Iran and North Korea: The proliferation Nexus

Survival

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 61-80

  Fitzpatrick, Mark ^a  

^a IISS ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644616089     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00396330600594264     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Glenn Kessler and Dafna Linzer, 'Nuclear Evidence Could Point To Pakistan', Washington Post, 3 February 2005.
2. Director of Central Intelligence, 'Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 21 December 2003', http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/archive/reports_2003.html, p. 5.
3. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (Basingstoke: Palgrave for the IISS, 2004), p. 67.
4. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2005), p. 96.
5. Kenneth Katzman, 'Iran: U.S. Policies and Options', Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 14 January 2000, p. 19.
6. IISS, North Korea's Weapons Programmes, p. 95.
7. See, for example, reports of cruise missiles exported to Iran in summer 2003: John Larkin and Donald MacIntye, 'Arsenal of the Axis', Time Asia Magazine, 14 July 2003.
8. Tom Warner, 'Ukraine Sold Cruise Missiles to Iran, China', Financial Times, 3 February 2005, http://news.ft.com/cms/s/ c2e687e4-758a-11d9-9608-00000e2511c8.html.
9. IISS, Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes, p. 104.
10. See, for example, Con Coughlin, 'Russia Helps Iran with Missile Threat to Europe', The Daily Telegraph, 16 October 2005.
11. Einar Koch, 'Irans Rekoten reichen bald bis Berlin', Bild, 16 December 2005, http://www.bild.t-online.de/BTO/news/2005/12/16/iran_raketen/ iran_raketen_berlin.html.
12. Interview with author, January 2006.
13. Alireza Jafarzadeh, presentation at Washington National Press Club, 21 November 2005; http://www.iranpolicy.org/images/stories/Nov21event/ jafarzadeh_statement_21nov05-final.doc.
14. This is a variation on a media story from the summer that a team of North Korean construction experts had arrived in Tehran to conduct a survey of Iranian requirements for underground bunkers to produce highly enriched uranium (Con Coughlin, 'North Korea to Help Iran Dig Secret Missile Bunkers', The Daily Telegraph, 6 July 2005).
15. Der Spiegel, 'Mullahs helfen Stalinisten' [Mullahs Helping Stalinists], 28 November 2005, p. 117.
16. Bill Gertz, 'N. Korea Ships Fuel, Missiles to Yemen', The Washington Times, 2 December 2002.
17. Roger Howard, Iran in Crisis; Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response (London: Zed Books, 2004), p. 103;
18. also Joongang Ilbo, 15 June 2003.
19. 'U.S. Official: Iran Acting as Proxy to Test North Korean Missiles', Associated Press, 6 August 2004.
20. 'Japan Suspects Iran-North Korean Cruise Missile Link: Reports', Reuters, 26 June 2005.
21. Louis Charbonneau, 'North Korea Provides Nuclear Aid to Iran', Reuters, 5 July 2005. As part of the 17 September 2002 North Korea-Japan Pyongyang Declaration with Prime Minister Koizumi, DPRK leader Kim Jong Il agreed to indefinitely extend the moratorium. He repeated the pledge in May 2004, but a year later North Korea threatened to end the moratorium.
22. Among the more wildly exaggerated claims, repeated by journalist Kenneth Timmerman without caveat, is that in 1993 Kim Il Sung agreed North Korea would help Iran make operational the nuclear warheads it had purchased from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics. Kenneth R. Timmerman, Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran (New York: Crown Forum, 2005), p. 124.
23. See, for example, 'Ties Deepen Between North Korea and Iran', Vantage Point, Yonhap News Agency, April 2005, pp. 20-21;
24. and 'North Korea, Iran to Enhance Bilateral Relations', Vantage Point, November 2005, p. 34.
25. Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, reported that at a 2003 Track II meeting in Geneva with members of Iran's Expediency Council, the Iranians pulled him aside after the formal session and pressed him exclusively about what Washington planned to do about North Korea. Henry D. Sokolski, 'Nonproliferation Hinges on North Korea', Wall Street Journal, 19 August 2003.
26. For example, North Korea's Nodong Sinmun, the organ of the North's ruling Workers' Party, said in its 28 November 2005 edition that the United States and other Western countries are sticking to a policy of hostility against Iran's nuclear development programme, and that 'it is a lawful and self-supporting right of any country to develop and use peaceful nuclear technology'. 'Headline: North Korea Backs Iran's Right to Nuclear Programme - Yonhap', BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 December 2005.
