The making of militants: The state and Islam in Central Asia

Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 554-566

  McGlinchey, Eric ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ISLAMISM; POPULAR PROTEST; STATE ROLE;

ASIA; CENTRAL ASIA; EURASIA;

EID: 33644549684     PISSN: 1089201X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/1089201X-25-3-554     Document Type: Article

References (87)

1. Gregory Massell has convincingly demonstrated that Islam provided the basis for mobilization against Soviet authoritarian rule in the 1920s. Today's Islamist movements by no means are a new phenomenon, and the logic I develop here can equally be applied to explain past Central Asian Islamist-based opposition movements. For more on Soviet-era Islamist opposition, see Gregory Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat. Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).
2. Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, 47-60;
3. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): 22-49.
4. Seth Mydans, "19 Killed in Uzbekistan; Terrorism Blamed," New York Times, 30 March 2004.
5. Sayyid Qutb, "Introduction," in Signposts in the Road (Indianapolis, IN: American Trust, 1990), 6.
6. Ibid., 5.
7. Ibid., 8.
8. Ibid., 8-9.
9. Ibid., 8.
10. Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilisation (London: Al-Khilafah, 2002), 63, www..hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/books/ clashofcivilisation/clashofcivilisation.pdf.
11. Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, www.theatlantic.com/issues/90sep/rage.htm. Lewis has met privately with Bush political strategist Karl Rove, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Vice President Dick Cheney. Emphasizing Lewis's influence on U.S. foreign policy, the Wall Street Journal refers to the retired Princeton professor's ideas as the "Lewis Doctrine." As David Frum, Bush's former speechwriter, noted to the Wall Street Journal, the president has been seen "carrying a marked-up article by Mr. Lewis among his briefing papers."
12. Peter Waldman, "Containing Jihad: A Historian's Take on Islam Steers U.S. in Terrorism Fight," Wall Street Journal, 3 February 2004.
13. Ahmed Rashid, "The New Struggle in Central Asia: A Primer for the Baffled," World Policy Journal, Winter 2000-2001, 33.
14. For more on the academic side of this debate, see Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (New York: Blackwell, 1986).
15. Qutb, "Introduction."
16. Edward Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," Nation, 22 October 2001, www.thenation.com.
17. "Rumsfeld Praises Army General Who Ridicules Islam as 'Satan,'" New York Times, 17 October 2003.
18. John O. Voll and John L. Esposito, "Islam's Democratic Essence," Middle East Ouarterly, September 1994, www.meforum.org.
19. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations," 25.
20. Paul E. Corcoran, "The Limits of Democratic Theory," in Democratic Theory and Practice, ed. G. Duncan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 13-24. Quoted in Voll and Esposito, "Islam's Democratic Essence."
21. Abdou Filali-Ansary, "What Is Liberal Islam? The Sources of Enlightened Muslim Thought," Journal of Democracy 14(2):19-33.
22. Clash theorists do address the Turkish case but see it as an example of exceptionalism rather than a harbinger of political reform in other Muslim societies. See, e.g., Bernard Lewis, "Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy," Middle East Quarterly, March 1994, www.meforum.org/meq.
23. My analysis of Kirghiz and Kazakh public opinion, forexample, demonstrates an overwhelming dislike of the authoritarian Akaev and Nazarbaev leaderships. See Eric McGlinchey, "Paying for Patronage: Regime Change in Post-Soviet Central Asia" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2003). Regarding the question of democracy, Richard Rose's study of Kazakh and Kirghiz public opinion demonstrates that 61 percent of Muslim Kazakhs and Kirghiz believe that "democracy is better than any other form of government" and, moreover, that "being a Muslim does not make a person more likely either to reject democracy or to endorse dictatorship."
24. Richard Rose, "How Muslims View Democracy: Evidence from Central Asia," Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 102-11.
25. BBC Monitoring International Reports, "USA's Rumsfeld Thanks Uzbekistan for 'Stalwart Support' in War on Terror," 24 February 2004, web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/ document?_m=09d8b10b74e5c07e6f8f9b90fc408315&_docnum=1&wc hp=dGLbVIb-zSkVA&-md5=9d74a9d3b7l7d69358ccff3b35459c17.
26. Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism: Briefing to the Sixtieth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights," January 2004, hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/29/global7127_txt.htm.
27. Peter Slevin, "U.S. Gives Uzbekistan Failing Grade on Rights," Washington Post, 11 January 2004.
28. Muqtedar Khan, "Prospects for Muslim Democracy: The Role of U.S. Policy," Middle East Policy, Fall 2003, 80-81.
29. Ibid., 81.
30. Steven Simon, "The New Terrorism," Brookings Review 21 (2003):18-24.
31. Walter Pincus, "Terror Suspect's Ambitions Worry U.S. Officials; Zarqawi May Be Looking beyond Iraq," Washington Post, 3 March 2004.
