The political representation of visible minorities in electoral democracies: A comparison of France, Denmark, and Canada

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 425-465

  Bird, Karen ^a  

^a MCMASTER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; ETHNIC MINORITY; MINORITY GROUP; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

CANADA; DENMARK; EURASIA; EUROPE; FRANCE; NORTH AMERICA; NORTHERN EUROPE; SCANDINAVIA; WESTERN EUROPE;

EID: 32844456241     PISSN: 13537113     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13537110500379211     Document Type: Article

References (94)

1. Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
2. The analysis presented here is strictly limited to the political representation of visible ethnic minorities. For operational purposes, I define visible minorities as non-aboriginal persons who are non-Caucasian in race and non-European in origin. Such people may be recent immigrants, or their ancestors may have lived in the country in question for several generations. To simplify the study, I have excluded from this definition other ethnic groups (e.g., Jews, Eastern Europeans) whose contemporary visibility, as well as their history of exclusion and discrimination, varies widely from country to country. Nor do I include territorial or linguistic minorities, or indigenous groups. In many cases, these latter groups have obtained some type of collective representational rights as part of a historical bargain to assure the viability of the state, and studying their political representation requires a different theoretical model than that presented here.
3. Visible minority representation has been researched most extensively in the United States and Britain. See, for example: Katherine Tate, Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and the Representatives in the U.S. Congress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003);
4. Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993);
5. Anthony M. Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997);
6. and Shamit Saggar, Race and Representation: Electoral Politics and Ethnic Pluralism in Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000.
7. Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence: The Political Representation of Gender, Ethnicity, and Race (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995);
8. Melissa S. Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998);
9. Jane Mansbridge, "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes,'" The Journal of Politics, 61(2000), pp.628-57,
10. and "What does a Representative Do? Descriptive Representation in Communicative Settings of Distrust, Uncrystallized Interests, and Historically Denigrated Status," in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds.), Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.99-123.
11. Mala Htun, "Is Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Minority Groups," Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2004), pp. 439-58.
12. For a discussion of the strategy of maximizing the number of cases, by including observations at multiple levels within a country, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), chapter 6.
13. Herbert Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 16 (1986), pp. 57-85.
14. Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
15. Also see Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, "Political Participation and Political Trust in Amsterdam: Civic Communities and Ethnic Networks," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1999), pp. 703-26.
16. Shamit Saggar and Andrew Geddes, "Negative and Positive Racialization: Re-examining Ethnic Minority Political Representation in the UK." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2000), pp. 25-44.
17. Such a project could examine variables such as voter turnout and political preferences among a set of ethnic groups in several cities, within a number of countries. It would require sample surveys for selected census tracts, which could be compared to census data for the same geographical area, and possibly to voter turnout figures at corresponding polling stations. Such data would allow us to compare, for example, voter turnout rates among various ethnic groups in instances where there is a same-ethnic candidate running for election, controlling for factors like length of settlement and spatial concentration of the group. Other information on ethnic networks, and how these may foster group-based political mobilization, would also be essential.
18. Questions on "race," ethnicity and religion cannot be asked in the French census. Michèle Tribalat, a senior research fellow at National Institute of Demographic Studies, even fell under criticism in the late 1990s for research in which she distinguished French nationals of foreign origin.
19. See Hervé Le Bras, "L'impossible descendance étrangère [Foreign descent: A flawed concept]" Population, Vol. 52, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct. 1997), pp. 173-85.
20. Recently, however, some market research firms have begun to collect data on ethnicity. See Sarah Nassauer, "Personal is Political in France: Marketer's Queries on Minorities' Habits Test nation's Self Image," The Wall Street Journal (18 May 2005), p. A12.
21. Jeanne-Hélène Kaltenbach and Michéle Tribalat, LaRépublique et l'Islam: Entre Crainte et Aveuglement (Paris: Gallimard, 2002).
22. This count for France does not include representatives of French overseas departments, territories and collectivities (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyana, Reunion, Mayotte, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, and Mayotte). Over 90 per cent of the population of these colonial constituencies is indigenous, as are most of their legislative representatives (15 of 22 members in the current legislature). The exclusion from this study of aboriginal and regional-territorial minorities means that, in Canada, neither francophone nor First Nations representatives are counted. In Denmark, the representatives elected for the Faroe Islands and Greenland are excluded.
