Consensus and parliamentary opposition: The case of Spain

Government and Opposition

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 86-108

  Mújica, Alejandro ^a   Sánchez Cuenca, Ignacio ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33645110472     PISSN: 0017257X     EISSN: 14777053     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2006.00172.x     Document Type: Review

References (50)

1. Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven, CT,Yale University Press, 1966.
2. Klaus von Beyrne, 'Parliamentary Oppositions in Europe', in Eva Kolinsky (ed.), Opposition in Western Europe, London, Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 31-2;
3. Stephanie Lawson, 'Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization', Comparative Politics, 25: 2 (1993), p. 203;
4. Oreste Massari, 'Natura e ruolo delle opposizioni politico-parlamentari', in Gianfranco Pasquino (ed.), Opposizione, governo ombra, alternativa, Rome-Bari, Gius Laterza &Figli, 1990, pp. 32-3;
5. Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro, 'South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional Order', Politics and Society, 23: 3 (1995), pp. 271-2;
6. James Cotton, 'Opposition in Asian Constitutional Systems: Characteristics and Potential for Democratic Consolidation', Government and Opposition, 31: 2 (1996), p. 177;
7. Geraint Parry, 'Opposition Questions', Government and Opposition, 32: 4 (1997), pp. 457-8;
8. Jean Blondel, 'Political Opposition in the Contemporary World', Government and Opposition, 32: 4 (1997), p. 462;
9. Gianfranco Pasquino, La oposicion, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1998, p. 41.
10. Cfr. Stefano Sicardi, Maggioranza, minoranze e opposizione nel sistema constituzionale italiano, Milan, Giuffrè Editore, 1984, pp. 3-8.
11. Richard Rose, Understanding Big Government, London, Sage, 1984, pp. 84-5;
12. Pasquino (ed.), Opposizione, governo ombra, alternativa, p. 15;
13. Pasquino, La oposición, p. 63.
14. Franco Cazzola, 'Consenso e opposizione nel parlamento italiano. Il ruolo del PCI dalla I alla IV Legislature', Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 2: 1 (1972), pp. 71-96.
15. Silvano Tosi, 'Italy: Anti-System Opposition within the System', in Rodney Barker (ed.), Studies in Opposition, London, McMillan St Martin's Press, 1971, pp. 153-67.
16. Giuseppe Di Palma, Surviving without Governing, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, pp. 55 ff.
17. Richard Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference?, London, Macmillan, 1980, pp. 80-1.
18. Rose, Understanding Big Government, p. 85.
19. Ibid.
20. Thomas Saalfeld, The West Bundestang after 40 Years: The Role of Parliament in a Party Democracy', in Philip Norton (ed.), Parliaments in Western Europe, London, Frank Cass, 1990, pp. 77-8.
21. See, for example, the case of Bangladesh; Nizam Ahmed, 'Parliamentary Opposition in Bangladesh: A Study of its Role in the Fifth Parliament', Party Politics, 3: 2 (1997), pp. 147-68.
22. We can only calculate the percentage of consensus for all laws in the V legislature (1993-96): from data provided by Guerrero, we can deduce that 63 per cent of all laws were approved with the vote of the main opposition party.
23. See Enrique Guerrero, Crisis y cambios en las relaciones parlamento-gobierno (1993-1996), Madrid, Tecnos, 2000, p. 163.
24. On the other hand, Capo has shown that during the first four legislatures, the average number of positive votes for all laws was 214 (in a chamber of 350 members), the average number of negative votes was only 36, and the average number of abstentions was 15. We can reasonably infer from this that in order to produce these averages, most laws had to be approved with a high degree of consensus.
25. See Jordi Capo, 'Oposición y minorías en las legislatures socialistas', in Revista Espanola de Investigationes Socwlógicas. 66 (1994), p. 96.
26. Maurizio Cotta, 'Parliamenti e rappresentanza', in Gianfranco Pasquino (ed.), Manuale di stienza della politica, Bologna, II Mulino, 1986, pp. 300-1.
27. Franco Cazzola, Governo e opposizione net portamento Italiano, Milan, Giuffrè Editore, 1974.
28. S. E. Finer (ed.), Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform, London, Anthony Wigram, 1975.
29. José Ramón Montero, 'Sobre el sistema electoral español: rendimientos políticos y criterios de reforma', in Juan Montabes (ed.), El sistema electoral a debate, Madrid, CIS & Parlamento de Andalucía, 1998, p. 40.
30. Rose uses a similar definition of consent: 'consent is given to laws by the approval of Parliament', see his Understanding Big Government, p. 90.
31. The Standing Orders of Congress, section 131.2, available at www.congreso.es.
32. Pasquino (ed.), Opposiziane, governo ombra, alternativa., p. 17.
33. Guerrero, Crisis y cambios en las relaciones parlamento-gobierno (1993-1996), p. 159.
34. This scholar concludes that during the first four legislative terms, organic laws accounted for 15.5 per cent of all new legislation. We have extended his analysis to include the sixth legislative term and the figure is slightly lower, 14.6 per cent. These percentages are similar to those in other Western democracies, where constitutional laws represent between 11 and 22 per cent of all laws;
35. see Rose, Understanding Big Government, p. 88.
36. Capo's formula is vf/n*v/N, where vf stands for the number of votes for the law, n is the number of MPs of the main party, v is the total number of cast votes, and is the size of the assembly. If the index has a value of 1, the incumbent party does not obtain support from any other parliamentary group. If the index has a value over 1, the incumbent gets support from other groups: the more so, the greater the number. Theoretically, the index can have a value under 1, for those rare cases in which the incumbent party is unable to obtain a yes vote from its own MPs.
37. See Capo, 'Oposición y minonías en las legislaturas socialistas', pp. 96-7.
38. See, among others, Joe D. Hagan, Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rlenner Publishers, 1993;
39. Lynn M. Maurer, 'Legislative-Executive Relations in a Newly-Consolidated Democracy: The Case of Spain', PhD dissertation, Columbus, Ohio State University, 1995;
40. José María Maravall, 'Accountability and Manipulation', in Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds), Democracy, Accountability and Representation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 154-96;
41. David Altman and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, 'Más allá de la poliarqui'a: una aproximación a la calidad de las democracias', Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 11 (1999), pp. 83-105.
42. Giuseppe Di Palma, 'Disaffection and Participation in Western Democracies: The Role of Political Oppositions', Journal of Politics, 31: 4 (1969), p. 987.
43. See Lipset y Rokkan (ed.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, New York, Free Press, 1967, pp. 9 ff.
44. Klaus von Beyme, 'Elite Input and Policy Output: The Case of Germany', in Moshe M. Czudnowski (ed.), Does Who Governs Matter?, DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1982, p. 63;
45. Belén Barreiro, 'Justificaciones, responsabilidades y cumplimiento de promesas electorales', Revista Española de Ciencia Político, 1: 1 (1999), p. 167.
46. Belén Barreiro, Democracia y conflicto moral: la político del aborto en España e Italia,
47. Madrid, Istmo, 2000; 'Judicial Review and Political Empowerment: Abortion in Spain', West European Politics, 21: 4 (1998), pp. 147-62.
48. As the number of organic laws dealing with foreign affairs is quite limited (10 laws) we have been forced to create a single category combining issues, regional governments and supranational institutions.
49. See Berta Alvarez-Miranda, Sur de Europa y la adhesión a la Comunidad: los debates políticos, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1996.
50. These analyses are available on request.