A look at intelligence analysis

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 231-264

  Lefebvre, Stéphane ^a  

^a DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 32744459300     PISSN: 08850607     EISSN: 15210561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/08850600490274908     Document Type: Article

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