Location choice by households and polluting firms: An evolutionary approach

European Economic Review

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 425-446

  Dijkstra, Bouwe R ^a   de Vries, Frans P ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Environmental policy; Evolutionary game theory; Location choice

Indexed keywords

HOUSING CONDITIONS; POLLUTION; WASTE DISPOSAL;

EID: 31544443513     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.09.006     Document Type: Article

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