27. 'North Proposes Co-Owning Reactor', Joongang Ilbo, 18 November 2005.
28. The IAEA has detailed 14 separate kinds of failures by Iran since 1991 to report nuclear activities and facilities that it was required to declare under its safeguards agreement, including the importation of nuclear materials and equipment, and 113 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal, separated plutonium and polonium-210;
29. the latter can be used as a neutron initiator for nuclear weapons. See 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,' Report by the Director General, GOV/2004/83, 5 November 2004, http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/gov2004-83_derestrict.pdf. Iran in 2005 admitted to a document from the A.Q. Khan network relating to the casting and machining of uranium metal in hemispherical forms, which has no purpose other than for nuclear weapons. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards. Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2005/87, 18 November 2005, www.iaea.org/ Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-87.pdf). In July 2005, the United States briefed the IAEA on thousands of pages of Farsi-language computer files that intelligence agencies acquired documenting Iranian efforts efforts from 2001 to 2003 to adapt its Shahab-3 missile to deliver a 'black box' that experts at US nuclear-weapons laboratories believe almost certainly is a nuclear warhead.
30. Carla Anne Robbins, 'US Gives Briefing on Iranian Missile to Nuclear Agency', Wall Street Journal, 27 July 2005 p. 3.
31. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical; The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 210-11.
32. Nazila Fathi and Michael Slackman, 'Iran's Oratory Reflects Devotion to 79 Revolution', New York Times, 20 December 2005.
33. Remarks at a 20 October 2005 London forum at the British Academy sponsored by the Institute for Public Policy Research. See also Mark Leonard, 'Can EU Diplomacy Stop Iran's Nuclear Programme', Centre for European Reform Working Paper, November 2005, p. 10.
34. Robert J. Einhorn, 'A Transatlantic Strategy on Iran's Nuclear Program', The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 4, Autumn 2004, p. 28.
35. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050428-9.html.
36. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050913-5.html.
37. Colum Lynch, 'U.S. Presses Russia to Halt Trade in Nuclear Technology with Iran', Washington Post, 4 October 2005.
38. David Sanger, 'Bush Backs Plan to Move Iran's Uranium Enrichment to Russia', New York Times, 18 November 2005.
39. On 18 July 2005, President Bush pledged to seek support from Congress to adjust US laws and policies and to work with friends and allies to adjust Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines to 'enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India'.
40. IISS, Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes, p. 17.
41. Robert Einhorn, unpublished presentation on 'U.S. Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea and Iran: Similar Challenges?' at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 9 November 2005 (summarised in http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction= events.print&event_id=153980&). As Einhorn put it, 'the downside risk of lending some legitimacy to Kim Jong Il's doomed regime is manageable'.
42. John Chipman, remarks upon press launch of Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes, 6 September 2005, http://www.iiss.org/showdocument.php?docID=661.
43. C. Kenneth Quinones, 'The United States in North Korea's Foreign Policy', in Byung Chul Koh (ed.), North Korea and the World - Explaining Pyongyang's Foreign Policy (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 2004), p. 127.
44. IAEA INFCIRC/651, 'Communication Dated 8 August 2005 Received from the Resident Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the Agency', http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/ infcirc651.pdf.
45. Robert S. Litwak, 'Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change', Survival, vol. 45, no. 4, Winter 2003-04, pp. 7-32.
46. Einhorn, 'U.S. Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea'.