Running in circles: chasing dewey

Educational Theory

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 315-341

  Glassman, Michael ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 33644855992     PISSN: 00132004     EISSN: 17415446     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0013-2004.2004.00022.x     Document Type: Article

References (111)

1. James and Dewey admired each other, but they did not work together formally to develop pragmatism. Some claim that James, because he came first, deeply influenced Dewey, but most scholars seem to agree that James' influence on Dewey was relatively minor. It is important to note that there was a third important character in the development of pragmatism: Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce actually coined the term "pragmatism." However, because Peirce lacked a strong academic base, was often ostracized by his peers, and sometimes wrote in an unintelligible style, his actual impact on the development of the school of philosophy known as pragmatism has been called into question. But without Peirce's formative influence, pragmatism might have been very different in character (and it would certainly have had a different name).
2. Darwin's influence was clearly responsible for the process of developing a (nonreligious) exploration of the human mind, if not the product of how to (scientifically) operationalize that exploration. This failure to develop a methodology for exploring the mind led James Angell to assert that Darwin did not have a major impact on psychology; however, I believe it is a mistake to underestimate Darwin's influence.
3. Dewey preferred the name experimental pragmatism, but this label is too easily confused with the experimental methodology that in many ways came to haunt him. At any rate, his preferred name never really caught on either inside or outside of pragmatism. Interestingly, despite numerous pleas, Dewey refused to rename pragmatism after the deaths of Peirce and James (see James Campbell, Understanding John Dewey [Chicago: Open Court Press, 1995]). Pragmatism is an obscure reference based on the Greek work pragmatikos, which means deed or affair; pragmatikos comes from the root word prassein, which means to pass through or experience. Peirce, in characteristic fashion, had come up with the perfect label for the fledgling philosophy, but nobody knew what it meant.
4. For an account of Watson's remarks, see Carl Murchison, A History of Psychology in Autobiography (Worcester, Massachusetts: Clark University Press, 1930/1953). For an account of Dunlap and Thorndike's comments, see John M. O'Donnell, The Origins of Behaviorism: American Psychology 1870-1920 (New York: New York University Press, 1985). This work will be cited as OB in the text for all subsequent references.
5. See William James, Pragmatism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1907). Angell studied with Dewey as an undergraduate before doing his advanced work with James at Harvard. In The Origins of Behaviorism, O'Donnell suggests that Angell's study in Europe, and possibly his relationship with Hugo Münsterberg, who was James' experimental alter ego at Harvard, may have significantly influenced him. When Dewey later hired Angell as a faculty member into his department at the University of Chicago, Angell seemed to be more of an experimental psychologist than philosophical pragmatist (see OB, 171-174).
6. See for example, John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt, 1927).
7. John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Psychological Review 3, no. 4 (1896): 357-370.
8. See, for example, O'Donnell, OB, 172-173;
9. and Elizabeth V. Gifford and Steven C. Hayes, "Functional Contextualism: A Pragmatic Philosophy for Behavioral Science," in Handbook of Behaviorism, eds. William O'Donohue and Richard Kitchener (New York: Academic Press, 1998), 287-322.
10. See, for example, Campbell, Understanding John Dewey
11. and John R. Shook, Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000).
12. This point suggests that a more meaningful title for this philosophical position might have been based on the word context. Indeed, in his book World Hypotheses (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942), Stephen Pepper tried to attach the label "contextualism" to what Peirce and James had called pragmatism. He was too late in the history of ideas, however, and the term contextualism eventually took on a much vaguer and more ambiguous meaning in the social sciences.
13. William James, The Principles of Psychology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1890).
14. Lev Semenovich Vygotsky later made the same point in Problems of General Psychology, vol. 1 of The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky, eds. Robert W. Rieber and Aaron S. Carton (New York: Plenum, 1988).
15. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publications, 1929); and John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Minton, Balch, 1929).
16. It is difficult to know whether Dewey appropriated many of James' pragmatic ideas because he became disenchanted with dualism or if he abandoned dualism because of James' pragmatic ideas. The former is the more practical explanation of Dewey's theoretical development, but the latter is suggested by Jane Dewey in her 1939 biography of her father. See Jane Dewey, "Biography of John Dewey," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing, 1939), 23.
17. Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); and Jane Dewey, "Biography of John Dewey," 1-46.
