Constructivism, identity and neoliberal (in)security

Review of International Studies

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2004, Pages

  Varadarajan, Latha ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 3142693620     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210504006096     Document Type: Review

References (125)

1. I use the term 'neoliberalism' (in the title and throughout the article) to refer to the ideology that promotes liberalisation/deregulation of domestic economies and their greater integration with a 'global economy'.
2. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, pp. 1, 17.
3. Here I refer to a group of scholars who have identified themselves/ been identified as embodying a 'mainstream constructivist position' as against a more 'radical' or 'critical constructivist' one. Often hailed as embodying a 'liberal constructivist position', scholars who could be classified as belonging to this group have made their mark in the field of security studies. Apart from Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, who are most closely identified with the 'security communities' literature, this group would include scholars like Richard Price, Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Elizabeth Kier, and Martha Finnemore. In this article, I do not engage with feminist and post-structuralist scholars whose work has contributed immensely to the opening up of the security debates within IR. For an analysis of the differences between the 'mainstream' constructivist and more critical perspectives, see Richard Price and Chritian Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism', European Journal of International Relations, 4:3, pp. 259-94.
4. For example, Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 313-26; Barry Buzan, People, States, Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in a Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991); Ole Waever et al. Identity, Immigration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); David Campbell, Writing Security (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
5. For example, Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 313-26; Barry Buzan, People, States, Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in a Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991); Ole Waever et al. Identity, Immigration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); David Campbell, Writing Security (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
6. For example, Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 313-26; Barry Buzan, People, States, Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in a Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991); Ole Waever et al. Identity, Immigration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); David Campbell, Writing Security (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
7. For example, Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 313-26; Barry Buzan, People, States, Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in a Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991); Ole Waever et al. Identity, Immigration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); David Campbell, Writing Security (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
8. For example, Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 313-26; Barry Buzan, People, States, Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in a Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991); Ole Waever et al. Identity, Immigration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); David Campbell, Writing Security (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
9. For example, Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 313-26; Barry Buzan, People, States, Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in a Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991); Ole Waever et al. Identity, Immigration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); David Campbell, Writing Security (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
10. For example, Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 313-26; Barry Buzan, People, States, Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in a Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991); Ole Waever et al. Identity, Immigration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); David Campbell, Writing Security (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
11. In this article, I look mainly at the analytical shortcomings of liberal constructivism in security studies. In doing so, I do not directly address two very important schools of thought that have profoundly shaped the nature of security studies, that is, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Two examples of work within these traditions are: Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
12. In this article, I look mainly at the analytical shortcomings of liberal constructivism in security studies. In doing so, I do not directly address two very important schools of thought that have profoundly shaped the nature of security studies, that is, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Two examples of work within these traditions are: Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
13. In this, my project is fairly similar to Mark Laffey's intervention in security studies to the extent that we both attempt to foreground 'transnational liberalism' in analysing questions of national identities and hence, security practices of nation-states. Mark Laffey, 'Adding an Asian Strand: Neoliberalism and the Politics of Culture in New Zealand', in Jutta Weldes et al. (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity, pp. 233-60.
14. To explore the nuances of each of the contributions would be beyond the scope of this essay. I focus here primarily on the two essays by Peter Katzenstein and the conceptual piece co-authored by Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein. Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', pp. 33-78; Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World', pp. 498-528. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security.
15. To explore the nuances of each of the contributions would be beyond the scope of this essay. I focus here primarily on the two essays by Peter Katzenstein and the conceptual piece co-authored by Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein. Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', pp. 33-78; Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World', pp. 498-528. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security.
16. To explore the nuances of each of the contributions would be beyond the scope of this essay. I focus here primarily on the two essays by Peter Katzenstein and the conceptual piece co-authored by Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein. Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', pp. 33-78; Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World', pp. 498-528. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security.
17. To explore the nuances of each of the contributions would be beyond the scope of this essay. I focus here primarily on the two essays by Peter Katzenstein and the conceptual piece co-authored by Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein. Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', pp. 33-78; Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World', pp. 498-528. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security.
18. Ibid., p. 14.
19. Ibid., p. 34. See also Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', American Political Science Review, 88:2, pp. 384-96.
