon? A Sociological Critique of Surveillance Theory', Sociological Review 41, no. 4 (1993): 653-78.
3. Lyon, 'Electronic Panopticon?', 657.
4. According to Foucault, within the Panopticon' [a] real subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation', and '[t]he surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action', Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 201-202.
5. Ibid., 205.
6. Ibid., 208.
7. Ibid., 201.
8. Ibid., 205.
9. Ibid., 206.
10. Ibid., 208.
11. Ibid., 205.
12. Ibid., 228.
13. This parallels Adam Watson's multi-state definition of hegemony, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992), 15.
14. We argue that an international society with its institutions, laws and rules (the juridical component) exists alongside a disciplinary society, just as Michel Foucault saw the juridical and disciplinary forms coexisting within domestic society. See Foucault, Society Must Be Defended (New York: Picador, 1997). When we speak of the 'interests' of a 'hegemon' the content of the hegemon's interests, the particular definition of the hegemon, and the very idea of the hegemon apply to a certain historical context. In this sense the hegemon is a social role or identity that is intersubjectively defined and contested within an international society or system. Thus, hegemonic status and power can not be reduced to material possessions alone; rather, its power depends on how actors are situated in a structure of power and social relations and how they act from such a situation to reproduce or magnify power.
15. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 156.
16. Ibid., 159.
17. Ibid., 158.
18. See Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
19. See William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
20. See Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
21. Much of the IR literature posits NGOs as members of a global civil society that seek to reform state power and/or the status of states as the 'ultimate moral actors' of international society. For example, liberal cosmopolitans who see global civil society as working to bring about a 'world society' where individuals are the moral referents (see Nigel Dower, 'The Idea of Global Citizenship - A Sympathetic Assessment', Global Civil Society 14, no. 4 [2000]: 553-57);
22. those who see NGOs reforming state-dominated global governance (see Mary Kaldor, 'Civilizing' Globalisation? The Implications of the 'Battle in Seattle', Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29, no. 1 [2000]: 105-114);
23. and Hedley Bull's argument that non-state actors may challenge the goal of an international society to preserve the preeminence of states as world actors (see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics [New York: Columbia University Press, 1977]).
24. However, when considering an international society that includes states and non-state actors one cannot assume that non-state actors are necessarily opposed to state interests and the state organisational form. In this context Thomas Risse has illustrated how transnational actors are often funded by and ally with states and International Governmental Organisations. See Thomas Risse, 'Transnational Actors and World Politics', in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 255-74.
25. Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 20.
26. Henry Steiner clarifies: '"First World NGOs" means those committed to traditional Western liberal values associated with the origins of the human rights movement'. Steiner, Diverse Partners: Non-Governmental Organizations in the Human Rights Movement (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Law School Human Rights Program and Human Rights Internet, 1991), 19.
27. Although both AI and HRW have made recent attempts to include economic, social and cultural rights. Makau Mutua, a critic of human rights NGOs like AI and HRW, admitted that in September of 1996 the latter 'abandoned its long standing opposition to the advocacy of economic and social rights. [HRW] passed a highly restrictive and qualified policy - effective January 1997 - to investigate, document, and promote compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights'. Nevertheless, Mutua views HRW's 'restrictive policy' with scepticism: 'this policy statement can be seen as a continuation of the history of skepticism toward economic and social rights HRW has long demonstrated; it sees economic and social rights only as an appendage of civil and political rights'. Mutua, 'Human Rights International NGOs: A Critical Evaluation', in NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance, ed. Claude E. Welch (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 155-156.
28. International Non-Governmental Organisations.
29. Mutua, 'Human Rights', 159.
30. Thus, when this perceived neutrality does not obtain, the moral credibility of NGOs may be jeopardised. Human rights abusers deflect accusations of abuse by labeling human rights NGOs as tools of imperial oppression. Anja Jetschke notes that in Indonesia in 1978, 'Quasi-official statements argued that, "Amnesty still suffers from a 'moral arrogance' of the West which has been deplored by the Third World at large"'. See Anja Jetschke, 'Linking the Unlinkable? International Norms and Nationalism in Indonesia and Philippines', in Power of Human Rights, 141.
31. Human Rights Watch [http://hrw.org/about/faq/#7] (Accessed 13 October 2005)
32. Janet Semple, Bentham's Prison: A Study of the Panopticon Penitentiary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 300.
33. Gill, 'Global Panopticon?', 39.
34. Nevertheless, even in such instances where human rights NGOs have criticised hegemonic states' human rights practices, those states' agents have been careful to declare their support for NGOs' role as independent and credible evaluators of human rights practices. Thus, for example, in response to a media question regarding an AI report quite critical of United States' human rights practices, Richard Boucher of the US Department of State alluded to US cooperation through information-sharing with human rights NGOs and US recognition of human rights NGOs as legitimate actors: 'We work with Amnesty International. We listen to Amnesty International. We have close ties. We talk to them all the time, share information. That being said, we don't necessarily agree with their views. We have recognised the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib. There is a firm US process underway to identify those responsible and carry out punishment.... [L]et me say we do take Amnesty's reports seriously. We look at what they say. We look at specific cases they raise and make sure that we are doing what we can for the people who might be hurt by harmful practices around the world'. US Department of State, 'Daily Press Briefing', Washington DC, 26 May 2005 [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpd/2004/32860.htm] (Date accessed 13 October 2005).