18. Richard Rorty has characterized this change of heart as a major mistake because it ties Dewey too closely to a notion of human progress in which experience and nature are understood as separate rather than as parts of a continuum. I disagree on this point. The lack of any metaphysical explication leaves Dewey far too open to misinterpretation (and he is misinterpreted enough as it is). Without a knowledge of Dewey's concept of experience it is almost impossible to understand "The Reflex Arc Concept." See Richard Rorty, "Dewey Between Hegel and Darwin," in Rorty and Pragmatism, ed. Herman Saatkamp (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press,1995).
19. John Dewey and Albert Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949). In this work Dewey suggested that he first explored a transactive understanding of experience, which is closely tied to his metaphysics, in "The Reflex Arc Concept."
20. Late in his career Dewey replaced the word interactive with transactive. This change did not affect the meaning for Dewey. See H.S. Thayer, The Logic of Pragmatism (New York: The Humanities Press, 1952). Dewey had the problem of choosing very common words to represent critical theoretical conceptions (for example, his use of "experience"). Unfortunately, this led to frequent misinterpretation of his work. One of the concepts that suffered most was interaction. What Dewey intended to convey is that in an interaction, two organisms come together and engage in an activity. The organisms are separate, but the experience is based in unity. This means that the activity will have an impact of both organisms that each will carry to its next experience, whether they remain together or go their separate ways. This concept is essential to Dewey's larger theory of a participatory democracy. Many readers understood interaction in a more general sense, however, as referring to two organisms simply meeting and perhaps engaging in some type of exchange. As a result of this misunderstanding, Dewey felt compelled to replace the word interaction with the more specific transaction.
21. For a discussion of warranted assertability, see John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938). Note also that James had developed a personalized vision of truth for his pragmatism, while Dewey initially wanted to define a much more public concept of truth. According to James, if an idea or an object works in your everyday life, then it has truth value (suggesting the extent to which he separated his philosophy of mind from his ideas on laboratory research). For more on this point, see James, Pragmatism.
22. If J.E. Tiles is correct about the importance the term naive realism held for Dewey (and I believe he is), it has critical implications for Dewey's theory. See J.E. Tiles, Dewey (London: Routledge, 1988). The physicist and logical positivist Hans Reichenbach would later apply the term naive realism to his own theory of knowledge. See Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1938). Reichenbach's naive realism claims that sentences only have meaning through verification, a notion very similar to Dewey's idea that knowledge is the result of experience-based experimentation. Reichenbach used the term to compare (in a positive way) his own theory of knowledge to Dewey's and thus to demonstrate the connection between Dewey's theory and modern physics (including relativity as well as quantum physics). For more on this relationship, see Hans Reichenbach, "Dewey's Theory of Science," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Schilpp, 263-290. This also explains why, when the logical positivists were planning their first volume in the United States, John Dewey was one of the first American philosophers they approached (see Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism).
23. Robert Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
24. See O'Donnell, OB; and Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy.
25. It should be noted that a number of Dewey's early works were in the area of psychology, including his 1887 textbook Psychology (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887). In addition, he served as president of the American Psychological Association in 1899-1900.
26. Interestingly, even though Hall was originally James' student at Harvard, they had a very contentious relationship.
27. Most biographers who have examined the relationship between Hall and Dewey are either philosophers or political scientists who have little interest in psychology.
28. In a relatively autobiographical work, Hall named Dewey as one of his students along with James McKeen Cattell, Henry Herbert Donaldson, and Joseph Jastrow - Dewey was even the first listed. See Lorine Pruette, G. Stanley Hall, A Biography of Mind (New York: D. Appleton, 1926). He also claimed that Dewey helped him develop the first laboratory in the United States at Johns Hopkins University. Hall did not mention James, on the other hand. Dorothy Ross, Hall's preeminent biographer, also lists Dewey as one of Hall's students at Johns Hopkins and suggests he was influenced by Hall's naturalism. See Dorothy Ross, G. Stanley Hall (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972). In Jane Dewey's biography of her father, Hall is mentioned but only in a single sentence. Dewey, through his daughter, was extraordinarily generous to many of the people whom he believed had influenced his thinking, so the brief mention in her biography suggests that Dewey did not think much of Hall's influence. The primary influence Hall might have had on Dewey was in his use of a genetic/evolutionary model, but even this is questionable for two reasons. First, Robert Westbrook suggests that Dewey read the journal 19th Century while an undergraduate, and this source certainly would have exposed him to evolutionary theory far more advanced than Hall's (see Robert Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991]). Second, familiarity with their work suggests that Dewey's vision of evolution was almost diametrically opposed to Hall's vision and use of Darwin and Francis Galton.