32. Konstantin Pribytkov and Alexander Stepanenko, "Kyrgyz, Kazakh Statesmen Speak of Religious Extremism Spread," Itar-Tass, 28 January 2000, web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/ document?_m=12a9aab00d7f572346250fde93da48ag&_docnum= 1&wchp=dGLbVIb-zSkVA&-md5=3a1e47342d890ed9l2393a9b6be8bf0f.
33. Ibid.
34. Luc Perrot, "Help Us or Face More Terrorism, Tajikistan's Rakhmonov Tells West," Agence France Presse, 2 December 2002, web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/ document?_m=a59a0143b54482d9bca3d06cl2616f62&_docnum=8&wchp= dGLb VIb-zSkVA&_md5=d4700676a83b77da1e0785619le0033c.
35. "Uzbekistan Keeps Threat of Terrorism from the Door - Leader's New Year Message," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 1 January 2003 (from Uzbek Television first channel, 31 December 2002), web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/ document?_m=a63e45d9l2ff5f6l7788ed407f52ef94&_docnum=1&wchp= dGLb VIb-zSkVA&_md5=9a2bad580e11dd779c85cba8e5e2cd9a.
36. Wahhabism is the strict form of Sunni Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. In Central Asia, however, the term Wahhabi is shorthand for any form of religious extremism.
37. U.S. Department of State, Human Rights and Labor, "Uzbekistan: International Religious Freedom Report 2003," www.state.gov/g/drl/ rls/irf/2003/24443.htm.
38. U.S. Department of State, Human Rights and Labor, "Tajikistan: International Religious Freedom Report 2003," www.state.gov/g/drl/ rls/irf/2003/24437.htm.
39. U.S. Department of State, Human Rights and Labor, "Kyrgyzstan: International Religious Freedom Report 2003," www.state.gov/g/drl/ rls/irf/2003/27209.htm.
40. By totalitarian states, I mean states in which power is monopolized by a single party and reinforced by absolute control over the media and the military. For more on the totalitarian state, see Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger, 1965).
41. For a similar argument, see Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
42. Several authors have faulted the transitions literature for failing to address nondemocratic outcomes. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 5-21;
43. and Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," World Politics, January 2002, 212-44.
44. Mohammed M. Hafez forwards a similar causality in his compelling study of militant opposition in Algeria and Egypt (Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World [Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003]). In contrast to the opposition groups analyzed in this article, however, Hafezs study focuses exclusively on Islamist opposition. Thus, although Hafez and I stress similar dynamics of repression and political exclusion, my findings suggest that Islamist opposition - be it moderate or militant - is unlikely in regimes such as Kyrgyzstan that allow some degree of political participation and public voice. Here, demands for electoral reform and political liberalization, rather than Islamist ideology, pattern social mobilization and opposition.
45. For more on the Freedom House scores and Freedom House's methodology, see www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/FHSCORES.xls.
46. Despite the March 2005 uprisings, which led to the ousting of President Askar Akaev and his replacement with Kurmanbek Bakiev, there is as yet little indication that Kyrgyzstan's new executive will either promote or tolerate a more active parliament.
47. Article 63.2 of the Kirghiz Constitution, quoted in Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Political Assessment Report, "Kyrgyz Republic Constitutional Referendum 2 February 2003" (Warsaw, 20 March 2003), 8.
48. OSCE/ODIHR, "Kyrgyz Republic Parliamentary Elections, 20 February and 12 March 2000" (Warsaw, 10 April 2000), 20.
49. Kyrgyzstan's opposition, now that it has won control of the executive branch, appears content to maintain strong presidential powers at the expense of the legislature.
50. For more on the Beknazarov case, see Ulugbek Babkulov and Kubat Otorbaev, "Rasplata za kritiku" ("Payment for Criticism"), Navigator, 24 January 2002, www.navi.kz/oldnavi/ articles/war240102a.shtml.
51. For the U.S. Department of State's interpretation of the Beknazarov case, see "Kirghiz Republic, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002" (U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 31 March 2003), www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/ 18374.htm.
52. For more on the official charges against Beknazarov, see Babkulov and Otorbaev, "Rasplata za krikiku."
53. For more on Erkebaev's interpretation of the Beknazarov charges, see Alisher Khamidov, "MP's Arrest Focuses Attention on Executive-Legislative Struggle in Kyrgyzstan," 9 January 2002, www.eurasianet.org.
54. Babkulov and Otorbaev, "Rasplata za krikiku."
55. Ibid.
56. For more on the Movement for the Resignation of Akaev, see Charles Carlson, "Kyrgyzstan: Embattled Opposition Mulls Election Strategy," Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 25 August 2003.
57. Roman Streshnev, "Voenno-politicheskoe obzorenie" ("Political Military Review"), Krasnaia zvezda (Red Star), 28 October 2003.
58. Charles Carson, "Kyrgyzstan: Hizb ut-Tahrir Accused of increased Militancy," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 3 March 2003.
