Insurgency and counterinsurgency in Iraq

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 103-121

  Hoffman, Bruce ^a  

^a RAND CORPORATION   (United States)

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EID: 33244482599     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100500522173     Document Type: Article

References (147)

1. For an interesting account of how this film is used to illuminate spiritual real-life issues, see Alex Kuczynski, "Groundhog Almighty," New York Times (Sunday "Fashion and Style" section), 7 December 2003.
2. See, for example, Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq: Too Uncertain To Call (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 November 2003;
3. James Fallows, "Blind Into Baghdad," The Atlantic Monthly 293(1) (January-February 2004), pp. 52-74;
4. Joshua Hammer, "Tikrit Dispatch: Uncivil Military," The New Republic, 1 March 2004;
5. Steven Metz, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," The Washington Quarterly 27(1) (Winter 2003-04);
6. and David Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess," New York Times Magazine, 2 November 2003.
7. This is also the thrust of an article by Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," Parameters (Spring 2004), pp. 16-17.
8. Although the sources cited throughout this article are published secondary scholarly sources or journalism accounts, the arguments presented here are based primarily from discussions held between December 2003 and June 2004 with serving American military and intelligence officers, U.S. and British officials in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and journalists who are currently in or have recently reported from Iraq.
9. Quoted in Dexter Filkins, "Sunni Clerics Call for an End to Killing of Iraqis," New York Times, 1 March 2004.
10. See Christopher Dickey, "Learning from the Pros," Newsweek, 16 January 2004;
11. James Dobbins et al., American's Role In Nation-Building; From Germany To Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corportion, MR-1753-RC, 2003), pp. 167-222;
12. Metz, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," pp. 27-28;
13. and, Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess."
14. Cordesman, Iraq: Too Uncertain To Call, p. 2.
15. Quoted in ibid.
16. Fallows, "Blind Into Baghdad," pp. 73-74;
17. and Metz, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," p. 27.
18. Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess."
19. E-mail communications with a senior CPA official, Baghdad, Iraq, January and February 2004.
20. See also Joshua Hammer, "Tikrit Dispatch: Uncivil Military," The New Republic, 1 March 2004.
21. As one U.S. Army officer involved in countering the insurgency observes, the real problem is that success "demands coordinated military, political, informational and economic efforts to remove the fundamental sources of strength - it is here where we are encountering our greatest difficulties." Quoted in Vernon Loeb, "Rumsfeld Seeks Better Intelligence on Iraqi Insurgents," Washington Post, 11 December 2003.
22. Cordesman, Iraq: Too Uncertain To Call, p. 3.
23. See Brian Knowlton, "Iraq Resistance Lasting Longer Than Expected, Powell Concedes," International Herald Tribune (Paris), 26 October 2003;
24. and, Lizette Alvarez, "British Official Sees No Early Exit From Iraq," New York Times, 5 January 2004.
25. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, R-4501-A, 1991, p. vii.
26. The three key British counterterrorist/counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1940s and 1950s involving Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus; the more recent struggle in Northern Ireland (although covering only the period between 1969 and 1991); the 1965-1980 Rhodesian conflict; and the counterterrorist experiences of Germany and Italy during the 1970s and 1980s. See Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, R-3506-DOS, 1992).
27. Ibid., p. 6.
28. Ibid., pp. vi, 3-6, and 77-78.
29. See, for example, Alex Berenson, "A Baghdad Neighborhood, Once Hopeful, Now Reels as Iraq's Turmoil Persists," New York Times, 14 December 2003;
30. Roger Cohen, "Iraq and Its Patron, Growing Apart," New York Times, 21 December 2003
31. Michael Knights and Jeffrey White, "Iraqi resistance proves resilient," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 2003, p. 24;
32. Metz, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," pp. 27-28; and,
33. and Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess."
34. H. D. S. Greenway, "U.S. Policy in Iraq Stirs Muslim Animosity," Boston Globe, 31 October 2003.
35. John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya to Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, CT & London: Praeger, 2002).