20. Ibid., p. 34. See also Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', American Political Science Review, 88:2, pp. 384-96.
21. The authors do not provide too clear an explanation of what they mean by norms. Starting with a definition that emphasises that norms are basically 'collective expectations about proper behavior of a given identity', they go on to argue that norms might sometime act to constitute - that is, give identities to actors. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 52. My own emphasis.
22. 'A large literature on national identity and state sovereignty attests to this important aspect of international polities'. Ibid., p. 59.
23. Ibid., fn. 85, p. 59.
24. This distinction is similar to what Wendt refers to as the 'corporate' and 'social' identities of the state. In a later formulation, he expands the 'social identity' category to include what he terms, 'type', 'role' and 'collective'. Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46 (1992), pp. 391-425; Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 224-33.
25. This distinction is similar to what Wendt refers to as the 'corporate' and 'social' identities of the state. In a later formulation, he expands the 'social identity' category to include what he terms, 'type', 'role' and 'collective'. Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46 (1992), pp. 391-425; Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 224-33.
26. On this issue, see Ido Oren, 'The Subjectivity of "Democratic" Peace: Changing US Perceptions of Imperial Germany', International Security, 20 (1995), pp. 147-84; and Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
27. On this issue, see Ido Oren, 'The Subjectivity of "Democratic" Peace: Changing US Perceptions of Imperial Germany', International Security, 20 (1995), pp. 147-84; and Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
28. The schematic diagram on p. 38 (discussed in pp. 43-52) makes a slight gesture at situating the constructivist position as against others such as the Marxist, Statist, and Bureaucratic Politics models. But, for the most part, the authors are very clear about who they are arguing with/against. For instance, in positioning the empirical essays in the field of security studies, the main question they ask is 'What is the relationship of the "cultural", "institutional", and "constructivist" arguments of this volume to those of realism and liberalism?', p. 68 (Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security).
29. For a greater explication of this point, see Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1994).
30. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 14.
31. I b i d.
32. A further reflection of this somewhat strange distinction can be found in Wendt's statement regarding the four 'national interests' that exist outside of social context - to preserve and further physical security, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem. The implicit assumption here being that all four have a universal, fixed and given meaning that is not open to social [reproduction. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 235-7. For a well-argued critique of this understanding of identity, see Maja Zehfuss, 'Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison', European Journal of International Relations, 1 (2001), pp. 315-48.
33. A further reflection of this somewhat strange distinction can be found in Wendt's statement regarding the four 'national interests' that exist outside of social context - to preserve and further physical security, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem. The implicit assumption here being that all four have a universal, fixed and given meaning that is not open to social [reproduction. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 235-7. For a well-argued critique of this understanding of identity, see Maja Zehfuss, 'Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison', European Journal of International Relations, 1 (2001), pp. 315-48.
34. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 30.
35. Ibid., p. 574.
36. While acknowledging the important contributions of neoliberal institutionalist and certain neorealist scholars in looking at the global economy as either providing incentive for cooperation or rationale for conflict, I do not engage with them in this essay because their focus has never been on the constitutive effects of the global economy. Examples of the former tradition include, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); and Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). The best exemplar of the latter is perhaps, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
37. While acknowledging the important contributions of neoliberal institutionalist and certain neorealist scholars in looking at the global economy as either providing incentive for cooperation or rationale for conflict, I do not engage with them in this essay because their focus has never been on the constitutive effects of the global economy. Examples of the former tradition include, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); and Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). The best exemplar of the latter is perhaps, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
38. While acknowledging the important contributions of neoliberal institutionalist and certain neorealist scholars in looking at the global economy as either providing incentive for cooperation or rationale for conflict, I do not engage with them in this essay because their focus has never been on the constitutive effects of the global economy. Examples of the former tradition include, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); and Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). The best exemplar of the latter is perhaps, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
