Shareability and actual sharing: Korsgaard's position on the publicity of reasons

Philosophical Investigations

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 172-189

  Van Willigenburg, Theo ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645206860     PISSN: 01900536     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9205.00169     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996
2. Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996
3. Richard Norman, 'Public Reasons and the "Private Language" Argument', in Philosophical Investigations 23, 2000, pp. 292-314
4. and Ken O'Day, 'Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons', in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1, 1998, pp. 61-83
5. 'Public Reasons and the "Private Language" Argument', p. 295
6. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 135
7. See also Norman, 'Public Reasons and the "Private Language" Argument' , p. 295
8. The Sources of Normativity, Reply, p. 237
9. Korsgaard was not the first to stress the distinction between 'incentive' and 'the actual reason for action'. See Barbara Herman's groundbreaking article 'On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty', Philosophical Review 90, 1981, pp. 359-382
10. Or, in Korsgaard's terms: 'particularistic' willing is impossible. See Korsgaard, C.M., 'Self-Constitution in the ethics of Plato and Kant', The Journal of Ethics 3, 1999, 1-29, pp. 23-27
11. Christine M. Korsgaard, 'The Normativity of Instrumental Reason', in: Cullity, G. & Gaut, B., Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, 215-254, p. 248
12. O'Day, 'Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons', p. 73
13. Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984
14. and Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound. Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraint, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000
15. A. Sen, "Rights and Agency", Philosophy and Public Affairs 11, 3-39
16. D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 104
17. T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 164 vv
18. Ph. Pettit, "Universalizability without Utilitarianism", Mind, 96, 1987, 74-82
19. and S. Kagan, The Limits of Morality, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989
20. 'The Reasons We Can Share', p. 287
21. and J. Dancy, Moral Reasons, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, pp. 166-252
22. For a critical note on the terminology see J. Skorupski, 'Agent-neutrality, consequentialism, utilitarianism: a terminological note', Utilitas 7, 1995, 49-54