36. Peter Maass, "Professor Nagl's War," New York Times Sunday Magazine, 11 January 2004.
37. Dexter Filkins, "Attacks on G.I.s in Mosul Rise as Good Will Fades," New York Times, 27 November 2003.
38. John F. Burns. "Witness: The New Iraq Is Grim, Hopeful and Still Scary," New York Times, 16 November 2003.
39. Quoted in Cohen, "Iraq and Its Patron, Growing Apart."
40. Quoted in Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, R-4042-USDP, 1991), p. 22.
41. Schwarz writes that Ponce previously "served as chief of personnel and later as deputy director (essentially commander under an inactive director) of the Treasury Police - the unit of the Salvadoran armed forces most notorious for its sadistic and particularly extravagant crushing of dissent - from 1979 to 1982, the height of the period of political violence in El Salvador...and was in fact denied a U.S. visa for years because of suspicion of human rights abuse." Note 12, p. 22.
42. Between 1980 and 1990 the United States poured more than $4.5 billion into El Salvador ($1.3 billion in the form of direct military assistance and over $850 million in unsubsidized credits - excluding an estimated CIA investment of over $500 million) in an effort to defeat the communist insurgency there. American training teams and advisory personnel also oversaw the five-fold expansion, equipping, and training of the 57,000 man Salvadoran armed forces during this time period. See ibid., pp. xiii and 2;
43. and, Bruce Hoffman et al., Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, R- 3998-USDP, 1991), p. 2.
44. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya to Vietnam, p. 6.
45. John Pimlott, "The British Army," in Ian Beckett and John Pimlott (eds.), Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 16-17.
46. Hoffman and Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 1.
47. Dexter Filkins, "Dual Role of GI's difficult to Juggle," International Herald Tribune (Paris), 3 November 2003;
48. and Michael Knights and Jeffrey White, "Iraqi Resistance Proves Resilient," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 2003, p. 24;
49. and, P. Mitchell Prothero, "Iraqi Guerrillas: 'Why we fight'," United Press International, 4 December 2003.
50. See, for example, John S. White, U.S. Army NGIC, NGIC Assessment: Adoption of Asymmetrical TTPs by Anti-Coalition Fighters in Iraq, 30 July 2003, available at http://www.ngic.army.smil/products/ crisis_support/htdocs/ngic-1127-7893-03/ngic-7893-03/ngic-7893-03.tl);
51. Brian Bennett and Michael Ware, "Life Behind Enemy Lines: An inside look at the Ba'athists, Terrorists, Islamists and Disaffected Iraqis Fighting U.S. Troops, Time (New York), 15 December 2003. p. 27;
52. and, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 180-183.
53. Quoted in Brian Knowlton, "Top U.S. General in Iraq Sees 'Classical Guerrilla-Type' War," International Herald Tribune (Paris), 16 July 2003.
54. Hoffman and Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 2.
55. Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, pp. 9-10 and 13-15.
56. Hoffman and Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict, p. vi.
57. Quoted in DGD&D 18/34/56 Army Code No 71596 (Pts. 1 and 2), Army Field Manual, vol. V, Operations Other Than War, "Section B: Counter Insurgency Operations, Part 2 The Conduct of Counter Insurgency Operations" (London: Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff,) 1995, p. 3-1.
58. Ibid., pp. 3-1 to 3-2.
59. As Nagl notes, this is an institutional pattern of behavior in the U.S. Army transcending half a century. See Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya to Vietnam, p. 6.
60. Quoted in Peter Baker, "Tactics Turn Unconventional; Commanders Draw Lessons of Belfast in Countering Attacks," Washington Post, 30 March 2003.
61. See also, Maass, "Professor Nagl's War."
62. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), passim.
63. Bruce Hoffman, "Current Research on Terrorism and LIC," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 15(1) (1992), p. 31.
64. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, pp. 33-34.