39. Within the discipline of International Relations, the main proponents of this tradition include Robert Cox, Stephen Gill and Mark Rupert. Admittedly, the focus of this scholarship has not been on questions of security. Dealing primarily with questions of international political economy, scholars of this tradition have focused not just on the production and demise of US hegemony, but also on the spread of 'transnational liberalism' within the global economy. See for instance, Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
40. Within the discipline of International Relations, the main proponents of this tradition include Robert Cox, Stephen Gill and Mark Rupert. Admittedly, the focus of this scholarship has not been on questions of security. Dealing primarily with questions of international political economy, scholars of this tradition have focused not just on the production and demise of US hegemony, but also on the spread of 'transnational liberalism' within the global economy. See for instance, Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
41. Within the discipline of International Relations, the main proponents of this tradition include Robert Cox, Stephen Gill and Mark Rupert. Admittedly, the focus of this scholarship has not been on questions of security. Dealing primarily with questions of international political economy, scholars of this tradition have focused not just on the production and demise of US hegemony, but also on the spread of 'transnational liberalism' within the global economy. See for instance, Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
42. The 'internationalisation' of capital generally refers to a more limited form of economic globalisation wherein national constraints still matter and nation-states still have a role to play. Jim Glassman, 'State Power beyond the "territorial trap": the internationalization of the state', Political Geography, 18 (1999), pp. 669-96. For further discussions of the concept of internationalisation, see Peter Dicken, 'Transnational Corporations and Nation-States', International Social Science Journal, 49: 151 (1997), pp. 77-89; and Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
43. The 'internationalisation' of capital generally refers to a more limited form of economic globalisation wherein national constraints still matter and nation-states still have a role to play. Jim Glassman, 'State Power beyond the "territorial trap": the internationalization of the state', Political Geography, 18 (1999), pp. 669-96. For further discussions of the concept of internationalisation, see Peter Dicken, 'Transnational Corporations and Nation-States', International Social Science Journal, 49: 151 (1997), pp. 77-89; and Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
44. The 'internationalisation' of capital generally refers to a more limited form of economic globalisation wherein national constraints still matter and nation-states still have a role to play. Jim Glassman, 'State Power beyond the "territorial trap": the internationalization of the state', Political Geography, 18 (1999), pp. 669-96. For further discussions of the concept of internationalisation, see Peter Dicken, 'Transnational Corporations and Nation-States', International Social Science Journal, 49: 151 (1997), pp. 77-89; and Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
45. The imperial system is of course hierarchical and the 'consensus' regarding developmental norms is more or less fixed by the countries in the top level of the hierarchy. Despite not having much say in the formation of the consensus, Third World elites are ideological recruits generally trained in the universities of the advanced capitalist countries or the IMF institute. For elaborations of the argument, see Robert Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10 (1981), pp. 126-55; and Production, Power and the World Order.
46. The imperial system is of course hierarchical and the 'consensus' regarding developmental norms is more or less fixed by the countries in the top level of the hierarchy. Despite not having much say in the formation of the consensus, Third World elites are ideological recruits generally trained in the universities of the advanced capitalist countries or the IMF institute. For elaborations of the argument, see Robert Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10 (1981), pp. 126-55; and Production, Power and the World Order.
47. James Petras and M.H. Morley, 'The US Imperial State', in J.F. Petras, (ed.), Class, State and Power in the Third World: With Case Studies on Class Conflict in Latin America (London: Zed, 1981), pp. 1-36.
48. Glassman, 'State Power Beyond the 'Territorial Trap', pp. 684-5.
49. John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 1995).
50. James Mittleman (ed.), Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1996).
51. Though admittedly, there is an acknowledgement that resistance to processes of internationalisation might be greater in the peripheral states because these measures are seen as being imposed by external forces.
52. A variant of the neorealist tradition that has been referred to as 'neoclassical realism' goes beyond structuralism to argue that state behaviour is driven by relative material capabilities which in turn are mediated by intervening unit-level variables such as elite perceptions. I do not engage with this literature in this article partly because, despite attempts to demarcate minor areas of difference, they (unlike the historical-materialists) belong to a tradition that has been the subject of strenuous critique by constructivist scholars. Furthermore, their discussions of the global economy (couched in the language of 'interests' and 'variables') are limited to the extent of highlighting relative material power. For a review of this literature see Gideon Rose, 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', World Politics, 51 (1998), pp. 144-72. I would like to thank Ron Krebs for bringing this article to my attention.
