‘Perhaps the most important primary good’: Self-respect and Rawls’s principles of justice

politics, philosophy & economics

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 195-219

  Eyal, Nir ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

distributive justice; equality; lexicographical order; liberty; maximin; primary goods; Rawls; self esteem; self respect

Indexed keywords

EID: 32944476033     PISSN: 1470594X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1470594X05052538     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 440, 536; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 386, 470; John Rawls, Collected Papers, edited by S.R. Freeman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 171–2; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 318.
2. Henry Shue, ‘Liberty and Self-Respect’, Ethics 85 (1975): 195-203.
3. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 179, 440-2, 536-7, 544; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 156, 386-8, 469-70, 477; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 319.
4. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 226, 227, 234; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. xv, 198-9, 200, 206; Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 318 note 29, 330. The fair worth of liberty is affected by the second principle of justice too. The first principle of justice is sometimes formulated somewhat differently, but hopefully not differently enough to affect the ultimate conclusion of the present article.
5. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 50; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 203.
6. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 544–6; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 477–9. The fact that the difference principle is implemented through a propertyowning democracy is in itself a social basis of self-respect. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., p. xv.
7. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 498ff., 544-8; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 436ff., 477-80; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 317.
8. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 26–30, 179-80, 510, 536; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 23–6, 156-7, 446, 469-70, 475; Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 23, 81-2, 324; John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 298; John Rawls, Justice as Fairness - A Restatement, edited by E. Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 139.
9. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 546; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., p. 478. This point is made in Shue, ‘Liberty and Self-Respect’, pp. 198–9, 202. Note also that if the parties were not concerned to distribute each type of social basis for selfrespect in equality (and, in the second place, at a maximum), they would have no reason to distribute the liberties along that particular pattern. Liberty could instead be distributed at maximum, maximin, or still otherwise. Admittedly, Norman Daniels is right in saying that ‘it is unlikely Rawls would feel committed to equality of self-respect’, but overlooks the parties’ concern for equality in the social bases of self-respect. See especially Norman Daniels, ‘Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty’, in Reading Rawls, edited by Norman Daniels (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), especially p. 275. The parties’ concern for equality in the social bases of self-respect also seems to be lost on Joshua Cohen, according to whom the parties seek only to find ‘support’ for their self-respect. See Joshua Cohen, ‘Democratic Equality’, Ethics 99 (1989): 736-7.
10. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen pointed this out to me. See also Russell Keat and David Miller, ‘Understanding Justice’, Political Theory 2 (1974): 15.
11. That the parties care also to increase or maximize each social basis of self-respect (and not only to equalize each, as suggested by Henry Shue) is allegedly alien to Rawls's Kantianism. But such thinking is indicated by Rawls's statement that it would be ‘clearly. a great misfortune’ if ‘Social cooperation to increase the conditions of self-respect [were] impossible’. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 545. On a deeper level, it is indicated by Rawls's view that every violation of the first principle of justice (including, I take it, failures to maximize (equal) liberty) compromises the ideal distribution of the social bases of self-respect. What such failures compromise is sometimes the maximizing of that social basis of self-respect.
12. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 207ff., 210, 544-8; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 180ff., 184-5, 477-80; Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 310–23.
13. Leading commentators on the priority of liberty, including Kenneth Arrow, Brian Barry, Herbert Hart, Joseph DeMarco and Samuel Richmond, Thomas Scanlon, and Amartya Sen, hardly mention the role of self-respect in grounding that priority. The notable exception is Henry Shue.
14. Daniels, ‘Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty’, pp. 253–81, especially pp. 256–7, 267-8.
15. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 542–3. In Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., p. 476, this appears in a mitigated form.
16. In Robert Taylor's recent reconstruction of Rawls, the priority of liberty is based on the supposedly capped need for money in order to develop one's first moral power. See Robert S. Taylor, ‘Rawls's Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2003): 261-4. Pace Taylor, expensive experiences can help us to nurture the first moral power. Whatever it is that develops the first moral power (education, exposure to distant cultures, or psychological counselling) can cost a lot of money.
17. In stating the fourth, the fifth, and the sixth arguments for liberty (and perhaps for its priority), Rawls goes further and actually says that these arguments support both principles of justice. (For a similar statement concerning the second argument, see Rawls, Collected Papers, p. 240). This clearly blights those arguments as arguments for the priority of liberty. For charity's sake, however, I shall overlook those statements. The priority of liberty deserves more chance than that.
18. The sixth argument relies on two ‘desiderata’ for principles of justice that allow these principles to be ‘effective in coordinating and combining the many social unions into one social union’. The first is that principles of justice express everyone's freedom and equality; the second is that they express the reciprocal nature of social arrangements. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 322. The first desideratum seems to reflect considerations underlying the fourth argument, and the second, considerations underlying the fifth argument.
