CEO compensation and subsequent firm performance: An empirical investigation

Corporate Ownership and Control

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 86-103

  Stammerjohan, William ^a  

^a LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO; Compensation; Stock option; Stockholder

Indexed keywords

EID: 31444439248     PISSN: 17279232     EISSN: 18103057     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.22495/cocv2i1p7     Document Type: Article

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