65. Carlotta Gall, "U.S. Military Unveils Changes in Strategy in Afghanistan," New York Times, 21 December 2003.
66. David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "New U.S. Effort Steps Up Hunt for bin Laden," New York Times, 29 February 2004.
67. Quoted in Thomas E. Ricks, "Marines to Offer New Tactics in Iraq: Reduced Use of Force Planned After Takeover From Army," Washington Post, 7 January 2004.
68. Ibid.
69. This point is corroborated by a senior CPA official, Baghdad, Iraq. E-mail communication, January 2004.
70. See Hammer, "Tikrit Dispatch: Uncivil Military."
71. Discussion with serving U.S. Army officer directly familiar with General Petraeus's initiatives, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, February 2004.
72. Hammer, "Tikrit Dispatch: Uncivil Military."
73. E-mail communication with senior CPA official, Baghdad, Iraq, January 2004.
74. The accusation was directed at foreign journalists with the guard blaming the United States, according to the journalists, for its "inability to bring order" to Iraq, quoted in Anthony Shadid, "For Pilgrims, Horror on a Holy Day," Washington Post, 3 March 2004.
75. DGD&D, Army Field Manual, Vol. V, Operations Other Than War, p. 3-1.
76. Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, p. 77.
77. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), p. 95.
78. Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), pp. 163-164.
79. Dana Priest, "Violence, Turnover Blunt CIA Effort in Iraq," Washington Post, 4 March 2004.
80. This entailed the re-assignment of the linguists, analysts and other experts serving in the 1,400-person Iraq Survey Group to the counterinsurgency mission from the search for WMD. See Douglas Jehl, "U.S. to Shift Some Experts From Arms to Anti-terror," New York Times, 27 November 2003.
81. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Current Military Situation in Iraq (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 November 2003), pp. 13-14.
82. Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, "Guerrillas Posing More Danger, Says U.S.," New York Times, 13 November 2003.
83. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, p. 165.
84. Author of, among other works, of With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987).
85. Dickey, "Learning from the Pros."
86. Don Van Natta, Jr. and Desmond Butler, "Hundreds of Militants Head to Iraq for Jihad," International Herald Tribune (Paris), 3 November 2003.
87. Marianne Brun-Rovet, "Insurgents are 'Few in Number but Organised'," Financial Times (London), 14 November 2003.
88. See also Schmitt and Sanger, "Guerrillas Posing More Danger, Says U.S.";
89. and Jehl, "U.S. to Shift Some Experts From Arms to Anti-terror."
90. Ambassador Bremer cited in Cordesman, The Current Military Situation in Iraq, p. 2.
91. Major General Raymond T. Odierno cited in Raymond Bonner and Joel Brinkley, "Latest Attacks Underscore Differing Intelligence Estimates of Strength of Foreign Guerrillas," New York Times, 28 October 2003.
92. John E. McLaughlin, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence quoted in Dana Priest, "The CIA's 'Anonymous' No. 2: Low-Profile Director Leads Agency's Analytical Side," Washington Post, 9 January 2004.
93. General Abizaid quoted in Schmitt and Sanger, "Guerrillas Posing More Danger, Says U.S."
94. See also, Brun-Rovet, "Insurgents are 'Few in Number but Organised'."
95. Quoted in Bonner and Brinkley, "Latest Attacks Underscore Differing Intelligence Estimates of Strength of Foreign Guerrillas."
96. See also, Maass, "Professor Nagl's War."
97. Cordesman, The Current Military Situation in Iraq, p. 25.
98. ibid., p. 2.
99. See reports such as those from June that cited American military commanders assertions that "foreign fighters are being actively recruited by loyalists to Saddam Hussein to join the resistance against American forces in Iraq." Michael R. Gordon with Douglas Jehl, "After War: Militants," New York Times, 22 June 2003.
100. Ned Parker, "Suicide Bombings in Iraq Blamed on Group of Foreign Fighters," Agence France Presse, 30 October 2003. A former senior CIA officer in August reported that U.S. and allied intelligence estimated that 500 to 600 foreign fighters had come to Iraq.