59. Ibid.
60. A. Galich, "Islam ... s listovkoi" ("Islam ... with a Leaflet"), Slovo Kyrgyzstana (Word of Kyrgyzstan), 15 August 2003.
61. For the parliamentary data, see "Age, Ethnic Profile of Newly-Elected Parliament," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 March 2000 (from Slovo Kyrgyzstana, Bishkek, 21 March 2000), web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m= 668662b6999452ece1a3ccff6b7af962&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVIb- zSkVA&_md5=bb2l0cda42598b2fae4953e73dd1e7c9. For figures on the ethnicity and composition of the Kirghiz population, see Alisher Khamidov, "Ethnic Uzbeks Stoke Unrest in Southern Kyrgyzstan," 26 June 2002, www.eurasianet.org.
62. For figures on the ethnicity and composition of the Kirghiz population, see Alisher Khamidov, "Ethnic Uzbeks Stoke Unrest in Southern Kyrgyzstan," 26 June 2002, www.eurasianet.org.
63. Ahmedjan Saipjanov, "Kyrgyzstan 'Statehood' Festivities a Potential Source of Interethnic Tension," 26 August 2003, www.eurasianet.org.
64. I have just begun analyzing these data sets. Surveys were commissioned by the U.S. Department of State and conducted by the polling agency Brif. For more on Brif and its survey methodology, see www.brif.kz.
65. Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship, 21-27.
66. The two opposition parties that sought to participate - Erk and Berlik - were denied registration by the Uzbek Central Election Committee. See Galima Bukharbayeva, "Uzbeks Vote for New Parliament under Intense Security," Agence France Press, 5 December 1999, available in LexisNexis.
67. Shahida Tulaganova, Report on the Media Situation in Uzbekistan (London: Cimera, 2001), 3. www.cimera.org/files/reports/ Cimera_MediaUzbekistan2001.pdf.
68. Human Rights Watch, "Uzbekistan: Dissident in Psychiatric Detention" (New York, 12 April 2001), www.hrw.org/press/2001/04/ uzbekistan041201.htm.
69. Ibid.
70. Gregory G eason, "Uzbekistan," Nations in Transit (New York: Freedom House, 2002), 424.
71. Independent organizations such as Human Rights Watch estimate that Uzbek government forces killed between 500 and 750 protestors. See Human Rights Watch, "Uzbekistan: Andijan Crisis Aftermath," www.hrw.org/campaigns/uzbekistan/andijan, and "Bullets Were Falling Like Rain: The Andijan Massacre, May 13, 2005," www.hrw.org/ reports/2005/uzbekistan0605.
72. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, April 2003, 109.
73. U.S. Bureau of Democracy, "Uzbekistan."
74. U.S. Bureau of Democracy, "Kyrgyzstan."
75. This research is part of a four-year study, "The Effect of the Internet on Society: Incorporating Central Asia into the Global Perspective," National Science Foundation Award no. 0326101. For more on this project, see www.depts.washington.edu/caict/index.shtml. Surveys will be conducted in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan.
76. Author interviews with Kurmanbek Dykanbaev, chairman of the Association of Local Self-Governance (Bishkek, Kyrygzstan, 16 March 2004), and with Abdulkhai Abdullaev, vice rector of the Tashkent Islamic University under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Tashkent, 20 March 2004).
77. and with Abdulkhai Abdullaev, vice rector of the Tashkent Islamic University under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Tashkent, 20 March 2004).
78. Author interview with Abdulkhai Abdullaev.
79. Reuters, "Nineteen Killed in Uzbek Bombs and Shootouts," 29 March 2004.
80. Associated Press, "US Forces Still Using Uzbek as Base for Afghan Operations," 29 March 2004.
81. For statistics on U.S. aid to Uzbekistan, see "U.S. Assistance to Uzbekistan - Fiscal Year 2002" (Washington, DC: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 9 December 2002), www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/ 15683.htm; and "U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia - FY 2002" (Washington, DC: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, January 2003), www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/ rpt/23630.htm.
82. and "U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia - FY 2002" (Washington, DC: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, January 2003), www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/23630.htm. DC: Bureau of European and Eurasia Affairs,
83. Out of a total of $297 million, $79 million was directly targeted at security and law enforcement. Uzbekistan received an additional $78 million for what the State Department calls "U.S. Defense Department excess and privately donated humanitarian commodities." "U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia - FY 2002."
84. "U.S. Assistance to Uzbekistan - Fiscal Year 2003" (Washington, DC: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 17 February 2004), www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/29494.htm.
85. Ibid.
86. For more on how states can apply military aid to domestic oppression, see Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Arms Transfers, Military Coups and Military Rule in Developing States," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (1992): 733-56.
87. All four members of the new Georgian leadership were supported by the U.S. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.