The 10 major problems with the anti-dumping instrument in the European community

Journal of World Trade

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 105-113

  Vermulst, Edwin ^a  

^a Waer and Verhaeghe   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANTIDUMPING; TRADE POLICY;

EURASIA; EUROPE;

EID: 33644635516     PISSN: 10116702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.54648/trad2005011     Document Type: Review

References (21)

1. In hierarchical order: the Anti-dumping Committee (ADC); the Commercial Questions Group (CQG), the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Council.
2. Article 5.5 ADA.
3. Thus, e.g., the Commission's "zeroing" practice was upheld repeatedly by the ECJ.
4. European Communities - Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India, Report of the Panel, WT/DS141/R, 30 October 2000;
5. EC - Bed Linen, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS141/AB/R, 1 March 2001.
6. Where the margin is less than 10 percent, a difference of more than 1 percent will be considered significant; where the dumping margin is between 10 and 20 percent, a difference of 2 percent will be considered significant, ect.
7. Victims: Vertically integrated companies.
8. Victims: countries with open account system, such as Korea, industries with standard payment terms, such as PSF and PTY industries in Thailand and Indonesia, developing countries where local currency interest rates are still relatively high.
9. Victims: developing countries where import duties are still relatively high and where verification systems often are under-developed.
10. The term "importer" is defined broadly by the EC authorities. Thus, it is, for example, not necessary that the related party actually "imported" the merchandise.
11. EC AD legislation does not contain a definition of "related parties".
12. Notably the "legally recognized partners in business" and the 5 percent shareholding concepts allow for the broad definition.
13. In May 2004, the following countries were listed as non-market economies: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, People's Republic of China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam.
14. Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002, [2002], O.J. L305/1.
15. These five conditions are: - decisions of firms regarding prices, costs and inputs, including for instance raw materials, cost of technology and labour, output, sales and investment, are made in response to market signals reflecting supply and demand, and without significant State interference in this regard, and costs of major inputs substantially reflect market values, - firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are independently audited in line with international accounting standards and are applied for all purposes, - the production costs and financial situation of firms are not subject to significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system, in particular in relation to depreciation of assets, other write-offs, barter trade and payment via compensation of debts, - the firms concerned are subject to bankruptcy and property laws which guarantee legal certainty and stability for the operation of firms, and - exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate. It is particularly the second condition that often creates problems in concrete cases.
16. In multi-country proceedings, injury tends to be assessed on a cumulated basis.
17. Exceptionally, the Commission will calculate injury margins on a country-wide basis, e.g., in the Photocopiers case.
18. Dumping margins tend to be relatively high in non-market economy cases and cases where parties are vertically integrated.
19. Member States, in contrast, have repeatedly blocked Commission proposals to impose AD measures, at least implicitly on the basis of their assessment of Community interest.
20. The typical exception to the rule probably is Gum rosin from China, [1994] O.J. L41/50, where it was decided not to impose AD duties on China because the interests of the EC processing industry outweighed those of the sole EC gum rosin producer in Portugal.
21. Judgment of the Court, 30 September 2003, in Case C-76/01 P, Eurocoton and Others v Council.