101. See Alissa J. Rubin, "Iraq Seen as Terror Target: Anti-Western Extremists Have Been Infiltrating and May Be Looking to Attack Symbols of America and Its Allies, Officials Say," Los Angeles Times, 10 August 2003.
102. See also Michael R. Gordon, "Terror Group Seen as Back Inside Iraq," New York Times, 9 August 2003.
103. General Abizaid was reported to have said in November that FRLs and not foreign terrorists "pose the greatest danger to American troops and to stability in Iraq." Schmitt and Sanger, "Guerrillas Posing More Danger, Says U.S."
104. Quoted in Desmond Butler and Don Van Natta, Jr., "Recruiters: Trail of Anti-U.S. Fighters Said to Cross Europe to Iraq," New York Times, 6 December 2003.
105. This figure dovetails with that provided by Ambassador Bremer in September, when he reported that 248 foreign fighters had been apprehended in Iraq, of whom 19 were members of Al Qaeda and 123 were from Syria alone. See Douglas Jehl, "Bremer Says 19 Al Qaeda Fighters Are in U.S. Custody in Iraq," New York Times, 26 September 2003.
106. The number of Al Qaeda detainees in November had increased by only one to 20, according to Lieutenant General Sanchez. See Brian Knowlton, "Iraqi Security Forces Outnumber American Troops, U.S. Says," International Herald Tribune (Paris), 11 November 2003.
107. The 300 figure was also cited by American officials in December. See Desmond Butler and Don Van Natta, Jr., "Recruiters: Trail of Anti-U.S. Fighters Said to Cross Europe to Iraq," New York Times, 6 December 2003.
108. Bonner and Brinkley, "Latest Attacks Underscore Differing Intelligence Estimates of Strength of Foreign Guerrillas." In September, "American military, intelligence and law enforcement figures" had put the number of foreign fighters at "as many as 1,000,"
109. See Eric Schmitt, "Iraq Bombings Pose a Mystery U.S. Must Solve," New York Times, 7 September 2003.
110. Cordesman, The Current Military Situation in Iraq, p. 7.
111. Quoted in Bonner and Brinkley, "Latest Attacks Underscore Differing Intelligence Estimates of Strength of Foreign Guerrillas."
112. And, in this context, it is argued that domestic American politics influence the depiction of the insurgency problem in Iraq variously as the product of FRLs or foreign jihadists. For example, an account published in Time magazine, explained that, "The Bush Administration, for its part, wants to portray the insurgency as mainly homegrown. That allows Washington to claim, as it repeatedly does, that when the die-hards run out of men and munitions, the insurgency will dissipate. It also allows Bush to avoid the charge that the war actually increased danger to the U.S. by stirring up a hornet's nest of terrorism." Bennett and Ware, "Life Behind Enemy Lines."
113. See also Steven R. Weisman, "U.S. Presidential Politics and Self-Rule for Iraqis," New York Times, 18 February 2004.
114. U.S. Department of Defense, Terrorist Group Profiles (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 56, 61, and 64.
115. Significantly, to maintain stability and order in Northern Ireland, the ratio of British security forces maintained in Northern Ireland (military plus police from the Royal Ulster Constabulary) was at a ratio of 20 security force members per 1,000 inhabitants. In Iraq, the ratio of coalition military forces to population is a considerably lower 6.1 per 1,000 inhabitants. See James T. Quinlivan, "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations," RAND Review 27(2) 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 28-29.
116. See also, idem., "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," Parameters (Winter 1995), pp. 59-69 available at (http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/1995/quinliv/htm).
117. In a November op-ed, Edward Luttwak further underscored the inadequacy of military forces deployed to Iraq noting that, "The support echelon is so large that out of the 133,000 American men and women in Iraq, no more than 56,000 are combat-trained troops available for security duties....For comparison, there are 39,000 police officers in New York City and they at least know the languages of most of the inhabitants, few of whom are likely to be armed Ba'athist fanatics."