23. This was Kofi Yamgnagne, the Togolese-born Socialist deputy for Finistère from 1997 to 2002.
24. Both are Franco-Arab women: Bariza Khiari (Socialist) and Alima Boumédiene-Thiery (Green). It is important to note that Senators are elected indirectly by an electoral council composed largely of municipal and regional representatives. The rule of gender parity applies to these elections.
25. Conseillers généraux are directly elected by canton, using SMD majority rules (the winner must receive at least 50 per cent of the vote, in elections taking place over two rounds), for a term of six years. Conseillers régionaux are elected by list, using PR, with the additional requirement that an equal number of male and female candidates be included in alternating order on every list. Following elections held in March 2004, the number of ethnic minorities elected at the cantonal level remained constant, while the number at the regional level appears to have increased to approximately 25.
26. With the exception of family reunification, France effectively ended new immigration in the early 1970s.
27. For example, until reforms introduced in 1981 to the basic 1901 law on the right of association, foreigners were prohibited from forming their own associations.
28. William Safran, "Institutional Pluralism and Multiculturalism in France: Post-Jacobin Transformations," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall 2003), pp. 437-65.
29. So too does the new "positive discrimination" policy adopted by the prestigious Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris, which exempts from competitive entrance examinations applicants who have graduated from a high school within a designated geographical zone. These so called "ZEPs" or education priority zones are determined in part by the proportion of immigrants and foreigners living in a neighborhood.
30. For the most part, the terms "ethnic" or "visible minority" are deliberately avoided even by the advocates of these groups. In the French context, the more accurate description might be the "children of colonization." They are, principally, those North African Arabs, sub-Saharan, Polynesian and South American Blacks, and Asians, who have long been relegated by the color of their skin, the national origin of their ancestors, or the sound of their names to the periphery of French citizenship.
31. Among the latter are: Egalité effective, an equal rights movement for visible minorities, headed by Stéphane Pocrain; and Africagora, a movement to increase Blacks' representation in business and politics.
32. See Philippe Bernard, "Les beurs séduits par la droite," Le Monde (4 December 2003),
33. and Karim Bourtel, "Grandes manoeuvres politiques autour des Franco-Maghrébins." Le Monde Diplomatique (November 2003).
34. Saifi's essential role has been to improve the electoral strategies of the party within the Franco-Arab community (see below). Mekachera, who was president of the Conseil national de Français musulmans until his appointment, was chosen to help ensure a moderate influence in the newly established Conseil Français du culte musulman (French Council of the Muslim Religion). The Political Representation of Visible Minorities in Electoral Democracies 461
35. Didier Hassoux, "Régionales: Les partis pas très ouverts," Libération (4 December 2003);
36. Besma Lahouri, "Des beurs très courtisés," L'Express (15 January 2004).
37. Claude Askolovitch, "L'UMP ferme la porte aux beurs," Le Nouvel Observateur, Vol. 2050 (19 February 2004);
38. Alain Auffray, "Sortie de ligne droite pour les beurs," Libération (20 February 2004).
39. It is significant that, while a prefect has no authority on religious issues, Sarkozy (and subsequently the press) has persistently described Roger Ben Mebarek as Muslim rather than as Franco-Arab.
40. Elaine Sciolino, "France Envisions a Citizenry of Model Muslims," New York Times (7 May 2003).
41. In the UMP, five of the party's 81 national secretaries are visible minorities.
42. For example, in Ile-de-France, just five visible minorities were elected among 209 regional councilors (2.4 per cent), and there are none within the regional executive. This region - encompassing Paris and its suburbs - has one of the most ethnically heterogeneous populations in all of France.
43. The Communist Party applied an innovative strategy during the 2004 regional elections. In Ile-de-France and five other regions, they formed a political alliance across a multitude of civic associations, including many devoted to anti-racism and human rights. Running under the banner Parti Communiste - Alternatif Citoyen, the party selected one-third of its candidates from among community leaders, a large number of whom were visible minorities.
44. See G. Dominique Baillet, Militantisme politique et intégration des jeunes d'origine Maghrébine (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001).
45. Olivier Masclet, La Gauche et les cités. Enquête sur un rendez-vous manqué (Paris: La Dispute/SNEDIT, 2003).
46. Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern France (New York: Routledge, 1992).
47. Albert Malibeau, "De la monarchie municipale à la française," Pouvoirs, Vol. 73 (1995), pp. 7-17.
48. Under this system, the winning list receives the first 50 per cent of all council seats, and the remaining half are distributed proportionally. Thus a winning list that receives 60 per cent of the popular vote will actually receive 50 per cent of the first half, plus 60 per cent of the remaining half - for a total of 80 per cent of all seats. The remaining 20 per cent of seats are split proportionally among the losing parties.