19. Gerald A. Cohen, Saving Justice from Constructivism (forthcoming).
20. Joshua Cohen, ‘Democratic Equality’, pp. 736–44.
21. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 440; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 386. Compare Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 318.
22. However, this explanation of what makes confidence in one's determinate plans and capacities ‘perhaps the most important primary good’ is not unproblematic. First, it may be logically impossible to consider one's own plan of life worthless. Second, losing confidence in one's plans and capacities is compatible with their rational pursuit: the (negative) absence of confidence in the high value of one's plans and capacities does not entail (positive) confidence that their value is low. Third, even if a rational person would not pursue a plan without confidence in its value and feasibility for her, that does not mean that she ‘just cannot’ (as Rawls put it) pursue it without such confidence: perhaps she would not pursue it owing only to her free choice not to. Fourth, the explanation fails to clarify what makes confidence in one's plans and capacities perhaps the most important primary good. See Taylor, ‘Rawls's Defense of the Priority of Liberty’, pp. 250–1. The present article expounds none of these problems.
23. Laurence L. Thomas, ‘Rawlsian Self-Respect and the Black Consciousness Movement’, Philosophical Forum (Boston) 9 (1977-78): 303, 304; Laurence L. Thomas, ‘Morality and Our Self-Concept’, Journal of Value Inquiry 12 (1978): 263 note 9; Laurence L. Thomas, ‘Capitalism Versus Marx's Communism’, Studies in Soviet Thought 20 (1979): 73; Laurence L. Thomas, ‘Morality and Human Diversity - Reply to Flanagan’, Ethics 103 (1992): 129-30; Laurence L. Thomas, ‘Self- Respect: Theory and Practice’, in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect, edited by Robin S. Dillon (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 256–8. See also Edward Kent, ‘Respect for Persons and Social Protest’, in Social Ends and Political Means, edited by T. Honderich (London: Routledge, 1976), pp. 35–6; Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1977), pp. 239ff.; Bernard R. Boxill, Blacks and Social Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), pp. 188–9; Michelle M. Moody-Adams, ‘Race, Class and the Social Construction of Self-Respect’, in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect, edited by Robin S. Dillon (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 275. Aspects of David Sachs's distinction between self-respect and self-esteem and Stephen Darwall's distinction between ‘recognition self-respect’ and ‘appraisal self-respect’ recall Thomas's. Rawls himself gradually became aware of the difference between self-respect and self-esteem. In his early writing, Rawls used the terms ‘self-respect’ and ‘self-esteem’ interchangeably. See, for example, Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 440; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., p. 386. Later, he conceded that the two terms designate different notions. See Rawls, Collected Papers, p. 260. However, he continued to believe that the problem would disappear had he ‘selected one term and stuck with it, style be damned’. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 404 note 39. Below, I show that the difference between the two notions is pernicious toward Rawls's politics.
24. Rawls did not associate them explicitly, but this is given by the mutual connections that hold between self-respect (identified in the context with confidence in one's plans and capacities) and excellence, on the one hand, and shame, on the other. Shame, which is ‘the feeling that someone has when he experiences an injury to his self-respect’, can only arise, according to Rawls, from loss of (perceived) excellence: this is true for both ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ shame, which are the only two kinds of shame mentioned by Rawls. As regards the former, ‘natural shame. arises. from injury to our self-[respect] owing to our not having or failing to exercise [the natural] excellences’. As regards the latter, ‘Actions and traits that manifest or betray the absence of [excellences] in one's person are likely. to occasion [moral] shame’. So in order for self-respect to diminish, one must feel that one lacks or fails to display some excellence. Confidence in one's plans and capacities, which is identified with self-respect, therefore involves the feeling that one possesses and exercises the excellences. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 442–5; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 388–91.
25. For Rawls, we excel to different degrees both overall and in those respects that we personally value most; indeed, the very standard of ‘excellence’ can legitimately vary among different persons. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 328, 426, 440, 441-2; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 288–9, 374, 386, 387-8.
26. Rawls, Collected Papers, p. 170; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 103–4, Section 48; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 88–9; Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 80–1.
27. Robert E. Lane, ‘Government and Self-Esteem’, Political Theory 10 (1982): 5-32; Gerald Doppelt, ‘Rawls’ System of Justice: A Critique from the Left’, Noûs 15 (1981): 264; Robert J. Yanal, ‘Self-Esteem’, Noûs 21 (1987): 364-5; Michelle M. Moody-Adams, ‘Race, Class and the Social Construction of Self-Respect’, p. 274.
28. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 440; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 386.
29. Indeed, it is doubtful that the parties in the original position are even aware of the exact nature of common psychological inhibitions. The veil of ignorance permits the parties to know very little about the persons they represent; almost only that these persons are ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ - well-defined notions which include nothing like systemic confusion of self-respect with confidence in one's plans and capacities. See Rawls, Collected Papers, p. 158 (emphasis added). Note that the original position presents both the parties and the people they represent as rational. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 74–5.
30. It is true that, in identifying the well-ordered society, the parties employ not only formal, logical considerations, but also ‘rely on various common sense psychological facts about human needs, their phases of development, and so on’. But Rawls specifies these psychological facts, and they do not seem to include anything like a systematic confusion of self-respect and confidence in one's plans and capacities. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 433ff., 447; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 380ff., 392-3; Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 81ff., 86-8. Moreover, Rawls expressly denies that our psychological nature can constitute a legitimate political consideration. See Rawls, Collected Papers, p. 608. This may also be the lesson of Rawls's discussion of champagne tastes. In addition, Rawls's later philosophy sometimes presents moral psychology as determined by political and philosophical considerations, rather than as their determinant. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 34, 86-8. Since the interest in self-respect determines a lot in Rawls's politics, this prevents that interest from being strictly psychological.