29. See O'Donnell, OB, 49. I am aware that this narrative presents a less sympathetic depiction of Hall than of Dewey. I have three responses. First, I believe that it is important to recognize that Hall's ambition and opportunism helped create the field of psychology in the first place and laid the foundation for strong links between psychology and education. On the other hand, Dewey, despite his eminence as a scholar in the United States during the early part of the twentieth century and his committed public activism, actually created very little that was lasting (beyond his own scholarship). Second, like Hall, Dewey had personality flaws. He could be quite cruel (in a very ethereal way) toward those who displeased him (his treatment of Randolph Bourne is one example), but these episodes are most often related to his public activism. And third, any discrepancy in how I have drawn these two scholars simply represents their personalities and how contemporaries viewed them. Hall was disliked by any number of people (including James and Ladd), not because of his theories, but because he was Hall.
30. Ross, G. Stanley Hall.
31. In the same account where he claimed Dewey as a student, Hall also observed that his own "life has been a series of fads or crazes" (see Pruette, G. Stanley Hall, A Biography of Mind, 3).
32. Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism.
33. Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: Norton, 1981).
34. Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar Strauss, 2001).
35. For example, Dewey did not attend the first meeting of the American Psychological Association. Hall clearly invited other philosopher-psychologists, such as James and Josiah Royce, but it is not clear whether Dewey was absent because Hall did not invite him or because he declined the invitation.
36. Thorndike would later claim that Hall was not scientific enough (in other words, not Hallian enough) in his approach.
37. In commenting on Dewey's body of work, Gordon Allport, who obviously had great affection for his subject, came to the conclusion that Dewey's impact on psychology would be limited because he lacked "fixed variables" and relied on "spiraling processes [that] make orderly analysis in terms of separate variables impossible." See Gordon W. Allport, "Dewey's Individual and Social Psychology," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Schilpp, 288. Somewhere Hall was laughing.
38. Ross, G. Stanley Hall.
39. Franz Boas, working in Boston and having developed a relationship with Hall, used a similar methodology for a very controversial study measuring the physical development of Boston school children.
40. Ross, G. Stanley Hall.
41. James R. Angell, "The Province of Functional Psychology," Psychological Review 14, no. 2 (1907): 61-91.
42. James actually hated the drudgery of laboratory work (see OB; and Menand, The Metaphysical Club). One of the ironies of modern psychology is that the two individuals who founded strict, laboratory-based empirical investigation in the United States, James and Hall, actually published very little of this type of work. Hall produced only four unpublished experimental manuscripts and one published experimental manuscript. James had only one published experimental manuscript in which he considered the explication of the process far more important than the product.
43. Some historians of psychology claim that James embraced experimentalism first and then moved to philosophy later in his career (see, for example, O'Donnell's discussion in The Origins of Behaviorism). This idea probably derives from the fact that many later psychologists followed the model of experimental work first and philosophy later (for instance, Hall claimed to have followed this sequence, but Hall claimed many things). A careful reading of James' work and career path shows, however, that this is probably not the course he followed. James was initially a philosopher, and this was always the dominant part of his intellectual agenda (for a detailed discussion of this point, see Menand, The Metaphysical Club). James seemed to keep laboratory work in a separate compartment of his mind.
44. The fact that Angell was John Watson's adviser is suggestive. It seems unlikely that Watson would have made such a strong break with Dewey so soon after his graduation from the University of Chicago without some encouragement from, or at least the silent acquiescence of, his mentor. Furthermore, Angell agreed with Thorndike and the Hallians on the issue of eugenics, though his position was more reflective of a positive eugenics.
45. Of course by the time Angell introduced functionalism, Hall played a far less important role in the APA; however, his doctrinal influence continued and remains evident to this day.
46. Titchener was very close to Hall, and Angell was close to James, at a time when James and Hall were battling over the fate of psychology. One has to wonder if the functionalist/structuralist split was something of a battle by proxy.
47. Shook, Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality.
48. Edmund Black, The War Against the Weak (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003); and Gould, The Mismeasure of Man.
49. Ross, G. Stanley Hall.
50. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man.
51. Edward Thorndike, "Eugenics: With Special Reference to Intellect and Character," in Eugenics: Twelve University Lectures (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1912), 319-342.