49. Romain Garbaye, "Ethnic Minorities, Cities, and Institutions: A Comparison of the Modes of Management of Ethnic Diversity of a French and a British City." In Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (eds.), Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
50. Nominating ethnic women for election also helps parties to meet the new gender parity requirement.
51. This lack of democratic credibility is not only a problem for ethnic minority representatives. Mariette Sineau has documented the same pattern in the ascension of women to political power in France. See Mariette Sineau, Profession femme politique (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2001). 462 K. Bird
52. Vincent Geisser, Ethnicité républicaine: Les Elites d'origine Maghrébine dans le système politique français (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1997).
53. The Union Française pour la Cohésion Nationale presented a slate of Franco-Arab candidates for cantonal elections in March 2004, and again formed a list for European elections in June 2004. Similarly, the association Africagora sponsored a multi-ethnic list for European elections.
54. William Safran, "Ethnoreligious Politics in France: Jews and Muslims," West European Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2004), pp. 423-51.
55. UN Human Rights Commission Statistical Yearbook (2002), pp.43-4.
56. The Danish statistics bureau does not record ethnicity or religion, but it does consider the place of birth of one's parents. Descendants of immigrants are those persons born in Denmark to parents who are not Danish citizens born in Denmark. There are very few third- or fourth-generation immigrants in Denmark, but they would be considered Danes, as long as one of their parents is a Danish citizen born in Denmark.
57. Deborah Roseveare and Martin Jorgensen, "Migration and Integration of Immigrants in Denmark," OECD Economics Department Working Paper, 30 April 2004.
58. European citizens as well as citizens from the Nordic countries enjoy this right on the same basis as Danish citizens, that is without the three-year residency requirement.
59. David Goodhart, "Too Diverse?" Prospect, February 2004.
60. SOPEMI report for Denmark, 2001. Reported in Roseveare and Jorgensen, p.16.
61. This method is also used in Belgian local elections, though with slight variations from the Danish rules. Note that a number of major cities in Belgium have also achieved nearly proportional political representation of ethnic minorities. This occurred before Belgium adopted (in 2004) its new law granting local voting rights to third-country nationals. See Dirk Jacobs, Marco Martiniello, and Andrea Rea, "Changing Patterns of Political Participation of Citizens of Immigrant Origin in the Brussels Capital Region: The October 2000 Elections," Journal of International Migration and Integration, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2003), pp. 201-21.
62. An exception is in the semi-proportional methods of election applied in the smallest villages (under 1,500 inhabitants) in French municipal elections. In these contests, voters are allowed to write in names of candidates and to cross others from the list.
63. In fact, some cities have seen too many ethnic candidates, in which case they tend to split the vote of the ethnic communities. For example, in 2001 municipal elections in Aarhus, there were 20 ethnic minorities of a total field of 220 candidates (9 per cent). Just two were elected.
64. In municipal elections in Aarhus, Lise Tögeby documents a voter turnout of 73 per cent among ethnic Turks and Pakistanis, compared to 72 per cent among ethnic Danes. Lise Tögeby, "Migrants at the Polls: An Analysis of Immigrant and Refugee Participation in Danish Local Elections," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1999), pp. 665-84.
65. The Turkish population is clearly the best represented in Denmark. This appears to be due to this group's longer history and deeper integration in Denmark.
66. Lise Tögeby, Fra Fremmedarbejdere til Etniske Minoriteter (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2003).
67. While they were in government, the Social Democratic coalition began the tightening of immigration policy with the Integration Act of 1999, and sought to introduce lower welfare benefits for immigrants. The present Liberal government, with parliamentary support from right wing parties, has made further cuts in immigration, and to social and political entitlements of settled immigrants.
68. This description of Naser Khader is drawn largely from Mehmet Umit Necef, "Impression Management and Political Entrepreneurship in Denmark." Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Turin, Italy, 2002.
69. Interview with Bünyamin Simsek, 24 November 2003. Simsek's personal story is also recounted by Roger Cohen, "For 'New Danes' Differences Create a Divide," New York Times (web edition), 18 December 2000.
70. Interview with Ouafa Rian, 25 November 2003.
71. Interview with Hüseyin Arac, 24 November 2003.
72. A candidate's age also factors in this strategic calculus. Younger candidates are more likely to cast their appeal to ethnic Danes, while older candidates are more likely to appeal to the ethnic communities. Note that while the visible minority male candidates in Denmark have ranged broadly in age, almost all ethnic minority women who have run as candidates are under 40 years of age.
73. Visible minorities, as defined under the federal Employment Equity Act, are persons other than aboriginal people who are non-Caucasian in race and non-European in origin. Statistics on the size of Canada's visible minority population are based on a census question asking people whether they are White, Chinese, South Asian, Filipino, Latin American, South-East Asian, Arab Japanese, Korean, or other. Additional census questions ask whether one is an aboriginal, and about the cultural background of one's ancestors.
74. Statistics Canada, "Study: Canada's Visible Minority Population in 2017," www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/050322/d050322b.htm (22 March 2005).
