Possible future architectures of global governance: A transnational perspective/prospective

Global Governance

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 97-117

  Khagram, Sanjeev ^a,b  

^a International Development and Global Citizenship   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Civil society; Global governance architectures; Globalization; Imperialism; Nation; Nation state system; Networks; Sovereignty; States; Transnational dynamics; World orders

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645150480     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-01201008     Document Type: Review

References (76)

1. Normative-analytic images entail something more than Weberian ideal types. They are rather parsimonious clusters of ingredients assembled to create pictures of (potential) realities. They are analytic in that they are conceptual abstractions. They are normative in that they link together ostensibly desirable ingredients into clusters and, arguably, have contemporary groups and coalitions that promote these images more or less actively.
2. Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State Is Inevitable: Teleology and the Logic of Anarchy," European Journal of International Relations (forthcoming).
3. See Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (New York: Vintage Books, 2000);
4. Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine, 1995);
5. and Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1997).
6. Robert A. Dahl has argued that polyarchy is unlikely to be achieved at the global level and that international organizations should be understood and treated as bureaucratic bargaining systems rather than as democratic institutions. Democratization is certainly possible even if democratic systems as conventionally understood might not be possible. One must not forget that the deliberative democratic forms associated with smaller polities did not transfer to the institutions associated with the nation-state.
7. All states would exhibit a form of "embedded autonomy." See Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
8. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), for a philosophical argument for this type of well-ordered world society of states, but one in which some states are "liberal" and others are "illiberal."
9. See Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
10. The Tobin tax is a simple sales tax on currency trades across borders (see www.ceedweb.org/iirp/factsheet.htm).
11. See, for example, Volker Ritterberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995);
12. and The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
13. The literature on deliberative democracy at the local level offers plenty of empirical examples and ideas along these lines. Very few of these scholars would probably argue for a model of grassroots global governance based on local deliberative units as primary and predominant.
14. See, among others, Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, eds., The Case Against the Global Economy: For A Return to the Local (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1997).
15. See Wendt's provocative draft paper, "Why a World State is Inevitable: Teleology and the Logic of Anarchy."
16. The Society for World Federalism has long supported and advocated for a global state.
17. For a much less optimistic variant of a decentered, network-governed world, see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
18. Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World Order," Foreign Affairs 183 (September-October 1997).
19. See also Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations," World Politics 27 (October 1972).
20. See Jan Martin, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, and Thorsten Benner, "Beyond Multilateralism: Global Policy Networks," International Politics and Society 2 (2000): 176-188;
21. and Steve Waddell, "Global Action Networks: A Global Invention to Make Globalisation Work for All," Journal of Corporate Citizenship 12 (winter 2003).
22. David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From Modern States to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996);
23. Daniele Archibuigi and David Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (London: Polity Press, 1999).
24. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Neo-Neo Functionalism," in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, eds., European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
25. See Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996);
26. and Saskia Sassen, Denationalization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), for similar ideas.
27. A much more elaborated depiction and analysis of world dynamics over the last 500, 1,000, or even 3,000 years is required to fully demonstrate the claims of this article. For an illuminating attempt along these lines, see Enrique Dussel, "Beyond Eurocentrism: The World System and the Limits of Modernity," in Frederic Jameson and Masao Miyoshi, eds., The Cultures of Globalization (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998).
28. The ideas and language for this section are partly derived from a larger initiative the author coleads with Peggy Levitt. See www.transnational-studies. org.
29. Even in a book that offered one of the strongest cases for focusing on the centrality of states, the editors clearly acknowledged that states are shaped by different types of transnational processes and dynamics. See Peter Evans et al., eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985).
30. The literature on these groups and their activities has mushroomed over the past decade. For a couple of excellent reviews of the recent literature, see Richard Price, "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics," World Politics 55, no. 4 (July 2003);
31. and Thomas Risse, "Transnational Actors and World Politics," in Water Carlsnaes et al., eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002).
32. For a proponent of the "transnationalist" civil society frame, see Ann Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment Press, 2000).
33. For a "globalist" perspective, see the various editions of Global Civil Society Yearbook, published by the Centre for Civil Society and Centre for Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Politics.
