"The unsteady and precarious contribution of individuals": Edmund Burke's defense of civil society

Review of Politics

Volumn 61, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 465-491

  Boyd, Richard ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 3142752136     PISSN: 00346705     EISSN: 17486858     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0034670500028928     Document Type: Article

References (132)

1. For the "liberal" interpretation, see most notably, Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography and Commented Anthology of Edmund Burke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), esp. "Introduction," and pp. 595-
2. For the "conservative" interpretation, see Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1958), esp. pp. 7-9, 24-25;
3. Francis P. Canavan, The Political Reason of Edmund Burke (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1960);
4. and Peter J. Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1965).
5. For Hobbes's statement of this dilemma, see Leviathan, "The Epistle Dedicatory," ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Press, 1968), p. 75;
6. David Hume, "On the Origin of Government," p. 40;
7. "Of the Parties of Great Britain," pp. 64-65 in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1987).
8. Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. Thomas H. D. Mahoney (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), p. 9. Unless otherwise indicated, all page references are to this edition.
9. Ibid., p. 289.
10. On the consistency of Burke's thought and his confrontation with this core constitutional dilemma, see his "Appeal from the Old to the New Whigs," in Further Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. Daniel Ritchie (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1992), esp. pp. 100-102.
11. Charles Taylor, "Atomism" in Philosophical Papers, Vol.2: Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985);
12. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962);
13. Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontents: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1996).
14. Sanford Lakoff so describes this Burkean impulse ("Tocqueville, Burke and the Origins of Liberal Conservatism," Review of Politics 60 [1998]: 435-64).
15. Phillipe Raynaud also suggests Burke's affinity to nineteenth century liberals- Constant, de Stael and Tocqueville-who defended a moderate liberal center against reaction and radicalism on right and left. See his "Introduction," Reflexions sur la revolution de France (Paris: Hachette, 1991), esp. pp. lvi-lvii, c-ciii.
16. The "civil" bond represents a linguistic and conceptual compound of civitas-or as Locke and Hobbes preferred, "commonwealth"- and the Latin societas, or voluntary association. For accounts of etymology, see John Locke, Second Treatise, X, 133;
17. Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. pp. 199-203.
18. Or, as the critical demurrer of Rousseau would have it, which allow conventional inequalities to ramify. Cf. Burke, Reflections, p. 42.
19. On this conceptual transformation, see Edward Shils, "The Virtue of Civility" in The Virtue of Civility and Other Essays (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1997), pp. 320-325
20. For passages that suggest Burke's indebtedness to the first tradition of civil society, see Reflections, "The engagement and pact of society, which generally goes by the name of the constitution," (p. 23);
21. "You had all these advantages in your ancient states, but you chose to act as though you had never been molded into civil society," (p. 40); and his discussion of the original contract (esp. pp. 67- 70).
22. For a more Lockean view that suggests at least a rudimentary distinction between the social and political union, consider, "If civil society be the offspring of convention, that convention must be its law. That convention must limit and modify all descriptions of constitution which are formed under it" (pp. 67-68);
23. "the change (in principles of succession) is to be effected without a decomposition of the whole civil and political mass for the purpose of originating a new civil order out of the first elements of society" (p. 24).
24. Cf. John Locke, Second Treatise, X, 132;
25. Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, Being an Answer to Mr, Burke's Attack on the French Revolution (New York: Putnam's, 1894), pp. 307-311.
26. Reflections, p. 109.
27. Ibid., pp. 8, 24, 67.
28. Ibid., p. 9.
29. Ibid., p. 53.
30. Ibid., p. 231.
31. Ibid., pp. 110, 87,112, 231.
32. Ibid., p. 110.
33. Ibid., p. 38.
34. Hobbes, Leviathan, chaps. 22,29;
35. Hume, "Of Parties in General" in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, p. 55.