75. See Jerome Black, "Minority Representation in the Canadian Parliament following the 1997 Election: Patterns of Continuity and Change." Paper presented at the Fourth National Metropolis Conference, Toronto, 2000.
76. Ujjal Dosanjh is Minister of Health, and Raymond Chan is Secretary of State for Multiculturalism. Dosanjh was formerly Premier of the NDP government in British Columbia.
77. In Canada, it is possible to calculate with relative accuracy a proportionality index for various groups (PI = the proportion of group members within an elected body/the proportion of group members within the general population). A score of 1.00 indicates that a group is represented in proportion to its numbers in the general population. The proportionality index for visible minorities in the House of Commons is 0.49; for women it is 0.40; and for foreign-born Canadians it is 0.78.
78. In Toronto, Vancouver and Montréal, the proportionality index for visible minority representation is 0.30, 0.37 and 0.39 (respectively). Visible minority representation is also low in Canada's medium-sized cities, such as Halifax, Hamilton, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Calgary, and Edmonton.
79. This figure is based on my interviews with candidates and campaign managers in a number of the ridings in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Similar figures have been reported in British Columbia. See Des Verma, Lenn Chow, Martin Collacott and Steve Kaufman, "Recruiting by Race is No Way to Build a Party." National Post, 13 August 2003.
80. More than 77 percent of all Liberals who were elected in 2004 were incumbents, compared to 58 percent of Conservatives, and 53 percent of New Democrats.
81. In the 2004 election, the Liberals appear to have had 20 visible minority candidates, compared to 29 for the Conservatives and 23 for the NDP. These numbers are based on an extensive review of campaign websites for all candidates of the three major parties. The numbers are generally consistent with figures reported by the Toronto Star (Liberals 23; Conservatives 32; NDP 25). See Robert Benzie, "It's Still a White Men's Club," Toronto Star, 9 June 2004, p. A9.
82. PI for the 19 largest visible minority ridings in the GTA: 0.21/0.53 = 0.40; PI for the House of Commons = 0.49.
83. The Conservatives do not have an affirmative action program to attract more visible minority candidates. Indeed, some Conservatives are unwilling even to acknowledge any formal ethnic outreach strategy, for fear that this may appear to make race a criterion in candidate selection.
84. One series of ads, run during the 2004 election, reminded immigrant voters: "You don't have to vote Liberal to be Canadian." Another series sought ethnic support for the Conservative position against legislation to allow same-sex marriage.
85. The Liberals have a similar fund that is available to female candidates, but not to visible minorities.
86. They include nine Indo-Canadians: Navdeep Singh Bains, Ruby Dhalla, Gurbax Singh Mali, Wajid Khan, and Ujjal Dosanjh (all Liberals), Gurmant Grewal, Nina Grewal, Rahim Jaffer and Deepak Obhrai (all Conservatives). The tenth South Asian elected in 2004 - Yasmin Ratansi (Liberal) - was born in Tanzania. All represent ridings in Ontario, British Columbia, or Alberta. Of note, the Grewals became the first married couple to be seated in parliament. Their marriage, as is the custom in their ethnic community, was an arranged one.
87. There is some evidence that the Chinese Canadian community demonstrates higher levels of political involvement in the province of British Columbia and in the city of Vancouver than they do in Ontario and Toronto. This may be a result of their much longer period of settlement on the west coast.
88. This is the case for women, as well as visible minorities. For many years, women's political representation was stunted by the popular belief that women were not suited by circumstance or temperament to govern. Yet even as this belief has waned over time, there has been only marginal improvement in women's representation. For advanced democracies at least, studies suggest that popular attitudes toward women are no longer a significant barrier to their inclusion in politics - though these attitudes do profoundly shape the way that women do politics. See, for example, Mariette Sineau, Profession Femme Politique (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2001).
89. Prior to the 2004 elections, three of the five visible minority representatives elected to regional councils across France were members of the FN.
90. One survey in Canada has suggested that the children of immigrants are more likely than their parents to support the positions of the Conservative Party. See National Post "Immigrant Children Inclined to Vote Tory," 21 May 2004.
91. See the campaigns conducted by the American Arab Institute, www.aaiusa.org/elections.htm, and of the Canadian Islamic Congress, www.canadianislamiccongress.com/election2004/Election2004.pdf, in this respect.
92. The Turkish parliament, for example, congratulated Hüseyin Arac for his success in becoming the first Turkish MP in Denmark. Likewise, The Tribune, an Indian on-line newspaper, has thoroughly documented the political successes of Indo-Canadians in various provincial and national elections (see www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20001126/edit.htm).
93. Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, "Challenging the Liberal Nation-State? Postnationalism, Multiculturalism, and the Collective Claims-Making of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities in Britain and Germany." In Koopmans and Statham (eds.), Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.187-232.
94. The issue was raised at the Durban World Conference against Racism, but the principal focus of these discussions was on securing voting rights for foreigners.