The individualist lottery: How people count, but not their numbers

Analysis

Volumn 64, Issue 282, 2004, Pages 106-112

  Timmermann, Jens ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644499383     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2004.00468.x     Document Type: Review

References (11)

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2. Repr. in J. G. Haber, Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 1994, 159-60
3. Broome, J. 1984. Selecting people randomly. Ethics 95: 38-55
4. Broome, J. 1998. Kamm on fairness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 955-61
5. Foot, P. 1967. The problem of abortion and the problem of double effect The Oxford Review 5
6. Hirose, I. 2001. Saving the greater number without combining claims Analysis 61: 341-42
7. Kamm, F. 1993. Morality, Mortality 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press
8. Kumar, R. 2001. Contractualism on saving the many. Analysis 61: 165-70
9. Otsuka, M. 2000. Scanlon and the claims of the many versus one. Analysis 60: 288-93
10. Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
11. Taurek, J. 1977. Should the numbers count? Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 293-316