Nonaudit services and shareholder ratification of auditors

Auditing

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 155-163

  Raghunandan, K ^a  

^a TEXAS A M INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142618479     PISSN: 02780380     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/aud.2003.22.1.155     Document Type: Article

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