118. Idem., "So Few Soldiers, So Much to Do," New York Times, 4 November 2003.
119. John F. Burns, "General Vows to Intensify U.S. Response to Attackers," New York Times, 12 November 2003.
120. Thom Shanker, "Rumsfeld, on the Ground in Iraq, Gets a Report on Progress Against the Insurgency," New York Times, 7 December 2003.
121. Thom Shanker and James Risen, "Hussein Tells Interrogators He Didn't Direct Insurgency," New York Times, 15 December 2003.
122. See Michael R. Gordon, "For U.S. Foes, a Major Blow: Fighters Now Lack a Symbol," New York Times, 14 December 2003.
123. Figures and Brigadier General Hertling quoted in Jim Michaels, "Attacks down 22% since Saddam's capture," USA Today (Washington, DC), 12 January 2004.
124. E-mail correspondence with Christopher Dickey, Newsweek's Paris Bureau Chief, 2 February 2004.
125. Figures and quote in "Iraq: The Body Count_Still Going Up," The Economist (London), 14 February 2004, p. 42.
126. Scott Atran, "Iraq and Al Qaeda: No Smoking Gun," Letter to the Editor, New York Times, 15 February 2004.
127. Rajiv Chanrasekaran, "Iraq's Shiites Renew Call For Militias," Washington Post, 4 March 2004.
128. Charles Simpson, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 62.
129. In Iraq, interestingly, success is in the process of being defined by U.S. military commanders in a similar vein. "If we're being held to a standard that the only way to win is have no more bombs go off, we won't live up to that," Brigadier General Hertling conceded. "Our standard is to reduce them every day. This is the hardest thing I've ever done." Quoted in Eric Schmitt, "For G.I.s, Pride in War Efforts but Doubts About Iraq's Future," New York Times, 4 January 2004.
130. Maass, "Professor Nagl's War."
131. See, for example, the comments of Raad Khairy al-Barhawi, a Mosul city councilman who says that he wants the "Americans to succeed," but also complains of death threats and therefore wishes that the Americans will leave.
132. Quoted in Filkins, "Attacks on G.I.s in Mosul Rise as Good Will Fades."
133. Quoted in Schmitt, "For G.I.s, Pride in War Efforts but Doubts About Iraq's Future."
134. P. Mitchell Prothero, "Iraqi Guerillas: 'Why We Fight'," United Press International, 4 December 2003.
135. Quoted in Vernon Loeb, "Rumsfeld Seeks Better Intelligence on Iraqi Insurgents."
136. Quoted in Knowlton, "Top U.S. General in Iraq Sees 'Classical Guerrilla-Type' War."
137. The infamous Abu Mus'ab Zaraqawi clearly has pretensions to such a role, as evidenced by the letter he wrote to bin Laden that was seized by U.S. authorities (see "Text from Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi Letter"), but has yet to merit or achieve such a distinction.
138. E-mail communication with a senior CPA official, Baghdad, Iraq, February 2004.
139. Knights and White, "Iraqi resistance Proves Resilient," p. 20.
140. Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, no date), p. 3.
141. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, And Information- Age Terrorism," in Ian O. Lesser et al. (eds.), Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, MR-989-AF, 1999), p. 47.
142. It should be noted that the netwar concept as explicated by Arquilla and Ronfelt envisioned a technologically adept and information technology-savvy adversaries, exploiting IT for offensive and defensive operations. This aspect of network is certainly not apparent in Iraq.
143. E-mail communication with a senior CPA official, Baghdad, Iraq, February 2004.
144. See, for example, Michael T. Kaufman, "What Does the Pentagon See in 'Battle of Algiers'?" New York Times, 7 September 2003;
145. Philip Gourevitch, "Comment: Winning and Losing," The New Yorker, 22 and 29 December 2003;
146. and Stuart Klawans, "Lessons of the Pentagon's Favorite Training Film," New York Times Sunday Arts and Leisure Section, 4 January 2004.
147. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 194.