The costs and benefits of moral suasion: Evidence from the rescue of long-term capital management

Journal of Business

Volumn 79, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 593-622

  Furfine, Craig ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644915032     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/499132     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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