31. Rawls, Collected Papers, p. 260 (emphasis added). See also Rawls, Justice as Fairness - A Restatement, p. 60.
32. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 534–41; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 468–74.
33. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 396; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 348.
34. Losing Kantian self-respect admittedly may ‘rationalize’ losing the pleasant moods that are connected by definition to confidence that one is a fully fledged person. Indeed, several commentators seem to presuppose that this is what makes selfrespect into a primary good. See Stephen J. Massey, ‘Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?’, in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect, edited by Robin S. Dillon (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 210–11; David Miller, ‘Arguments for Equality’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1982): 79; Robin S. Dillon, ‘Self- Respect: Moral, Emotional, Political’, Ethics 107 (1997): 226-7; Richard Kraut, ‘Politics, Neutrality, and the Good’, Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1999): 315-32. But that misinterprets Rawls. Primary goods are only ‘those things which are generally necessary for carrying out. [one's plan] successfully whatever the particular nature of the plan and its final ends’. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 411; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., p. 361. Things that are necessary for maintaining pleasant moods, but not for fulfilling or pursuing every conceivable plan of life are not primary goods. Rawls's parties protect citizens from ‘losing face’ only in order to protect them from ‘losing heart’ in the pursuit of plans. (The false impression that something may be a primary good not just through promoting conceptions of the good, but also through promoting other ends and interests is partly Rawls's own fault. Rawls sometimes defines primary goods merely negatively, as those goods the goodness of which does not rely on the specifics of one's plan of life. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 62, 92; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 54, 79. He forgets to add, positively, that primary goods are good in virtue of their value for the successful pursuit of a plan of life. But in relation to self-respect, at least, there is no ambiguity. Rawls specifically states that the fact that, without self-respect ‘we cannot. continue in our endeavors’ is what makes it ‘clear why self-respect is a primary good’. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 440; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., p. 386.)
35. See, for example, Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 318.
36. The ‘equality’ between the later Rawls's citizens warrants, for each, only very limited added confidence in her own capacity for a conception of the good (and hence very limited confidence in the value and the feasibility of that conception). That ‘equality’ admittedly means that each is at or above a certain level of a capacity for a conception of the good (and of a sense of justice). But that level can be objectively very low. It is defined simply as the highest level of that capacity that happens to be shared by all (see the references in fn. 40). Being at or above that level gives each citizen absolutely no guarantee that her plan is valuable and feasible enough to warrant a potentially costly pursuit. (For an additional argument against Rawls's threshold conception of equality, see Geoffrey Cupit, ‘The Basis of Equality’, Philosophy 75 (2000): 110.)
37. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 19, 313-4.
38. ‘The importance of self-respect is that it provides. a firm conviction that our determinate conception of the good is worth carrying out. Thus, the parties give great weight to how well principles of justice support self-respect.’ See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 318–9. See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 178–9, 440; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 155–6, 386.
39. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 178–9, 440; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 155–6, 386. See also Shue, ‘Liberty and Self-Respect’, pp. 198–9.
40. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 544–5; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., p. 477; Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 180, 319. Rawls's distinction between social bases that ‘affirm’ citizens’ self-respect and those that ‘guarantee’ citizens the conditions necessary for the development of warranted self-respect is echoed in Doppelt's distinction between the ‘formal content’ and the ‘material content’ of the social bases of self-respect; in Cohen's distinction between ‘recognitional’ and ‘resource bases of self-respect’ in Rawls; and in McKinnon's distinction between the ‘egalitarian’ and the ‘meritocratic’ aspects of self-respect. See Doppelt, ‘Rawls’ System of Justice’, p. 274; Cohen, ‘Democratic Equality’, p. 737; Catriona McKinnon, ‘Exclusion Rules and Self-Respect’, Journal of Value Inquiry (2000): 491-505.
41. Daniels, ‘Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty’, pp. 275–6.
42. On the one hand, Rawls thinks of money as a crucial dimension of the ‘worth of liberty’ - a basis of self-respect in its own right (see note 4 above). He concedes that ‘one ground’ of the ‘right to hold and to have exclusive use of personal property’ is that this ‘right allow[s] a sense of self-respect. Having this right and being able effectively to exercise it is one of the social bases of self-respect’. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness - A Restatement, p. 114, including note 36. His exposition of Hegel's view that having property ‘expresses the. dignity of free persons as such, and. their superiority to all things’ is uncritical. See Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, p. 342. On the other hand, Rawls occasionally denies that income and wealth are social bases of self-respect. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 544.
43. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 545; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., p. 478; Shue, ‘Liberty and Self-Respect’, pp. 198–9.
44. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 45, 89, 498ff.; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn., pp. 40, 77, 436ff.; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 317.