Computationally-efficient combinatorial auctions for resource allocation in weakly-coupled MDPs

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 787-794

  Dolgov, Dmitri ^a   Durfee, Edmund ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial Auctions; Distributed Implementation; Generalized Vickrey Auctions; Markov Decision Processes

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION; GENERALIZED VICKREY AUCTIONS; MARKOV DECISION PROCESSES;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; RANDOM PROCESSES; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS;

EID: 33644801199     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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