34. See Sanjeev Khagram and Sarah Alvord, "Locating Contemporary, Progressive, Civic Transnational Advocacy," in L. David Brown and Srilatha Batliawala, eds., Claiming Global Power (Bloomfield, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 2005).
35. See Doris Buss and Didi Herman, Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right in International Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
36. See Ralph Hamann, Nicola Acutt, and Paul Kapelus, "Responsibility Versus Accountability?" Journal of Corporate Citizenship 9 (spring 2003).
37. See John Boli and George Thomas, eds., Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1870 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
38. See Daphne Josselin and William Wallace, eds., Non-State Actors in World Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2001);
39. and Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds., The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
40. The literature on transnational corporations is too vast to even begin a listing here. For a very early introduction, see George Modelski, ed., Transnational Corporations and World Order: Readings in International Political Economy (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1979).
41. See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and
42. Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).
43. See August Nimtz on Marx and Engels as prototypical transnational activists, in Sanjeev Khagram et al., eds., Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002);
44. and Thalia Kidder and M. McGinn, "In the Wake of NAFTA: Transnational Workers' Networks," Social Policy 25, no. 4 (summer 1995).
45. I am referring to the prominent transnational network WIEGO, Women in the Informal Economy Globalizing and Organizing.
46. On religion, see, for example, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James P. Piscatori, eds., Transnational Religion, the State and Global Civil Society (Boulder: Westview, 1997).
47. For many people around the world, of course, state-sponsored transnational terrorism is a signature tactic of various governments and presidential administrations of the United States.
48. See Nikos Passas, Transnational Crime (Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1999);
49. and Waller Enders, "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time Series Investigation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 3 (2000).
50. P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
51. See Aiwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logic of Transnationality (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999);
52. and Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Moser, eds., New Approaches to Migration: Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home (London: Routledge, 2001).
53. See John W. Meyer et al., "World Society and the Nation-State," American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 1 (July 1997).
54. American Journal of Sociology, John W. Meyer et al., Ibid.
55. These statistics come from Freedom House, "Democracies Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century," in Freedom in the World: 1999-2000 (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2000). While there are numerous problems with this dataset, it does provide some insight into broad patterns of the twentieth century.
56. Although, for the colonial world, national security was linked to the somewhat broader concept of self-determination.
57. See the special volume of Global Governance, "Governance After War," edited by Charles C. Call and Susan E. Cook, vol. 9, no. 2 (2003).
58. See Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Relations (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979). For one critique, see
59. Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations: A Critique," Review of International Studies 17, no. 1 (1991).
60. See H. Richard Freeman and Peter Andreas, The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999);
61. Thomas W. Gallant, "Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism and State-Formation: Transnational Crime from a Historical World Systems Perspective," in Josiah Heyman, ed., States and Illegal Practices (Oxford: Berg, 1999);
62. and David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, eds., Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
63. See the statistics assembled by Ted Robert Gurr and his colleagues, "Global Warfare Totals, 1946-1999," and "Trends in Violent Conflict," at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity.
64. See also Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
65. See Marina Ottaway, "Think Again: Nation-Building," Foreign Policy 132 (September-October 2002).
66. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).
67. The extensive literature problematizing the "nation-state" is impossible to cite here, but see, for example, Matthew Sparke, Hyphen-Nation-States: Critical Geographies of Displacement and Disjuncture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
68. See Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
69. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995);
70. Alice H. Amsden, The Rise of the Rest: Challenges to the West from Late Industrializing Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
71. Gerald Meier and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., Frontiers in Development Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
72. One study notes, for example, that approximately forty states "died" during the twentieth century. See Tanisha M. Fazal, "State Death in the International System," manuscript, Columbia University, 2003. On juridical and empirical states
73. see Robert H. Jackson and Carl C. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics 35, no. 1 (1983).
74. On failed states, see Robert Roberg, ed., Why States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
75. For more positive perspectives, see John Gerard Ruggie, "The United Nations and Globalization: Patterns and Limits of Institutional Adaptation," Global Governance 9, no. 3 (July-September 2003);
76. and Madeline Albright, "MisUNderstood: Why the United Nations Is Indispensable," Foreign Policy 138 (September-October 2003).