Why we are not allowed to sell that which we are encouraged to donate

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 60-70

  Björkman, Barbro ^a  

^a ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; COMMODIFICATION; DONOR; ECONOMICS; ETHICAL THEORY; ETHICS; HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH; HUMAN; MORALITY; ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION; REVIEW; TRANSPLANTATION;

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH;

COMMODIFICATION; ETHICAL THEORY; HUMANS; ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION; TISSUE AND ORGAN PROCUREMENT; TISSUE DONORS; VIRTUES;

EID: 33644910480     PISSN: 09631801     EISSN: 14692147     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0963180106060075     Document Type: Review

References (34)

1. There is an important distinction to be made between people who give up their organs while still alive and those who give up their organs posthumously. Naturally monetary compensation can be given to both groups; one could, for example, imagine a sort of reversed insurance system where I, on agreeing to the harvesting of certain organs after my death, collect some form of compensation today (monetary or otherwise). This paper, however, will focus on living individuals.
2. Another example might be the Lutheran opinion of letters of indulgences; it appears that on this view, forgiveness is something that can, and should, be given but never sold.
3. The following argument refers to the situation in an industrialized country, leaving open what further complications might arise in developing countries.
4. See, for example, Erin C., Harris J. An ethical market in human organs. Journal of Medical Ethics 2003;29:137-8;
5. Rhodes R. Organ transplantation. In: Kuhse H, Singer P, eds. A Companion to Bioethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing; 2001:329-40.
6. See, for example, Harvey J. Paying organ donors. Journal of Medical Ethics 1990;16:117-9.
7. Titmuss RM. The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. London: George Allen and Unwin; 1970.
8. Radcliffe-Richards J. Daar AS, Guttman RD, Hoffenberg R, Kennedy I, Lock M, Sells RA, Tilney N. The case for allowing kidney sales. The Lancet 1998;352:1950-2.
9. Savluescu J. Is the sale of body parts wrong? Journal of Medical Ethics 2003;29:138-9.
10. People's emotional aversions should not be granted the status of an argument as such (pro or con) but rather as an incentive, a motive, for looking for alternatives to the predominant consequentialist arguments. Hence, even if people were to feel differently, the virtuous thing to do would still be to refrain from selling one's organs.
11. Kant I. Lectures on Ethics, translated by Louis Infield. New York: Harper & Row; 1963:124.
12. See also Stempsey W. Organ markets and human dignity: On selling your body and soul. Christian Bioethics 2000;6(2):195-204.
13. See note 4, Rhodes R. 2001. Also see Savulescu, J. "Taking the plunge," New Scientist 2001;169:50.
14. Virtue ethics is frequently accused of not being satisfactorily action guiding; see, for example, Oakley J. A virtue ethics approach. In: Kuhse H, Singer P, eds. A Companion to Bioethics, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001:86-97;
15. Louden R. On some vices of virtue ethics. American Philosophical Quarterly 1984;21:227-36.
16. For an overview of the debate see Veatch RM. The place of care in ethical theory. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1998;23(2):210-24;
17. Gillian C. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.
18. A problem with the Aristotelian definition is that the difference between a virtue and a vice is not obvious. This distinction was further spelled out by Pincoffs, who suggested that a virtue is a trait of character, manifested in habitual action, that is good for a person to have. Pincoffs EL. Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductionism in Ethics. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas; 1986:78.
19. This could be contrasted with, for example, Nietzsche's views.
20. Crisp R, Slote M, eds. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003.
21. Swanton C. Virtue Ethics - A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003.
22. Broadie S, Rowe C. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics - Translation, Introduction and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2002:24.
23. My example draws heavily on Peter Singer's example from his 1972 essay "Famine, Affluence and Morality." See Singer P. Famine, affluence and morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1972;1:229-43.
24. Again, this should not be interpreted as saying that the consequences of an action are of no matter to the virtue ethicist.
25. A possible exception could be if the purpose of forcing the person in the predicament to make a promise is to make him/her refrain from committing a heinous deed that we know for sure she/he would otherwise commit.
26. Aristotle. The Politics 1323a 14-9.
27. Nussbaum M. Aristotelian social democracy. In: Douglass R, Mara G, Richardson H, eds. Liberalism and the Good. London: Routledge; 1990:203-52.
28. Galston W. Liberal Purposes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 1991:258-9.
29. See note 24, Galston 1991:18-9.
30. Hursthouse, R. After Hume's justice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1990-91;229-45.
31. Anscombe GEM. Ethics, Religion and Politics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing; 1981:138.
32. See note 26, Anscombe 1981:145.
33. See note 26, Hursthouse, at p. 235.
34. See note 3.