53. For an analysis that borrows heavily from the historical materialist tradition and reveals some of its limitations, see Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, 'Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization', Review of International Studies, 19 (1993), pp. 321-47.
54. Speech by President Bush in West Point, New York, 1 June 2002.
55. Introduction to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 September 2002.
56. India conducted a series of three tests on 11 May 1998 and followed it up with two more tests on 13 May.
57. See for instance, Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Har Anand, 1999); George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1999); Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); and Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
58. See for instance, Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Har Anand, 1999); George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1999); Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); and Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
59. See for instance, Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Har Anand, 1999); George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1999); Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); and Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
60. See for instance, Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Har Anand, 1999); George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1999); Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); and Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
61. Prabhu Chawla, Interview with Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee, India Today, 25 May 1998, p. 39.
62. Cited in Shiv Visvanathan, 'Welcome to the Patriot Games', Economic and Political Weekly, 23 May 1998, p. 1225.
63. I b i d.
64. These and other headlines (such as 'A moment of pride') are oft-cited in the numerous analyses (both, supportive and critical) of the Indian nuclear tests. See for instance, Arundhati Roy, 'The End of the Imagination', The Guardian, 11 August 1998; Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global Nuclear Disarmament (New York: Interlink Books, 2000), p. 44.
65. These and other headlines (such as 'A moment of pride') are oft-cited in the numerous analyses (both, supportive and critical) of the Indian nuclear tests. See for instance, Arundhati Roy, 'The End of the Imagination', The Guardian, 11 August 1998; Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global Nuclear Disarmament (New York: Interlink Books, 2000), p. 44.
66. While scholars differ on their exact understanding of what 'postcoloniality'/'the postcolonial condition' means, what holds this often diverse group together is a turning away from a treatment of the 'postcolonial' as a 'chronological condition'. Apart from Itty Abraham's analysis of India's nuclear programme, some examples of postcolonial scholarship in the discipline of International Relations include: Sankaran Krishna, 'The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory', Alternatives, 18 (1993), pp. 385-417; Phillip Darby and A.J. Paolini, 'Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism', Alternatives, 19 (1994), pp. 371-98; and Himadeep Muppidi, 'Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity: The Persistent Puzzle of US - Indian Relations', in Weldes, et al. (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity, pp. 119-46.
67. While scholars differ on their exact understanding of what 'postcoloniality'/'the postcolonial condition' means, what holds this often diverse group together is a turning away from a treatment of the 'postcolonial' as a 'chronological condition'. Apart from Itty Abraham's analysis of India's nuclear programme, some examples of postcolonial scholarship in the discipline of International Relations include: Sankaran Krishna, 'The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory', Alternatives, 18 (1993), pp. 385-417; Phillip Darby and A.J. Paolini, 'Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism', Alternatives, 19 (1994), pp. 371-98; and Himadeep Muppidi, 'Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity: The Persistent Puzzle of US - Indian Relations', in Weldes, et al. (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity, pp. 119-46.
68. While scholars differ on their exact understanding of what 'postcoloniality'/'the postcolonial condition' means, what holds this often diverse group together is a turning away from a treatment of the 'postcolonial' as a 'chronological condition'. Apart from Itty Abraham's analysis of India's nuclear programme, some examples of postcolonial scholarship in the discipline of International Relations include: Sankaran Krishna, 'The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory', Alternatives, 18 (1993), pp. 385-417; Phillip Darby and A.J. Paolini, 'Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism', Alternatives, 19 (1994), pp. 371-98; and Himadeep Muppidi, 'Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity: The Persistent Puzzle of US - Indian Relations', in Weldes, et al. (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity, pp. 119-46.
69. For variations of this argument, see Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed Books, 1998); Himadeep Muppidi, Competitive Economic Restructuring in the Global Economy: A Critical Constructivist Approach, Ph.D thesis, University of Minnesota, 1998; and Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
70. For variations of this argument, see Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed Books, 1998); Himadeep Muppidi, Competitive Economic Restructuring in the Global Economy: A Critical Constructivist Approach, Ph.D thesis, University of Minnesota, 1998; and Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
71. For variations of this argument, see Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed Books, 1998); Himadeep Muppidi, Competitive Economic Restructuring in the Global Economy: A Critical Constructivist Approach, Ph.D thesis, University of Minnesota, 1998; and Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
72. Suo Moto statement by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Parliament, 27 May 1998: http://www.india.gov
73. Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb.