52. Frances X. Ryan, Darwin's Impact: Social Evolution in America (Chicago: Thoemmes Press, 2001).
53. For more on Thorndike's position, see Thorndike, Eugenics. For examples of Dewey's early work on intelligence and morality, see John Dewey, "Interpretation of Savage Mind," Psychological Review 9, no. 3 (1902): 217-230;
54. and "The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality II: Its Significance for Conduct," Philosophical Review 11 (1902): 353-371. Dewey's decision to develop a metaphysics (around 1915) was a major break with pragmatism as defined by Peirce, James, and even the earlier Dewey. A question that has perplexed a number of Dewey scholars is why he made such a drastic and fateful change of course. Many scholars seem to follow Jane Dewey's suggestion that Dewey was responding to intellectual interactions with Coleridge and his philosophy students at Columbia (see Jane Dewey, "Biography of John Dewey"). I have never been satisfied with this explanation: from a pragmatic perspective, metaphysics does not have enough power as an instrument for solving problems to warrant the initiation of this type of inquiry. I believe the timing of Dewey's turn toward metaphysics suggests that he may have undertaken this inquiry as a way to establish the type of voice that could effectively counter Goddard, Terman, Robert Yerkes, and especially Thorndike. One of the strengths of the eugenics movement was its ability to explain all human development through a general metaphysics (based on the transfer of genetic materials). Dewey's switch to metaphysics, marked by the publication of Democracy and Education in 1916, occurred just as the intelligence testing/eugenics movement, and Thorndike's place in it, was reaching its apogee. (It is important to note that Dewey's pursuit of metaphysics had little impact on his philosophical trajectory, which was coherent throughout his mature period.)
55. This is a primary reason it is so important to recognize and appreciate Dewey's metaphysics, even early in his career.
56. The arguments that Gould makes against the intelligence tests in The Mismeasure of Man could have easily been taken from Dewey's writings of the 1910s.
57. In general terms, the democratic realist position was this: because participatory democracy fails far more often than it succeeds (that is, propagandists who appeal to the most base aspects of the human condition often prevail over superior candidates), it cannot really be trusted as a governing tool. Therefore, they considered it preferable to establish an elite intermediary class (between the populace and the state) that would govern for the benefit of all. The democratic realists were particularly interested in two psychological theories: Freud (because of his depiction of base human instincts) and intelligence testers (because of their assertion that there was a "scientific" approach to proving the existence of this elite class). For a discussion of democratic realism, see Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy.
58. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916).
59. Walter Lippman, The Phantom Public (New York: Macmillan, 1925).
60. Gordon W. Allport, "Dewey's Individual and Social Psychology," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Schilpp, 263-290;
61. and John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Schilpp, 515-608.
62. Of course, philosophical/theoretical considerations continue to inform psychology today, but I believe that it is more than a little bit disingenuous to claim that these aspects of psychology have the power and influence that James and Ladd originally envisioned for them.
63. This model emerged from both Galtonian "metaphysics" and methodology and from the important role that phrenology played in the development of psychology on the European continent.
64. Dewey, "The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Psychology."
65. Clearly, many scholars have done interesting work in these different areas; for the sake of efficiency, I limit my discussion here to a couple of representative scholars for each theoretical model. Furthermore, while I am aware that there are disagreements within each of these theoretical models, a discussion of these is beyond the scope of this paper.
66. John Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1963). It is important to note the limits of these parallels, however. Piaget focused on the subject of epistemology and considered himself to be a "genetic epistemologist," while Dewey shunned epistemology as such. As Arthur Lovejoy noted, for Dewey there is never knowledge, but always knowledge coming into existence (see Arthur Murphy Lovejoy, "The Epistemology and Metaphysics," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Schilpp, 203).
67. Jean Piaget, The Equilibration of Cognitive Structures: The Central Problem of Intellectual Development (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
68. Piaget is similar to Dewey in his contention that in order for a genetic response to have significance, it must be based on an active adjustment to the problem presented by the situation. If the child offers a parallel answer (that is, the same type of answer to different problems) again and again, that means that the child has been robbed of vital experience and has no chance to move beyond rote (habitual) response.
69. For some examples, See Robert Case, "The Development of Conceptual Structures," in The Handbook of Child Psychology: Cognition, Perception and Language, vol. 2, eds. Deanna Kuhn and Robert S. Siegler (New York: Wiley, 1998), 745-800;
70. and Nora Newcombe and Janellan Huttenlocher, "Children's Early Ability to Solve Perspective-Taking Problems," Developmental Psychology 28, no. 4 (1992): 635-643.
71. Dewey abandoned the Hegelian notion of conflict relatively early in his career (there is much debate over whether Dewey abandoned Hegel completely). The practical arguments presented by Jane Addams strongly influenced Dewey in this direction. See Mary Jo Deegan, Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School, 1892-1918 (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988).
72. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.
73. This led to an unfortunate distinction (dating back to the Angell/Titchener split) between Piaget's functionalism and his structuralism.
74. Leslie Smith, "Epistemological Principles for Developmental Psychology in Frege and Piaget," New Ideas in Psychology 17, no. 2 (1999): 83-117.
75. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. See also the discussion of Dewey's debates with Bertrand Russell in R.W. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
76. See, for example, Jean Lave, Cognition in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
77. Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism. As previously noted, Hall also had a relationship with Boas.
78. Dewey felt that the word experience carried too much baggage. Little did he know what was in store for the word culture.
79. For Dewey's discussion of the relationship between scientific knowledge and everyday knowledge, see John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty.
80. He describes these experiments in John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913).
81. It is important to remember that Dewey wanted to name his theory experimental pragmatism.
82. Lave, Cognition in Practice.
83. Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known.
84. For Lave's discussion of "transfer" of knowledge, see Lave, Cognition in Practice. I would argue that Lave's unspoken target is actually the eugenics mindset of stable problem-solving abilities.
85. Dewey, "The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality."
86. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems.
87. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.
88. I think one of the reasons Rorty is so critical of Dewey's turn to metaphysics is that he does not approach the theory from the intersection of psychology and educational policy, but rather from philosophy.
89. L.S. Vygotsky, Thinking and Speech, in Problems of General Psychology, eds. Rieber and Carton.
90. Michael Glassman, "Dewey and Vygotsky: Society, Experience and Inquiry in Educational Practice," Educational Researcher 30, no. 4 (2002): 3-14.
91. In discussing Dewey, it is important to differentiate between the writings of Karl Marx and Marxist ideology. Dewey claimed he had read very little of Marx's work and, therefore, had no concrete opinion of him (see Sidney Hook, The Meaning of Marx [New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1935]). Still, some scholars have argued that Dewey's writings bear a marked similarity to those of Marx (see Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy). Marxist-based ideologies were a completely different issue for Dewey. Dewey felt a natural antipathy toward the centralized bureaucracies these ideologies often preached. He was also influenced away from Marxism by his former students Sidney Hook and Max Eastman.
92. L.S. Vygotsky, "The Problem of the Cultural Development of the Child," in The Vygotsky Reader, eds. René Van der Veer and Jaan Valsiner (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1996), 55-72.
93. An important exception is James Wertsch, who has done excellent work in this area. See, for example, James Wertsch, Voice of the Mind: A Sociocultural Approach to Mediated Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
94. Vygotsky, Thinking and Speech, chap. 7. For an extended discussion, see Michael Glassman, "Understanding Vygotsky's Motive and Goal: An Exploration of the Work of A.N. Leontiev," Human Development 39, no. 6 (1996): 309-327.
95. A.N. Leontiev, Problems in the Development of the Mind (Moscow: Progress Press, 1981).
96. A.N. Leontiev, Activity, Consciousness and Personality (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1978). I would argue that despite the fact that Leontiev used the same terminology, in this respect he was moving away from Vygotsky's intellectual alliance with the great theater work of Konstantin Stanislavsky.
97. At least this seemed to be Dewey's understanding of their argument. See John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916).
98. I am not as sure about Vygotsky, who I believe is much more ambiguous on this issue.
99. I believe that, ultimately, this is the argument Vygotsky was attempting to make in "Thought and Word."
100. My own thinking about Leontiev is that he was never able to overcome the problem of dualism in the way that Dewey did because he wanted to retain an external meaning system that could be measured.
101. Yrjo Engestrom, Learning by Expanding (Helsinki: Orienta-Konsultit Oy, 1987).
102. I would argue that, at least when considering thinking and problem solving, Engestrom's theory may come closest to what Dewey was attempting to explore in "The Reflect Arc Concept" and "Interpretation of Savage Mind." Engestrom's triangle seems to capture the role of the transactive nature of each experience. At the same time, he (like most others in this group) has not developed an advanced metaphysics, and this limits his explication of melioration through change. It is important to point out that Engestrom does not recognize Dewey as one of his influences. Dewey might have liked this fact, however, because it would enable him to claim that Engestrom came to many of the same realizations through his own experience.
103. For an overview, see Kenneth J. Gergen, "Psychological Science in a Post-Modern Context," American Psychologist 56, no. 10 (2001): 803-813.
104. This is a radical conception with which few postmodernists or pragmatists would agree.
105. See, for example, Gergen, "Psychological Science in a Post Modern Context"; and Jack Martin and Jeff Sugarman, "Between the Modern and the Postmodern: The Possibility of Self and Progressive Understanding in Psychology," American Psychologist 55, no. 4 (2000): 397-406.
106. See, for example, Jacques Derrida, On Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
107. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953).
108. Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known.
109. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.
110. See, for example, Lave, Cognition in Practice.
111. Leontiev, Activity, Consciousness and Personality.