A model of an opportunistic-partisan political business cycle

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 242-252

  Sieg, Gernot ^a  

^a TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF BRAUNSCHWEIG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Economic Models of Political Processes; Macro economic Policy Formation; Political Business Cycle

Indexed keywords

BUSINESS CYCLE; MODEL; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 33645298491     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: 14679485     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2006.00378.x     Document Type: Article

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