74. The news of the tests was greeted with joyous celebrations and an over-90 per cent approval rating. The Leader of the Opposition, Congress President Sonia Gandhi echoed the Prime Minister by claiming the '[the] nuclear question is a national matter, not a partisan one. On this, every Indian stands united'. However, this was a gross simplification of the issue and completely tried to paper over the long history of anti-nuclear activism in India. The protests over the tests became more vocal with the passage of time and even found expression in later sessions of the Indian parliament.
75. Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb, p. 18.
76. Ibid., p. 19.
77. The most fervent advocate of 'becoming modern' in the Indian context was of course Jawaharlal Nehru, who later became independent India's first Prime Minister. An earlier exposition of these views can be seen in his elaborate engagement with Indian history. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: John Day, 1946).
78. Cited in Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb, p. 49.
79. See Prakash, Another Reason, p. 3.
80. In a speech to the Indian parliament, Nehru declared: 'A new weapon of unprecedented power both in volume and intensity,...is being tested, unleashing its massive power as a weapon of war...I have stated publicly as our view that these experiments...should cease'. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1956-April 1961, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India (1961), p. 191.
81. The main elements of the Standstill Agreement are spelled out by Aabha Dixit, in her essay, 'Status Quo: Maintaining Nuclear Ambiguity', in David Cortwright and Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p. 55.
82. For a more detailed description of the non-aligned proposal see, William Epstein, 'Give More to Get More', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 50 (1994).
83. Admittedly there was a commitment among the signatories 'to work towards universal nuclear disarmament' (Art. VI), but this was couched in sufficiently general terms as to render it a formal concession of dubious value.
84. Raja Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage (Delhi: Viking, 1991), p. 89.
85. The main focus of this article is of course the 1998 tests. But, it should be kept in mind that the PNE was conducted a short period after the famine and drought-like situation of the late 1960s when India had to approach the United States for surplus stocks of wheat to help with the situation. Even as India struggled to come to terms with aftermath of the famine, it got embroiled in a war with Pakistan (1971). Despite the brief spurt of popularity following the victory in Bangladesh, Mrs. Gandhi's government also had to deal with the effects of the immense refugee flows (apart from the cost of the war itself) on the Indian economy. Even though the early 1970s did see a series of good harvest production and improved public sector performance, between January 1973 and January 1974, inflation went up by 20 per cent. See Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984), and A.K. Roy, 'Pokhran Tests and Emergency', Economic and Political Weekly, 27 June 1998, pp. 1610-11.
86. The main focus of this article is of course the 1998 tests. But, it should be kept in mind that the PNE was conducted a short period after the famine and drought-like situation of the late 1960s when India had to approach the United States for surplus stocks of wheat to help with the situation. Even as India struggled to come to terms with aftermath of the famine, it got embroiled in a war with Pakistan (1971). Despite the brief spurt of popularity following the victory in Bangladesh, Mrs. Gandhi's government also had to deal with the effects of the immense refugee flows (apart from the cost of the war itself) on the Indian economy. Even though the early 1970s did see a series of good harvest production and improved public sector performance, between January 1973 and January 1974, inflation went up by 20 per cent. See Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984), and A.K. Roy, 'Pokhran Tests and Emergency', Economic and Political Weekly, 27 June 1998, pp. 1610-11.
87. Abraham, Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb, p.165.
88. In a remarkable analysis, Partha Chatterjee charts the manner in which the project of nationalism of imagining India - was formulated, contested, and reformulated over a period of more than five decades. Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
89. Muppidi, Competitive Economic Restructuring.
90. For arguably the most compelling exposition of this view, see R.C. Dutt, The Economic History of India, 2nd edn., vols. I & II (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co.), 1906. See also, Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 302.
91. For arguably the most compelling exposition of this view, see R.C. Dutt, The Economic History of India, 2nd edn., vols. I & II (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co.), 1906. See also, Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 302.