36. Locke, Second Treatise, X, 132
37. -88 XIX, 211-12, 220.
38. Reflections, p. 113.
39. Ibid., pp. 111-117
40. Ibid., pp. 102-103.
41. Russell Kirk appreciates this point (The Conservative Mind, pp. 28-29).
42. On Mansfield's differing view of Burke's religion, see Statesmanship and Party Government: A Study of Burke and Bolingbroke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 232-233
43. J. C. D. Clark warns against attempts to supplant the religious basis of eighteenth century with secular rationalism, English Society: 1688 - 1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 257.
44. Mill, "Utility of Religion," in Three Essays on Religion (New York: Henry Holt, 1878), p. 70.
45. Tocqueville, Ancien Regime and the French Revolution, ed. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Anchor, 1983), pp. 6-7, 205
46. Democracy in America, ed. Mayer (New York: Harper, 1966), Vol.I, Pt. 2, chap. 9, pp. 294-301.
47. This argument presumes that Burke should in principle prefer an established state religion. However, there is also some evidence to support the view that in ideal terms Burke might well have seen the advantages of religious disestablishment. In principle, the advantages of a separation between religion and politics are evident in his favorable assessment of the role of voluntary religious association among the New England colonists" (A Speech on Conciliation with America," in Pre-Revolutionary Writings, ed. Ian Harris [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], esp. pp. 221-224).
48. This was also a position he supported in the context of the Irish question ("Tracts on the Popery Laws," ibid., pp. 95-96). In both these cases Burke appreciates that a spirit of religious dissent is at least potentially compatible with an independent and pious liberty.
49. Reflections, pp. 169-171
50. Ibid., p. 117.
51. "Speech on a Motion for Leave to Bring in a Bill to Quiet the Possessions of the Subject Against Dormant Claims of the Church," 17 February 1772 in The Works of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little Brown, 1894), 7:139.
52. Reflections, p. 115.
53. Ibid., p. 13.
54. "Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians," Works, 7: esp. 47-57.
55. Reflections, p. 12.
56. James Conniff, The Useful Cobbler: Edmund Burke and the Politics of Progress (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), importantly suggests that the "Lockeanism" Burke attacks is not Locke's own (p. 105). Burke discounts Locke's presumption of "tacit consent," which resembles his own in many respects. The "Lockeanism" Burke finally indicts appears closer to Rousseau.
57. "Speech on the Acts of Uniformity," Works, 7:17.
58. Reflections, p. 173.
59. Cf. the arguments of Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), Bk. V, Ch. 1, Pt. Ill, Art. 3, esp. pp. 314-15;
60. James Madison, The Complete Madison: His Basic Writings, ed. Saul K. Padover (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 304.
61. Reflections, p. 13.
62. Burke here expresses the possibility of a "Protestant theory of persecution" later explored by Lord Acton. John E. E. Dalberg-Acton, "The Protestant Theory of Persecution," in Essays in the Study and Writing of History (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1985), esp. pp. 98-102.
63. Reflections, pp. 25-26.
64. See Clark, English Society, esp. pp. 250-257
65. "Speech on Relief of Protestant Dissenters," Works, 7: 24-26.
66. "Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians," ibid., p. 48.
67. "Regicide Peace 2," 5: 312;
68. compare Reflections, pp. 12-13,72-73,78,144.
69. Reflections, p. 144.
70. Proces-Verbaux du comite d'instruction publique, 1791-1792
71. Quoted in Kung Chuan Hsiao, Political Pluralism (New York: Harper, 1927), p. 263. My translation.
72. Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 263.
73. Reflections, p. 231;
74. Rousseau, Social Contract, Bk. II, chap. 3, pp. 156-57
75. Ibid., p. 53.
76. Ibid., p. 231.
77. Bolingbroke, The Works of Lord Bolingbroke (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1841), 3: 485-488; 4:108-109.
78. Hobbes, Behemoth, Or The Long Parliament CChicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), esp. pp. 2-3,18-19, 22-27;
79. Hume, "Of Parties in General" and "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm."
80. Burke, "Vindication," in Harris, Pre-Revolutionary Writings, p. 56.
81. Reflections, p. 115.
82. Ibid..
83. Ibid., p. 116.
84. Ibid., p. 106;
85. see also, pp. 115-16.
86. Harvey Mansfield, "A Sketch of Burke's Life" in Selected Letters of Edmund Burke, ed. Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 31.
