An economic response to unsolicited communication

Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 31-68

  Loder, Theodore ^a   Van Alstyne, Marshall ^b   Wash, Rick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Advertising; Call externalities; Coase Theorem; Email communication; Filter; Information asymmetry; Screening; Signaling; Spam; UCE

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644881439     PISSN: 15380637     EISSN: 15380637     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1538-0637.1322     Document Type: Article

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