Debate: Democracy, authority and publicity

Journal of Political Philosophy

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 85-100

  Wall, Steven ^a  

^a BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33645145454     PISSN: 09638016     EISSN: 14679760     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00258.x     Document Type: Review

References (45)

1. For an important exception see J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
2. T. Christiano, "The authority of democracy," Journal of Political Philosophy, 12 (2004), 266-90; all parenthetical references are to this article.
3. Christiano claims that when the two dimensions conflict the procedural dimension generally takes precedence over the outcome dimension (268).
4. Instrumentalist accounts of authority hold that democratic institutions should be assessed along the outcome dimension only.
5. Political power here should be understood along standard Weberian lines.
6. 'Hence, authoritative directives are often characterized as "content-independent." See H. L. A. Hart, "Commands and authoritative legal reasons," Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
7. Authority is a normative concept. But it can also be understood in a non-normative de facto sense. A government that issues directives that only purport to be authoritative, but are not genuinely authoritative, will not have authority in the sense specified here.
8. A piecemeal justification of authority can allow that some directives bind uniformly. It denies merely that all directives bind in this uniform way.
9. The phrase is taken from L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 63.
10. See in particular The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), chs 2-4.
11. Ibid., p. 53.
12. See J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 56-57.
13. The NJT is silent on the question of whether there are general limits to the authority of governments, such that no government could be legitimate if it did not respect them. But while the NJT does not entail that there are such limits, it is compatible with the NJT that such limits exist.
14. B. Williams and J. Smart, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 93-108.
15. Raz defends three theses: the normal justification thesis, the dependence thesis and the preemption thesis. I shall not say anything about the preemption thesis.
16. Raz, Morality of Freedom, p. 47.
17. Raz calls these "dependent reasons."
18. Here I assume that in embarking on the weapons program the Nazi authorities issue directives that direct people to support the program.
19. See Raz's explanation for why DT does not entail the no difference thesis. Morality of Freedom, pp. 48-51.
20. George's fate is similar to that of a person who is unjustifiably locked up by the authorities of an unjust state; and who, once in prison, best complies with reason by treating the directives of the state-appointed warden as authoritative. Doing so is his best bet for a tolerable life in the prison. But assuming that both NJT and DT are correct, this fact would do nothing to establish the legitimacy of the state authorities in general or the authority of the warden in particular.
21. Citizens have reason to support institutions that treat one another justly. Compliance with unjust authorities frustrates efforts to comply with these reasons. That is why unjust authorities tend to not satisfy the conditions of the NJT.
22. Note that on Christiano's own account of justified authority, unjust governments can be entitled to a good measure of legitimacy. For, on this account, if a government is democratic, and if it respects certain basic rights, then it will be legitimate, even if it produces outcomes that are unjust. (See 290.)
23. The foundational principle of justice on which Christiano's argument rests is the principle of the equal advancement of interests. He gives arguments-to be discussed below-for why this principle must be publicly realizable.
24. Democratic decision-making requires that each adult citizen have "an equal say in how the society ought to be organized" (276). Each adult citizen has an equal right to participate in the processes of debate, adjudication and decision that lead to political outcomes.
25. A modern society is, among other things, a pluralistic society in which there is disagreement over the content of justice.
26. Christiano allows that undemocratic political authorities, such as monarchs, could enjoy an attenuated sense of legitimacy. Subjects might have reason to go along with their commands, but the authorities would not have a right to rule. (See 287, n 22.)
27. A principle that is otherwise fully just, but fails to satisfy the requirement of publicity is, in Christiano's terms, "defective" in its justice. Complete justice requires justice to be done and to be seen to be done. (See 271.)
28. But see 274, where Christiano remarks that "full publicity" is impossible in a modern society since citizens will disagree about justice. This betrays a commitment to a stronger notion of publicity than the weak notion that Christiano officially adopts.
29. Christiano also offers a formal argument for why justice must be public (see 271). Since this argument does not play much of a role in his defense of democratic authority, I shall not consider it.
30. See section V below where I compare the plausibility of a view I term complex instrumentalism with Christiano's dualism.
31. This is true, absent special considerations. For example, if I am the worst-off person and justice requires priority to the worst-off, then the fact that a principle of justice favors my interests relative to others could be a reason for thinking it is correct.
32. This could be true for different reasons. Incommensurable values or epistemic limits can explain how two conceptions of justice could be equally rationally eligible.
33. See R. Dworkin, "Political equality," Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 200-201.
34. See D. Estlund, "Political quality," Democracy, ed. E. Paul, F. Miller and J. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 127-60.
35. The possibility here is not merely logical, but also realistic. See Estlund's proposal for a "progressive voucher plan" for funding political campaigns; ibid., pp. 152-8.
36. I ignore the possibility that these two goals could pull in opposing directions.
37. The terminology is my own. But the distinction it registers can be found in J. Elster, Sour Grapes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 91-100.
38. See also D. Copp, "Could political truth be a hazard for democracy?" The Idea of Democracy, ed. D. Copp, J. Hampton and J. Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 101-17.
39. A full discussion of this point is not possible here. The basic idea is that if an option is a necessary component of a good human life, then the option has intrinsic value. The option is not a means to a good human life, but rather a necessary contributing element to it. See my Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 6.
40. Although Raz has not endorsed such a view, I believe he would not be unhappy with it. See his brief remarks on the participatory values of democracy in "Liberalism, scepticism and democracy," Ethics and the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 117.
41. Since I do not here purport to offer a complete defense of complex instrumentalism, I shall not consider other possible versions of dualism.
42. That is, the different values engaged by the different dimensions of evaluation may be incommensurable, even if all are explained, ultimately, by their contribution to human welfare.
43. To clarify: I do not claim that it is impossible to resolve conflicts between irreducibly distinct considerations. I claim only that if distinct considerations are rooted in the same underlying value, then it is natural to resolve conflicts between them by appeal to that value.
44. See 290: "[W]hat the argument for the limits of the authority of democracy shows is that the justice of democracy is conditional on the realization of publicity . .."
45. Christiano himself allows that " People may disagree about what liberal rights are basic and what their boundaries are as well as what equality in these liberal rights consist in" (289-90).