35. 'They are crucial in mobilizing domestic opposition and social movements', Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, 'The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction', in The Power of Human Rights, 5.
36. This is true in other uses of the Panopticon. For example as Gill explains in his account of the global economic Panopticon, credit agencies need not be at every individual transaction. The transaction itself happens at a retailer, the credit agency collects this information, and then organises information on individuals into a 'credit report': 'everyday transactional activity... leaves traces that can be (electronically) stored, sorted, and evaluated'. Gill, 'Global Panopticon?', 20. In other words, the person using a credit card knows that someone will eventually find out the details of their financial habits, and that this information will be used to determine their 'credit rating'. NGOs have also, moreover, been innovative in gathering evidence through means that are difficult for abuse perpetrators to detect and control. For example, the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights distributed video cameras to human rights abuse victims and trained them to 'record and prove that "they were there and they saw"'. Explaining the benefits of the cameras Peter Gabriel said: 'Now the people can watch, witness and report on those in power. With Witness we are serving notice on governments. We are watching that they can no longer keep their deeds hidden'. Stanley Cohen, Denial and Acknowledgement: the Impact of Information about Human Rights Violations (Mount Scopus, Jerusalem: Center for Human Rights, 1995), 12, 87.
37. Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 264-266.
38. Human rights NGOs have recognised their ability to provide evidence for prosecution, even employing and promoting innovative and technical means such as forensics to uncover evidence of past human rights abuses. See Aryeh Neier, War Crimes (New York: Times Books, 1998)
39. and Luis Fondebrider, Uncovering Evidence: The Forensic Sciences in Human Rights (Minneapolis: The Center for Victims of Torture, 2004).
40. In Chile NGOs pursued prosecution themselves in domestic courts and in doing so established a 'solid record of each case' that in some cases later enabled prosecution in politically more favorable circumstances (i.e., after Pinochet's arrest). 'Truth commissions' have informed and been informed by human rights NGOs' investigation efforts. NGOs have even conducted private versions of such commissions when governments do not. Truth commissions, often under pressure from NGOs, have released these reports to the public, have 'pass[ed] their files on to the prosecuting authorities' and 'have named names of wrongdoers, thus providing a moral sanction, at least. Some have recommended other sanctions... such as removing abusers from positions' in the civil service and military. HRW and AI have taken the position that international law supports a 'right to truth' and thus requires the investigation of 'gross violations of human rights'. Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001), 29, 37-38, 87, 183.
41. Korey, NGOs, 324.
42. US Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 'Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements', Washington DC, 1973, 255.
43. Ibid., 257.
44. US Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 'Hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights in the World Community, Washington, DC, 1974, 41.
45. Korey also notes that '[t]he impact of the change in the United States would shortly be felt in regional and international institutions'. Korey, NGOs, 187, 189.
46. Ibid., 344.
47. Ignatieff, Human Rights, and 'Intervention and State Failure', in The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention, eds. Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
48. Ignatieff, 'Intervention and State Failure', 236.
49. See Karl Marx, 'On the Jewish Question', in Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, eds. Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday, 1967).
50. Richard Flathman, The Practice of Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
51. Bull, Anarchical Society, 20.
52. Hedley Bull, Justice in International Relations (Hagey Lectures: University of Waterloo, Ontario, 1984), 18.
53. Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
54. See also the work of solidarist R. J. Vincent, Human Rights in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
55. Wheeler, 302.
56. The invasion was launched one day after President Suharto met in Jakarta with American President Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Geoffrey Robinson states that: 'documents reveal that East Timor was indeed discussed with Suharto and that the United States did give its approval to the invasion'. Robinson, 'If You Leave Us Here We Will Die', in New Killing Fields, 163.
57. Greg Fealy, The Release of Indonesia's Political Prisoners: Domestic Versus Foreign Policy, 1975-1979 (Melbourne, 1995).
58. 'UN Bids Indonesia Leave East Timor', New York Times, 23 April 1976.
59. In accord with Chapter VII of the UN Charter these observers could only be sent with the permission of the controlling sovereign state, allowing the Indonesian government to deny 'legally' - citing 'safety concerns' - the UN and UN Secretary General Waldheim's repeated requests for an observer presence.
60. 'Indonesia Charged with Atrocities', New York Times, 13 March 1977.
61. 'There have been reports in the Australian Parliament that as many as 100,000 of East Timor's total population of 600,000 may have been killed by the Indonesians', ibid.
62. 'Excerpts from State Department Reports on the Status of Human Rights Abroad', New York Times, 10 February 1978, emphasis added.