87. Hume, "That Politics may be reduced to a Science," in Essays, pp. 29,26-27,31.
88. Hume, "Of Parties in General," ibid., p. 61
89. See for example Irene Coltman, Private Men & Public Causes: Philosophy and Politics in the English Civil War (London: Faber and Faber, 1962).
90. For Burke's own words on this "political school," see "Thoughts," p. 133.
91. For an account of its pervasiveness and Burke's "counterrevolution, " see Mansfield, Statesmanship and Party Government, esp. pp. 98-105, 111, 121,178.
92. Burke, "Thoughts," p. 184.
93. Burke, "Observations on a Late Pamphlet Intitled "The Present State of the Nation,'" Works 1:9.
94. "Thoughts," p. 185.
95. Ibid., p. 184.
96. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Bk. I, chap. 22, pp. 274-75 ; chap. 29, pp. 374-75;
97. David Hume, "Of Parties in General" and "The Parties of Great Britain," in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, esp. pp. 60-62, 65-66.
98. "Thoughts," p. 184.
99. "I remember an old scholastic aphorism, which says, 'that the man who lives wholly detached from others, must be either an angel or a devil.'" Cf. Aristotle, Politics, I,1;
100. quoted in ibid., p. 190.
101. Ibid., p. 190.
102. Ibid., pp. 185-186
103. Ibid., pp. 185.
104. Aristotle, Politics, Bk. I; Bk. Ill, x, xv.
105. See for example, Heinrich Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought (New York: Greenwood, 1969), esp. pp. 143-144, 301-302;
106. Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches (London: Allen and Unwin, 1949), 1: esp. 145-50
107. Sanford Lakoff similarly takes Burke and Tocqueville's attention to pluralism as a distinguishing element of their "liberal conservatism." See his "Tocqueville, Burke and the Origins of Liberal Conservatism," esp. p. 456.
108. Here I follow Nancy Rosenblum's multiple liberal traditions thesis, Another Liberalism: Romanticism and Reconstruction in Liberal Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
109. For Burke's attack on the legal positivism which would treat property, church, and private association as "fictitious persons, creatures of the state, whom at pleasure they may destroy" (Reflections, p. 121).
110. Ibid., pp. 70-71.
111. Hannah Arendt later acknowledged Burke's prescience on this point (The Origins of Totalitarianism [New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951], pp. 294-296).
112. Reflections, p. 88.
113. Ibid., p. 40.
114. Ibid..
115. Ibid., pp. 51, 217, 258.
116. Ibid., pp. 217, 258. Unlike Burke, Tocqueville saw the advent of this atomization in the centuries-old administrative centralization of the Bourbons. But the two agree about its disastrous consequences.
117. Cf. Tocqueville, Ancien Regime, pp. 205-207.
118. Reflections, p. 258.
119. Ibid., p. 48.
120. Ibid..
121. Ibid..
122. Ibid., pp. 69, 9.
123. Burke also decries the concealed vanity of the spirit of philosophical reform: "A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views. People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors"
124. ibid., pp. 37-38.
125. In Burke's thought, as well as in social reality, the distinction between voluntary association and prescriptive institution blurs. For example, Harvey Mansfield has properly emphasized the sense in which Burke envisions political parties to be "establishments"-that is, inherited, quasi-institutional structures rooted in social gradations and vested interests-and not voluntary "associations," as Jefferson intended. See his Statesmanship, esp. pp. 193-196
126. Yet even "voluntary" associations have ascriptive dimensions: they are rooted in traditions, we tend to belong from habit, and often exit is an unimaginable option. Tocqueville's later account of American associational life does not escape this ambiguity. Consider Democracy in America, esp. Vol.I, Pt. 2, chap. 9, where Tocqueville describes religious association as a "moeur" and as a "political institution"; Vol.II, Pt. 1, chap. 7, where civic associations are characterized as a "general habit or taste"; a "technique" or "spirit," which must be "taught."
127. Notably, Albert Hirschman, Passions and Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977);
128. Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995);
129. Ralph Lerner, "Commerce and Character" in The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle and Practice in the New Republic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
130. Reflections, p. 114.
131. Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995), p. 56.
132. Far from presuming the harmony of pluralism, classical political thought was also well aware of its tensions. Compare the predicament described by Augustine, City of God, Bk. XIX, chaps. 7-10,17.