K-price auctions: Revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design

Economic Theory

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 255-270

  Monderer, Dov ^a   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^a  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Competition in auction design; Fun seeking; Internet auctions; Risk averse agents; Risk seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142773247     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0424-x     Document Type: Article

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