92. Muppidi, Competitive Economic Restructuring, p. 145.
93. Here, I emphasise a very small part of Muppidi's elaborate analysis of 'postcoloniality'. He frames Indian postcoloniality as '[neither] a revolution, nor a total break from the colonizer, but a carefully mediated separation that would erase an economically exploitative relationship without erasing the 'benefits' of modernity that it had brought'. This framing shows how the relationship to 'modernity' can still be understood as an important aspect of the 'postcolonial identity-logic' while not losing sight of economic relations. Ibid, p. 153.
94. The opening line of the Preamble declares that India is a 'sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic'.
95. Even prior to independence, the most important sections of the Indian capitalist class embraced the idea that state planning was necessary to mobilise the resources of the Indian nation and protect them from Western capital. For an illustration of this, see Nehru's discussion of the 1938 National Planning Committee, in The Discovery of India, pp. 395-402.
96. See 'Discussion re Reported Investment in Indian Industries and Take-over Bids of Indian Companies by Certain Non-Resident Indians', Lok Sabha Debates, 24 August 1983.
97. For more detailed accounts of the Prime Minister's speeches, see P. V. Narasimha Rao: Selected Speeches (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1995).
98. Ironically, one of the first MNCs to re-enter India after the liberalisation was Coca-Cola - the soft drinks giant that had been forced to leave in undignified haste nearly a quarter-century back.
99. The General Budget, 1991-92, Lok Sabha Debates, 24 July 1991.
100. I b i d.
101. As Muppidi and other scholars have pointed out, the relationship of various political parties to the economic liberalisation programme is more complicated than that, with several parties such as the Communist Party of India (Marxist) which initially opposed the programme on ideological grounds, actually adopting it later.
102. Bhogendra Jha, Lok Sabha Debates, 14 September 1991.
103. Manmohan Singh, the Finance Minister who steered the liberalisation programme, was a high-ranking official at the IMF. This was also true of several top-level bureaucrats associated with the Rao regime, giving credence to Robert Cox's notion of 'socialisation' of Third World elite.
104. Nirmal Chatterjee, Lok Sabha Debates, 30 July 1991.
105. Muppidi's analysis of economic restructuring provides a more elaborate exposition of a similar argument. See especially, chs. 4 and 5. Muppidi, Competitive Economic Restructuring, pp. 100-176.
106. The entire debate on the question of economic liberalisation in the Indian parliament was peppered with references to Indians becoming 'beggars', going with a begging bowl to the IMF, and needing to accept the conditionalities since beggars could not afford to be choosers. See for instance, Discussions on the General Budget, Lok Sabha Debates, 30-31 July 1991.
107. See for instance, Bidwai and Vanaik, New Nukes; Sumit Sarkar, 'The BJP Bomb and Aspects of Nationalism', Economic and Political Weekly, 14 July 1998, p. 1725; for an analysis of the connections between the language of 'nuclear apartheid' (used by the Indian government in the international arena) and the exclusionary practices of the hindutva ideology, see Shampa Biswas, '"Nuclear Apartheid" as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource?', Alternatives, 26 (2001), pp. 485-522.
108. See for instance, Bidwai and Vanaik, New Nukes; Sumit Sarkar, 'The BJP Bomb and Aspects of Nationalism', Economic and Political Weekly, 14 July 1998, p. 1725; for an analysis of the connections between the language of 'nuclear apartheid' (used by the Indian government in the international arena) and the exclusionary practices of the hindutva ideology, see Shampa Biswas, '"Nuclear Apartheid" as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource?', Alternatives, 26 (2001), pp. 485-522.
109. See for instance, Bidwai and Vanaik, New Nukes; Sumit Sarkar, 'The BJP Bomb and Aspects of Nationalism', Economic and Political Weekly, 14 July 1998, p. 1725; for an analysis of the connections between the language of 'nuclear apartheid' (used by the Indian government in the international arena) and the exclusionary practices of the hindutva ideology, see Shampa Biswas, '"Nuclear Apartheid" as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource?', Alternatives, 26 (2001), pp. 485-522.
