An economic answer to unsolicited communication

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 5, Issue , 2004, Pages 40-50

  Loder, Thede ^a   Van Alstyne, Marshall ^a   Wash, Rick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Filtering; Information asymmetry; Information economics; Mechanism design; Screening; Signaling; Spam; UCE

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER CRIME; DATA TRANSFER; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INFORMATION SERVICES; SIGNAL FILTERING AND PREDICTION; SIGNALING; SPAMMING; TELECOMMUNICATION;

INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; INFORMATION ECONOMICS; MECHANISM DESIGN; UCE;

ELECTRONIC MAIL;

EID: 3242777742     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/988772.988780     Document Type: Conference Paper

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