63. Kathleen Teltsch, 'Portuguese Priest Backing for an Independent East Timor', New York Times, 14 December 1979.
64. Jetschke, 144.
65. Robinson, 'If You Leave', 165. Robinson also notes that pressure from Australian Prime Minister John Howard and America's public disapproval of Indonesia's occupation both partially explain Habibie's puzzling move. Another probable factor was the recent collapse of the Indonesian economy: its many years of rapid growth having given cover to the Suharto regime for its dubious human rights record.
66. 70 percent of houses, 77 percent of health facilities and 95 percent of the schools in East Timor were destroyed. Erin Towbridge, 'Back Road Reckoning', in New Killing Fields, 209.
67. Robinson, 'If You Leave', 179.
68. The media 'is the major public arena in which the construction of human rights information into a social problem is attempted and contested'. Cohen, Denial, 60.
69. Seth Mydans, 'Thousands in East Timor Fleeing as Militias Attack', New York Times, 7 September 1999.
70. Towbridge, 'Back Road', 208.
71. Robinson, 'If You Leave', 179.
72. Most estimates put the number of Aceh province tsunami deaths or missing at 220,000. The most recent 'Indonesia Tsunami Situation Report' of the World Health Organization's Regional Office for Southeast Asia placed the number of deaths and buried at 124,404 and the number of missing at 111,888. [http://w3.whosea.org/en/Section23/Section1108/Section1835/ Section1851/Section1867_8859.htm] (Accessed on 13 October 2005).
73. The people of Aceh province have sought independence from the central government off and on since 1976. While the Indonesian parliament granted Aceh substantial autonomy in 2001, talks between the GAM and the Indonesian government fell through, and Aceh has since been under martial law.
74. Richard Spencer, 'Indonesia Imposes Military Guards on Aid Agency Staff', Daily Telegraph (London), 12 January 2005.
75. HRW's statement was issued in the form of a letter to Indonesian President Yudhoyono. While the letter praised the President's 'leadership in swiftly convening a donors' meeting in Jakarta to assess and address the needs in Aceh', it also expressed concern 'about ongoing restrictions on access to humanitarian organizations, the media and other independent observers'. Such policies, HRW asserted, produce 'lengthy and time-consuming bureaucratic processes to gain entry... [and] should be abolished'. In a final rebuke of the Indonesian government, HRW stated that 'such practices do not reflect well on an emerging democracy committed to human rights'. Human Rights Watch [http:// hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/06/indone9955.htm] (Accessed 13 October 2005).
76. The report and the full list of reported human rights abuses in the Aceh area following the tsunami can be viewed at [http://web.amnesty.org/ library/Index/ENGASA210022005] (Accessed 13 October 2005).
77. Spencer, Indonesia Imposes Military Guards on Aid Agency Staff.
78. When the UN did finally act, with UNAMIR II, the mission was far too late to be considered a successful response, with the advance of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) stopping much of the killing.
79. Korey, NGOs, 309.
80. See Risse and Sikkink, Power of Human Rights.
81. See also Gideon Rose, 'The Exit Strategy Delusion', Foreign Affairs (January/February 1998): 56-67.
82. Colin Powell, 'US Forces: Challenges Ahead', Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992): 32-45.
83. 'It was an article of faith among members of the Secretariat that, were the UN to suffer another disaster like Somalia with more peacekeepers being killed, the organisation would suffer a possible fatal blow to its credibility'. Wheeler, 216.
84. Power, 302.
85. Darryl Li, 'Echoes of Violence', in New Killing Fields, 128.
86. Peter Maass, 'Paying for the Powell Doctrine', New Killing Fields, 76.
87. Wheeler, 208.
88. 'The Secretariat's naming of the violence as a civil war and not a genocide legitimated [France, Britain and the US's] decision not to intervene to stop the massacres'. Ibid., 221.
89. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore argue that the 'peacekeeping culture' at the UN 'colored its categorization of the problem' in Rwanda as one of civil war, which, in turn, influenced the Security Council's perception of the situation. See Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 124.
90. Power, 347.
91. In Rwanda, the Interhamwe militias were so brazen that they committed atrocities in full view of United Nations mission observers (UNMOs). Romeo Dallaire writes: 'on June 14, the Interhamwe entered the St. Paul church site, collected about forty children, took them out into the street and killed them, just to show they could'. Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil (Toronto: Random House, 2003), 420.
92. Power, 347.
93. Most notably, Médecins sans Frontiéres, Oxfam, and Human Rights Watch/Africa. Note also that, consistent with our conceptualisation of hegemony, we see France and Britain as hegemons, self-aware of their status as capable agents in influencing the international order.
94. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Brief Edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 1993), especially 248.
95. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 215-16. Foucault further connects discipline to capitalism: '[T]he techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital',
96. ibid., 221.
97. Ignatieff, Human Rights, 71.
98. 'It [discipline] must also master all the forces that are formed from the very constitution of an organized multiplicity; it must neutralize the effect of counterpower that spring from them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to dominate it'. Foucault, Discipline and punish, 219, emphasis added.