Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 5, Issue , 2004, Pages 120-124

  Mehta, Aranyak ^a   Vazirani, Vijay V ^a  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Truth revelation

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTER SIMULATION; FUNCTION EVALUATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; SET THEORY; THEOREM PROVING; VECTORS;

AUCTIONS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; DIGITAL GOODS; TRUTH-REVEALATIONS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 3242743706     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/988772.988791     Document Type: Conference Paper

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