110. In late 1995, the CIA detected signs of activity near the Pokhran range and alerted the Clinton administration to the possibility of an Indian nuclear test. The Clinton administration responded by immediately mounting diplomatic pressure on India and spelling out in detail the implications that a nuclear test would have for the Indian economy. World News, CNN interactive, 12 May 1998.
111. Less than a month before conducting the nuclear tests, Yashwant Sinha, the Indian Finance Minister articulated his government's understanding of swadeshi in a speech that was an exercise in rhetorical and ideological contortions at the Harvard Club: 'Swadeshi is pro-globalization because it is pro-Indian without being anti-foreign. And that is the important message from India: you can be pro your own country without being anti any other country. Therefore, swadeshi is the best means of globalization.' Quoted in Narayan Keshaven, 'Swadeshi goes global', Outlook, 27 April 1998, p. 45 (my own emphasis).
112. Press Release, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, New Delhi, 11 May 1998.
113. Within the US, anger at the Indian tests was almost overshadowed by the shock of the CIA having no prior knowledge of the Indian state's intentions. The quote by Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-Indiana) is from a larger story on the failure of the US intelligence community. 'CIA caught off guard on India nuclear test: Hearings, Inquiry planned', World News, CNN interactive, 12 May 1998: http://www.cnn.com
114. Though generally mentioned in the context of the hindutva ideology, the hypermasculinity of the 'performance' did not go unnoticed by analysts like Madhu Kishwar. This analysis, I contend, can be extended beyond the BJP's ideology to argue that the 'opening up' of the economy was seen as a kind of emasculation that needed to be overcome by an exhibition of 'national potency', and what could be more potent than a nuclear bomb? Madhu Kishwar, 'BJP's Wargasm', Manushi, no. 106, 1998.
115. In one of his early speeches to the Constituent Assembly, Nehru claimed that unlike 'smaller countries', India could not be forced into alliances with 'Great Powers', for '[After] all in the past, as a national movement, we opposed one of the greatest world powers. We opposed it in a particular way and in a large measure succeeded that way...' Nehru, Selected Speeches, p. 32.
116. Suo Moto statement by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Parliament 27 May 1998: http://www.india.gov
117. The Economist, 23 May 1998, vol. 347, no. 8069, p. 37.
118. '...the farmer, who raised the prestige of the country and saved it from becoming a beggar will be greatly disappointed. I remember once the country had to face severe famine during Pandit Nehru's time...A poster had been displayed on the wall of a church in Italy in which our hungry children with begging bowls were shown asking for alms. When this fact was brought to the notice of Panditji, the next day he made a statement that our children may die of starvation, but we cannot tolerate the insult to our country,' - C.J. Yadav; 'The country has to go to the IMF for a loan, surrendering our sovereignty, selling our soul', - V. Gowda, Lok Sabha Debates, 30-31 July 1991.
119. '...the farmer, who raised the prestige of the country and saved it from becoming a beggar will be greatly disappointed. I remember once the country had to face severe famine during Pandit Nehru's time...A poster had been displayed on the wall of a church in Italy in which our hungry children with begging bowls were shown asking for alms. When this fact was brought to the notice of Panditji, the next day he made a statement that our children may die of starvation, but we cannot tolerate the insult to our country,' - C.J. Yadav; 'The country has to go to the IMF for a loan, surrendering our sovereignty, selling our soul', - V. Gowda, Lok Sabha Debates, 30-31 July 1991.
120. The Economist, 16 May 1998, vol. 347, no. 8068, p. 38.
121. 'Nobody can question our right to go ahead with this type of testing if we want to...But, if some countries here and there talk in a way as if they are questioning our right, they have no business to do that.' Indrajit Gupta (CPM); 'The hands of the five nuclear weapons states are not clean. They have no business to pass judgment on us and no business to impose sanctions on us. If they do so, we will be with you to tighten our belts and march along with you to oppose those sanctions.' Natwar Singh (Congress-I), Lok Sabha Debates, 27 May 1998.
122. Natwar Singh, Ibid.
123. BM, 'BJP's search for short-cuts to political consolidation', Economic and Political Weekly, 30 May 1998, p. 1299.
124. Visvanathan, 'Welcome to the Patriot Games', p.1226.
125. Laffey, Adding an Asian Strand, p. 236.