Nature appreciation, science, and positive aesthetics

British Journal of Aesthetics

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 279-295

  Parsons, Glenn ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644699813     PISSN: 00070904     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjaesthetics/42.3.279     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Allen Carlson, 'Nature, Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 40 (1981), pp. 15-27. Note this is not the claim that viewing nature using scientific information about it is necessary and sufficient for appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, but the claim that viewing nature aesthetically (whatever that may mean) in light of such information is necessary and sufficient for its appropriate aesthetic appreciation.
2. Carlson sometimes describes his view as the weaker claim that scientific knowledge is necessary for appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature (see, e.g., 'Nature, Aesthetic Appreciation, and Knowledge', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 53 [1995], pp. 393-400, esp. p. 393). In conversation, however, he acknowledges that the claim that aesthetic appreciation together with scientific knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature is plausible and merits careful consideration. Furthermore, I will argue that Carlson's position actually requires the stronger claim.
3. Allen Carlson, 'Nature and Positive Aesthetics', Environmental Ethics, vol. 6 (1984), pp. 5-34.
4. Kendall Walton, 'Categories of Art', Philosophical Review, vol. 79 (1970), pp. 334-367 [hereafter CA].
5. Carlson, 'Nature, Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity', p. 21.
6. Emily Brady, 'Imagination and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 56 (1998), pp. 139-147 at p. 140.
7. Similarly, Thomas Heyd asserts that knowledge about the relationship between two types of tree is irrelevant to appreciating them. See his 'Aesthetic Appreciation and the Many Stories About Nature', British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 41 (2001), pp. 125-137, esp. p. 128.
8. Robert Stecker, 'The Correct and the Appropriate in the Appreciation of Nature', British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 37 (1997), pp. 393-402, at p. 398.
9. Malcolm Budd raises a related but distinct concern in 'The Aesthetics of Nature', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 100 (2000), pp. 137-157; I discuss Budd's concern in detail in Section VI.
10. Yuriko Saito, 'Appreciating Nature on its Own Terms', Environmental Ethics, vol. 20 (1998), pp. 135-149, at pp. 144-145.
11. Compare Saito's claim that 'the molecular structure of a rock.... seems too removed from our immediate perceptual arena to be realizable on the sensuous surface [of the rock]', and so cannot inform our aesthetic appreciation of it (Saito, 'Appreciating Nature on its Own Terms', pp. 144-145).
12. Heyd, 'Aesthetic Appreciation and the Many Stories about Nature', pp. 128-129.
13. See also Stecker, 'The Correct and the Appropriate in the Appreciation of Nature', p. 401,
14. Cf. Brady, 'Imagination and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature', p. 141.
15. Such an aesthetic response fits the general manner in which properties contra-standard for observers tend to function in Walton's theory: that is, they produce negative aesthetic judgements. See Walton, CA, p. 352. Cf. the case of the living room with a sink, discussed in Section II.
16. For discussion of different versions of positive aesthetics, see Malcolm Budd, 'The Aesthetics of Nature'.
17. See Carlson, 'Nature and Positive Aesthetics'.
18. Eddy Zemach also argues for the employment of a beauty making criterion for the selection of the correct manner of appreciating artworks. See his Real Beauty (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State U.P., 1997), pp. 86-89.
19. Carlson, 'Nature, Aesthetic Judgement, and Objectivity', p. 27, n. 21.
20. On the latter point, Janna Thompson writes that 'if beauty in nature or in art is merely in the eyes of the beholder, then no general moral obligation arises out of aesthetic judgments'. See her 'Aesthetics and the Value of Nature', Environmental Ethics, vol. 17 (1995), pp. 291-305, at p. 292.
21. See also Budd, 'The Aesthetics of Nature', p. 141.