Demand for a jury trial and the selection of cases for trial

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 119-142

  Hersch, Joni ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645287524     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/498831     Document Type: Review

References (23)

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