What to do with the stability pact

Intereconomics

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 7-10

  Eichengreen, Barry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 32644459439     PISSN: 00205346     EISSN: 1613964X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF03031832     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. See Willem Buiter, Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti: Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht, in: Economic Policy, VoI. 8, No. 16, 1993, pp. 57-100.
2. See Juergen von Hagen, lan J. Harden: National Budget Processes and Fiscal Performance, in: European Economy, Reports and Studies, No. 3, 1994, pp. 311-418
3. Kichiro Fukasaku, Ricardo Hausmann (eds.): Democracy, Decentralization, and Deficits in Latin America, Paris 1998, OECD
4. Juergen von Hagen: Budgeting Institutions for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline, ZEI Policy Paper No. B98-01, Bonn 1998, Center for European Integration Studies.
5. See Juergen von Hagen, Barry Eichengreen: Federalism, Fiscal Restraints and European Monetary Union, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, 1996, pp. 134-138
6. Ernesto Stein: Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size in Latin America, in: Kichiro Fukasaku, Ricardo Hausmann (eds.): Democracy, Decentralization, and Deficits in Latin America, Paris 1998, OECD, pp. 95-120.
7. Simon Wren-Lewis: The Limits of Discretionary Fiscal Stabilisation Policy, in: Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2000, pp. 92-105
8. Charles Wyplosz: The Stability Pact Meets its Fate, paper prepared for the Euro 50 Group, Paris, 27 November 2002
9. Charles Wyplosz: Fiscal Policy in EMU: Rules or Institutions?, paper prepared for the Group of Economic Analysis of the European Commission, April 2002.